12.14.09
Posted in Aeronautical, Broadband, Financials, Inmarsat, Operators, Services at 5:24 pm by timfarrar
Since we last wrote on the topic in September, skepticism about the future of in-flight Internet services has become even more widespread, and recently disclosed usage data from Aircell has not been particularly impressive – roughly 100K sessions per week (of which only a fraction are paid for), equating to about a 5% take rate on equipped aircraft.
The good news is that Aircell is now touting the “operational applications” of in-flight Internet: the obvious corollary being that it is going to try and extract some money from airlines to pay for these benefits, as we suggested it would have to back in September.
The bad news is that the business case for Row44′s Ku-band service looks even more questionable than we had suspected, and it faces a near term deadline (we understand January 2010) from Southwest to secure $100M+ of funding for its planned fleetwide rollout. We have been told that the Southwest-Row44 agreement calls for Southwest to pay Row44 a fee of $0.25 per passenger flown on each equipped aircraft, whether or not they use the service, and Southwest will then mostly likely give the connectivity away for free. With Southwest carrying about 170K passengers per plane per year, that would mean Row44 receiving just over $40K per plane per year (about $22M per year in total once fleetwide installation is complete), which it hopes to supplement with advertising revenue. However, we are doubtful that a dramatic increase could be realized from advertising: for example according to a recent article, in-flight magazines generate an average of about $1M per airline per year in gross advertising revenue, and a large airline such as Southwest would presumably therefore generate in the high single digit millions of dollars from its magazine. Given the lack of technology (and power outlets) required to read the magazine, then even if Southwest gives away the Row44 service for free, usage would be far less than the 80% of passengers that read the in-flight magazine, and we would view it as unlikely that advertising revenue could add more than a few million dollars to Row44′s income.
More to the point, a free service will put an unsustainably costly load on the Row44 network: we believe this was originally designed with an expectation of loading 100 planes onto each transponder (which can provide 18Mbps of capacity), but if 25% of passengers used the network for streaming video, and other high bandwidth applications (remember that these were the primary selling point of Row44′s solution compared to Aircell), then it is quite possible that 1 transponder would be needed for every 20-30 planes. With each transponder costing about $1.25M, Row44 could find itself coming close to spending all of the revenue from Southwest on bandwidth and never making any margin to even begin to pay for the $100M+ of equipment that it would have installed.
In this context, it is far from clear that a sustainable business model is available for large scale Ku-band passenger communications deployments (although a limited Panasonic service on Lufthansa could be viable, assuming Panasonic has some form of revenue sharing agreement with Intelsat and initial installations rely on the old Connexion antennas). Certainly it appears that Viasat, which was the primary equipment supplier to Connexion-by-Boeing (and was rumored to be in pole position to secure a deal with Lufthansa, prior to its recent shift to Panasonic) is emphasizing the lower cost of Ka-band capacity over a Ku-band only model for mobility services. Intriguingly, even Inmarsat may agree that Ka-band is the future: we understand that it has recently issued an RFI for one or more Ka-band satellites, which are likely to be part of its planned roadmap for future government and/or aero services (e.g. UAVs).
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12.07.09
Posted in ICO/DBSD, LightSquared, Operators, Regulatory, Services, Spectrum, TerreStar at 10:41 am by timfarrar
On Friday Dec 4 we attended an FCC discussion of the National Broadband Plan here in Menlo Park, at which Carlos Kirjner and Blair Levin presented on various issues being addressed in development of the National Broadband Plan. The most interesting part of the presentation was the assertion that “at least 150MHz” of TV spectrum could be freed up by relocating over the air TV broadcasters to a smaller portion of the UHF band “while keeping all major channels on the air”.
Its been widely discussed how the broadcasters might be incentivized to move, perhaps by offering them a share of the future auction proceeds, so at the end of the presentation I asked if a similar arrangement would be available for other spectrum bands, such as MSS. Blair Levin confirmed that other bands, including MSS-ATC spectrum, were also under review and that historic band allocations may no longer be optimal to meet future wireless spectrum demand. As part of the FCC’s review of Harbinger’s proposed purchase of SkyTerra, the FCC has also asked some very detailed questions about SkyTerra’s progress towards an ATC deal, and the discussions that they have had with different parties.
Will the National Broadband Plan provide an alternative way for MSS operators such as SkyTerra, ICO/DBSD and TerreStar to monetize their spectrum, as it does not look like any of these operators are going to move forward with ATC deployment in the near future? Globalstar’s ATC lease agreement with Open Range is seeing more progress, but is limited to a few million rural consumers (and the Open Range terrestrial rollout is being supported by USDA loan guarantees).
Certainly in the 2GHz band (unlike the L-band) there are no existing satellite services which would prevent operators returning their spectrum to the FCC for re-auction. The National Broadband Plan is due to be published in February 2010, so we will soon see whether the FCC is going to come up with a plan to make sure that MSS spectrum is put to use in terrestrial networks in a more timely manner.
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11.16.09
Posted in Globalstar, Inmarsat, Iridium, LDR, LightSquared, Operators, Orbcomm, Services at 12:37 pm by timfarrar
Inmarsat revealed in its 2009Q3 results that it is in negotiations to acquire a satellite services provider that generated more than $50 million in revenue in 2008, is currently profitable and will have no material indebtedness at closing, in a purchase that would cost less than $150M. There are very few companies in the MSS space that fit the profile given by Inmarsat, but one that does is SkyBitz, which Inmarsat noted in its June 2009 investor day presentation was one of the “key competitors” in the satellite Low Data Rate (LDR) market. Inmarsat also noted that one of its objectives in investing in SkyWave was to “stimulate consolidation in the [satellite LDR] market”.
Indeed, back in July we speculated that a possible resolution to the fight between Inmarsat and SkyBitz over what SkyBitz characterized as “restrictive trade covenants included by Inmarsat” in its SkyWave investment would be for Inmarsat to facilitate a buyout of SkyBitz. An Inmarsat acquisition of SkyBitz would have the added benefit (for Inmarsat) of taking out another of SkyTerra’s key LDR customers, in addition to the 50K GlobalWave customers who were moved from SkyTerra’s satellites to Inmarsat’s I4 satellite network in October 2009.
***We’ve now been reliably informed that Inmarsat’s current acquisition target isn’t SkyBitz. We understand it is most likely a system integrator focused on government business. We don’t have a name at this point, but one company in this area that would fit the disclosed parameters is Segovia. There are likely several other similar possibilities as well.***
We’ve lamented previously that no-one ever seems to leave the MSS industry, but if Inmarsat does eventually follow through on its stated ambitions to stimulate consolidation in the LDR market, then perhaps that sector could be one place where much needed MSS industry consolidation finally begins.
In that context, with Orbcomm having yet another disappointing quarter, we wonder if now is the time for a competitor to make a bid for Orbcomm. After all, the company expects to settle the $50M insurance claim for the failure of all of its QuickLaunch satellites “imminently”, at which point Orbcomm will not have spent too much on its second generation constellation and will still have a reasonable amount of cash on its balance sheet. That might be particularly attractive to Globalstar or Iridium, either of which would benefit greatly from moving Orbcomm’s subscribers over to their own networks (albeit with significant costs for terminal upgrades), and could allay investor concerns about whether Orbcomm can fund the rest of its second generation satellite constellation (which would be exacerbated if the company fails to receive something close to $50M from its insurance claim in the near future). With its partners postponing some new service offerings until messaging delays are resolved, Orbcomm will need these new satellites sooner rather than later if it to build a sustainable business and generate the rapid growth that has been promised ever since the company’s IPO in 2006, but to date has failed to materialize.
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11.13.09
Posted in Globalstar, Iridium, Operators at 9:56 am by timfarrar
It seems a lot of noise is being made about the potential impact of Globalstar filing the license application for its second generation constellation with the French regulatory agency ANFR instead of the FCC. Indeed this was even raised as a concern on Iridium’s 3Q2009 results call yesterday. In our view this is basically a storm in a teacup: both Iridium and Globalstar are licensed to use particular parts of the Big LEO L-band frequency allocation (1610-1626.5MHz), and in the US the FCC decided (in Nov 2007) to share this spectrum equally between the two companies (Globalstar has the bottom 7.775MHz, Iridium the top 7.775MHz and the middle 0.95MHz is shared). However, in certain other countries (e.g. Russia), some of this band is reserved for Radioastronomy and Microwave Landing Systems and so Globalstar is unable to use much (in some cases any) of the lower 8MHz of the band. Thus Globalstar wants to keep operating up to 1621.35MHz as it was allowed to in the US before the FCC’s November 2007 ruling.
In theory, the FCC’s November 2007 ruling applied to the global operations of both systems, although in reality, Iridium would still need to seek a license from individual country regulators to operate below its originally authorized 1621.35-1626.5MHz frequency band, which may or may not have been granted. Iridium still has the opportunity to make this argument, even when Globalstar is licensed by ANFR, but it will not be able to seek sanctions against Globalstar by the FCC if it is unsuccessful and Globalstar remains authorized to operate some of its gateways up to 1621.35MHz. Instead, the licensing of the two systems will depend on the decisions of individual regulators.
Some observers have seen this as a potential problem for Iridium, but that’s not really the case. Iridium will certainly need to build the capability into its next generation system to adjust frequency allocations on a country by country basis, but that’s far from an insurmountable (software) challenge. The places where Iridium will need additional frequencies for broadband and/or voice services include the oceans (for evolutions of OpenPort), where there is unlikely to be an issue as there is relatively little Globalstar coverage, and a few key countries (e.g. Afghanistan) where support from the DoD may count in Iridium’s favor in securing additional spectrum. Thus we believe Iridium is unlikely to face any meaningful incremental capacity constraints as a result of this decision. Globalstar will benefit by avoiding potential regulatory sanctions that Iridium might have pushed the FCC to impose, but there are much bigger issues for both companies: in particular, whether sufficient growth potential remains in the handheld MSS market for all of the MSS operators to be successful.
On another topic, we’ve just released the latest report in our MSS information service, with extensive discussion of the outlook for ATC, the growth prospects for in-flight connectivity and the competition between Inmarsat and maritime VSAT. In the last few months we’ve also produced detailed profiles of Iridium and Thuraya, and will be releasing profiles and forecasts for Inmarsat and TerreStar in the near future. Subscribers to the research service include the majority of leading MSS operators, distributors, equipment suppliers and satellite manufacturers, as well as a number of investors in the MSS sector. As one MSS operator recently told us: “your reports are the only ones on the MSS sector that actually provide valuable insight for someone working in the industry”. According to another provider: “I base my business targets on your forecasts; they are the only projections that you can rely on to be realistic”.
If you are interested in finding out more about our research, then contact us for more details.
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10.16.09
Posted in Globalstar, Handheld, Iridium, Services, TerreStar at 12:07 pm by timfarrar
At the SATCON conference in New York this week, TerreStar was showing its Elektrobit Genus phone. The company had conducted live demos of calls over the satellite at the IACP conference in Denver the previous week (with reportedly very good results in terms of call quality), but unfortunately a similar opportunity wasn’t available in New York. Nevertheless a few interesting facts emerged about the phone.
Firstly you have to switch manually into satellite mode (via a menu selection) in order to use either voice or data over the satellite. This was not necessary from a technical perspective (the phone could have roamed automatically since the satellite is basically treated like an international GSM network), but was insisted on by AT&T so that users know they will incur roaming charges, and that they will not be able to get the same quality of service that they would expect from a terrestrial network (i.e. they will have to stand outside, and not be inside a building or a car).
Secondly, as shown in the picture below, there is an external antenna port, enabling a cradle-type device with an external antenna to be connected, so that adequate link margin is available in Northern Canada and Alaska. The external antenna is a quad helix antenna about 0.3 inches in diameter (about the size of the Thuraya antenna) and 3 inches in length which swings up from the back of the cradle in the same manner as the rotating antenna on the old Iridium 9505 phone. These cradles will be sold separately (pricing is unclear but we’d guess in the $100-$200 range) and will increase the handset volume by about 60%.
In the lower 48 states and southern Canada (i.e. below the red line in the map above) the Genus phone uses an internal patch antenna located at the right upper corner of the phone in the picture above. It will be particularly interesting to see how sensitive the call quality is to the orientation of the phone when it is being used in practice – users are instructed to hold the phone so that their fingers do not obstruct the link (per the sticker on the back of the phone), but if you are moving around, then inevitably your head will come between the phone and the satellite some of the time. TerreStar’s very large (i.e. very sensitive) satellite antenna will certainly help to close the link, but given how many arguments there have been on conference panels we’ve chaired in the past between proponents of getting the antenna clear of the head (i.e. Globalstar, Inmarsat and Iridium) and those who don’t believe an external antenna is needed (i.e. TerreStar and SkyTerra), this will be one of the first things to examine when the phones become available for testing.
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09.30.09
Posted in Financials, Handheld, Operators, Spectrum, TerreStar at 4:38 pm by timfarrar
TerreStar and AT&T have now announced that AT&T will distribute TerreStar’s Genus (Elektrobit) phone to “government, first responders, public safety, energy, utility, transportation and maritime users” and given additional details of the expected pricing for this satellite-cellular roaming service. The phone will cost $800 to $900 (subsidies were not mentioned, which is perhaps not too surprising given that the service is not being targeted at consumers initially), and then in addition to a standard voice plan, subscribers will need to pay $24.99/month for satellite access and an additional usage fee for satellite roaming (in the United States) of $0.65/minute for voice and $5/Mbyte for data.
TerreStar and AT&T are basically targeting the existing handheld MSS market, but expect that the phone will be deployed more widely, because it will become an “everyday” phone for end users, rather than being a shared phone which is kept in a cupboard for emergencies. In our view, the size of the potential addressable market is probably not too far off that for Land Mobile Radio, where we estimate there are around 2.5M to 3M handsets in use in the US today, with about half in public safety and the rest in other government and private sector market segments (parks, utilities, railroads, energy, etc.). Of course only a fraction of those users also carry a employer-provided cellphone, and at this point in time, TerreStar’s solution is more likely to be a replacement for that device rather than for an LMR radio itself. So let’s assume AT&T and TerreStar are targeting a potential market of say 1M people. For comparison, today there are about 170K MSS phones in use in the US and Canada (including many Globalstar phones with limited two-way service at present), of which probably just under 100K are in the lower 48 states (and remember that the TerreStar phone is unlikely to work as reliably as Iridium or Globalstar in Alaska or Northern Canada).
In that context, TerreStar would be doing amazingly well if it could gain 50K subscribers by the end of 2010 and 100K-150K subscribers by the end of 2011 (when SkyTerra also expects to be offering next generation services, and Globalstar will be back in full two-way service). Remember also that in 1999-2000, despite massive advertising (at least in Iridium’s case), Iridium and Globalstar only managed to gain a few tens of thousands of users on a global basis in their first year of commercial service. TerreStar will probably share the end user revenue about 50/50 with AT&T (Iridium and Inmarsat expect to get about 70% of retail revenue but AT&T would likely want a bigger incentive to promote the service) and monthly retail ARPUs (including the satellite access fee but excluding any terrestrial voice plan) might be expected to be between $40 and $50. So let’s assume TerreStar receives $25 per user per month. If there are (in the most optimistic scenario) an average of 20K subs in 2010 (assuming deployment ramps up towards the end of the year) and 100K subs in 2011, then that would generate service revenues for TerreStar of $6M in 2010 and $30M in 2011. There would presumably be additional equipment revenues (although we doubt TerreStar is looking to make a profit on equipment sales) and perhaps revenue from some other services like M2M data (once chipsets are available, which means only a limited amount of revenue could be produced even in 2011).
However, its pretty clear that TerreStar is going to need to raise additional funds to cover its operating costs in the near future, since its cash burn rate even before going into full commercial service is about $25M per quarter, and excluding the money purchase agreement for the second satellite (not part of this $25M cash burn), TerreStar had $110M of cash at the end of June 2009. Thus regardless of what happens to the $430M of preferred shares (which must be redeemed or converted next April), TerreStar will need to raise more money by mid 2010. From mid 2011, TerreStar will also need to begin paying cash interest on its debt, at an annual rate of more than $150M per year in 2012.
Given the relatively limited opportunity in professional markets (at best a few hundred thousand subscribers for TerreStar, once the overall market is shared with SkyTerra and other MSS operators), TerreStar will eventually need to either achieve considerable success in consumer markets (requiring a dramatically different price point for both equipment and airtime) or find a strategic partner interested in buying or leasing the company’s 20MHz of spectrum for a terrestrial ATC deployment (which doesn’t look likely in the near term, not least because TerreStar doesn’t even have an ATC license as yet). In this context, its probably most appropriate to look at TerreStar’s initial service offering as a proof-of-concept (and a means to justify further funding) for one of these two longer term possibilities, rather than as the means to generate an immediate financial return on its own. We’ll see over the next 12 months whether TerreStar is able to provide the proof that both the financial markets and potential strategic partners will be looking for.
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09.14.09
Posted in Aeronautical, Financials, Inmarsat, Operators, Services at 12:26 pm by timfarrar
It seems that people are now coming round to the view, which we’ve expressed since 2006, that there won’t be enough paying users of in-flight broadband for both network providers and airlines to make a profit on the costs of deploying equipment and running a network (as Boeing found out after spending somewhere between $1B and $2B on Connexion). Our view was that only airlines who are interested in offering a differentiated service would be able to justify the costs involved. However, to date the leading service providers (Aircell and Row44) have apparently not only been installing the equipment for free, but have also been offering a cut of revenues to the airline. Its no wonder that this “no lose” proposition has led to fleetwide installation commitments from most of the major US airlines. In comparison, installations of Inmarsat equipment for in-flight cellular services on aircraft in other parts of the world have slowed dramatically over the last 18 months, as most airlines no longer have the money to pay for fleetwide upgrades (with the possible exception of Ryanair, which we suspect may have a similarly attractive deal from OnAir).
Lost in the noise of Southwest’s commitment to install Row44 service across its entire fleet of 540 aircraft was the footnote that there isn’t “a solid timeframe for [installation]” because “certain specific details concerning the cost and financing of equipage are still being worked out”. From what we’ve heard, Row44 needs to raise a lot more money very soon in order to move forward with full-scale deployment (pretty obviously, since fitting equipment on 500 planes at $250K+ each would cost $125M), and presumably Southwest’s announcement was timed to help them secure that funding. However, with Southwest also demanding “control [over] the price point that our customer sees”, it seems a pretty unpalatable deal for potential investors if Row44 must front the installation costs and pay for the network and then let Southwest set the pricing to maximize its own return (probably more dictated by customer loyalty) rather than Row44′s revenues. Similarly unreasonable expectations appear to have been the reason why the oft-mentioned return of Connexion service on Lufthansa (who refused to provide any revenue guarantee to the network provider but wanted to make the provider liable for any future equipment deinstallations) has not happened to date.
What is the solution to achieving a sustainable business model for in-flight broadband? Whether it lies in airlines providing connectivity for free as a differentiator for their customers, or airlines using the link to the aircraft as a means to reduce their own operating costs, what we’re ultimately going to have to see is a change in the direction that the money flows. Instead of airlines getting the equipment for free and receiving a share of the service revenues, the airline is going to have to pay for the equipment and maybe in some cases even offer a revenue guarantee to the network provider (particularly on long-haul international routes where the cost of providing Ku-band coverage is much greater).
How palatable will in-flight connectivity be then to airlines that are currently losing hundreds of millions of dollars a year? At the very least we’d expect them to be a lot more discriminating in deciding whether to provide connectivity or not (who needs it on a one hour shuttle flight?). Perhaps its only if one of the providers goes bust that we’ll see a return to rationality in pricing (of course, it would be very unlikely for the service itself to disappear completely as Connexion did, because the costs of operating either Aircell or Row44′s networks domestically aren’t that high). Until that point is reached, expect airlines to continue to scramble to get something for nothing with their in-flight connectivity installations. In the meantime we’ll be watching carefully to see if the discussions over “cost and financing of equipage” between Southwest and Row44 get resolved and if investors are willing to put more money into in-flight connectivity providers.
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09.09.09
Posted in Globalstar, Handheld, Inmarsat, Iridium, Operators, Services, TerreStar, Thuraya at 12:43 pm by timfarrar
Unfortunately its not new services, but the prices of current and future satellite phones and airtime that seem to be headed upwards. The last year has seen Iridium introduce its new, improved 9555 handset at a higher price than the 9505A that it replaced, with phones now selling for about $1500, while Thuraya has “simplified” (i.e. increased) its airtime pricing and introduced the more expensive ruggedized XT phone. Inmarsat admitted in June that its new GSPS handset may sell for up to $750 at launch in 2010, compared to the $500 retail price point it suggested previously. Even TerreStar has now indicated that its new handset may cost up to $800, with airtime pricing at “less than $1 per minute”.
We’ve commented before on how satellite phone revenues have been falling since 2005, and competition has certainly diminished as Globalstar has experienced problems with its two-way services over the last couple of years. However, it seems the consensus amongst current participants in the handheld MSS market is that there is little if any growth potential still left in satellite phones, and the actions of Iridium and Thuraya appear to indicate that their remaining customers are relatively price insensitive.
Even more surprising is that so far, at least, the new entrants do not seem to be particularly keen on shaking up the existing “premium price” paradigm for satellite phones. In the case of TerreStar this is rather worrying, given that their objective is to greatly expand the satellite phone market, and bring satellite-cellular roaming to a mass market, which seems very unlikely to happen with an $800 phone. Is TerreStar simply trying not to give too much away about its future pricing plans, while it focuses on developing all the other elements needed for a commercial service, such as distribution channels, billing systems, etc.? Will TerreStar actually be able to convince a cellular operator to subsidize its phone (which would require a significantly greater commitment from a partner than its current roaming agreement with AT&T)? We should find out soon, as TerreStar intends to launch commercial services at the end of 2009.
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07.20.09
Posted in Financials, ICO/DBSD, Operators, Spectrum, TerreStar at 3:20 pm by timfarrar
On July 9, DISH Network filed a letter in the ICO North America (DBSD) bankruptcy case, indicating that it had purchased all of the $43.7M of first lien secured debt from the pre-petition lenders.
The first lien lenders had been objecting to ICO’s proposed restructuring which their financial advisers (Chanin Capital Partners) characterized as “a ‘plan’ that is doomed to fail, due to lack of financing, overwhelming debt and inability to move the company from the developmental (non-revenue producing) stage into an operating, revenue producing one”, while DISH Network stated in its letter that it “adopts those objections in their entirety and is prepared to prosecute the objections…”
According to Chanin, ICO/DBSD’s plan “seeks to put the Debtors in a holding pattern in the hope that the capital markets will become more accessible in the future. During this time the Debtors have no intention of furthering their business”.
However, with Echostar already holding a significant stake in TerreStar, ICO’s 2GHz rival, which just launched its own satellite earlier this month, could this development provide renewed impetus to the long rumored merger of the two companies and provide an alternative way forward for the development of MSS and ATC services in the 2GHz band?
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07.03.09
Posted in Inmarsat, LDR, LightSquared, Operators, Regulatory, Services at 9:12 am by timfarrar
In April 2009, Inmarsat announced that it would be taking a 19% stake in SkyWave, facilitating SkyWave’s acquisition of Transcore’s satellite communications assets. However, SkyBitz, Wireless Matrix, XATA and Comtech Mobile Datacom [the Commenters] jointly objected to SkyWave’s FCC application for the transfer of these assets, citing “numerous and substantial negative impacts on MSS Providers and other end-users using L-band capacity”. Although the submission is heavily redacted, it appears that one of their primary concerns relates to the “restrictive trade covenants included by Inmarsat” in the Transaction and they demand an explanation of how Inmarsat “will ensure non-discriminatory treatment of all MSS Providers and other end-users with respect to capacity, availability and contractual terms and conditions”. The Commenters “believe in fact that the Transaction will (i) actually eliminate competition for end-users (as a result of the Covenant), (ii) delay deployment of advanced satellite services to end-users other than SkyWave’s customers, (iii) result in higher pricing to end-users at the expense of higher margins for SkyWave and Inmarsat, and (iv) ultimately reduce the affordability of MSS services for end-users.”
While it remains unclear exactly what is contained in the “Covenant” referred to in these comments, Inmarsat noted at its recent investor conference that one of its motivations for investing in SkyWave was to promote consolidation in the Low Data Rate (LDR) industry, and that more than half of the investment comes in the form of future airtime credits. The Transaction also “provides for a fully funded development programme for new products and services” and will drive “traffic growth on Inmarsat satellite network”, we assume at least partly as a result of SkyWave and Transcore committing to use Inmarsat’s capacity exclusively (Transcore currently uses SkyTerra’s L-band capacity in North America). The airtime credits and development program certainly give SkyWave an advantage over other providers using leased L-band capacity, and this financial and commercial advantage is presumably what would induce the “consolidation” that Inmarsat seeks.
What is particularly interesting is that on June 29, SkyWave withdrew its FCC application to undertake the Transaction and on June 23, Inmarsat (in conjunction with other MSS operators) sought an extension of time until July 14 to respond to the FCC’s consultation proceeding for its Third Annual Report to Congress on Status of Competition in the Provision of Satellite Services in which the only meaningful concern was also expressed by SkyBitz.
With SkyBitz (which currently uses leased SkyTerra capacity) cited by Inmarsat as one of the “key competitors” in the LDR market (and the only plausible one that could switch to Inmarsat capacity, since the other key competitors listed, namely Iridium, Qualcomm and Orbcomm, all use incompatible technologies), it will be very interesting to see what happens over the next few weeks: will Inmarsat restructure (or even abandon) the SkyWave Transaction to eliminate the “restrictive trade covenants” that SkyBitz is concerned about (presumably making it more difficult to promote the consolidation Inmarsat seeks), or will Inmarsat actually facilitate a deal between SkyBitz and SkyWave to fulfill its market consolidation objective and eliminate the most prominent source of objections?
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