09.20.10
Posted in Globalstar, Handheld, Inmarsat, Iridium, Operators, Services at 8:46 am by timfarrar
One of the most interesting questions about Inmarsat’s new ISatPhone Pro is how well it will work at low elevation angles, including for example whether the phone antenna needs to be pointed towards the satellite. This is going to be particularly relevant in Alaska, much of which lies very close to the nominal edge of coverage, and well outside the 20 degree elevation angle contour (where Inmarsat suggests that “more user cooperation is required”), as shown below.
However, I’ve been told by Inmarsat that the phone is performing better than expected, even at relatively low elevation angles, so it will be interesting to see what this means in practice. Given that the beams used for registering the phone on the Inmarsat satellite are lower power than the beams used for a call, it appears probable that either the phone will register successfully and then calls can be made OK, or the phone won’t register and then no calls can be made at all.
Its surprising that we haven’t yet seen any published real world tests of the Inmarsat phone in comparison to Iridium, similar to the Frost & Sullivan reports which compared Iridium and Globalstar in 2008 and 2002. However, I’m sure similar analyses will be undertaken by both Iridium and Inmarsat at least for their own internal purposes, and possibly even for external publication if they believe the results are favorable. If you’ve tried out the phone in “fringe” coverage areas then feel free to let us know about your experience in the comments section below.
UPDATE: So now Frost & Sullivan has released its comparison of the Iridium and Inmarsat phones, which was commissioned by Iridium. It is notable that in Anchorage, Alaska, Frost & Sullivan “was unable to make or receive a call despite dozens of attempts and was only able to briefly find a satellite”. This points to difficulties with registration, as we suspected. However, Inmarsat sources tell us that it is perfectly possible to register on the satellite in Alaska, and make calls there. We haven’t yet got an independent view, but it would seem likely that the actual answer may lie somewhere between these two opposing views. We would speculate that you will probably have to have a pretty good idea where the Inmarsat satellite is so you can point the phone antenna at it during registration (maybe using a compass would be helpful?).
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07.13.10
Posted in Globalstar, Handheld, Inmarsat, Iridium, Operators, Services, TerreStar, Thuraya at 2:37 pm by timfarrar
Inmarsat has now launched its ISatPhone Pro, which I was lucky enough to try out the other week. Although the phone itself is not particularly attractive, the call performance was better than I expected – voice quality was good (with the other party easily recognizable), and the ability to ‘walk and talk’ was far superior to my experience with the TerreStar Genus phone. Latency was also somewhat better than on the Genus phone. The main limitation was that the phone only registers on the Inmarsat satellite when the antenna is extended and pointed in the direction of the satellite, which means there is a delay of 1-2 minutes before a call can be made, and calls will rarely, if ever, be received on the phone (assuming the user doesn’t want to carry it around with the antenna extended).
Though Inmarsat’s phone is not expected to perform well at high latitudes (particularly in Alaska), it should generally be a good alternative for those MSS voice users who aren’t worried about carrying such a large device. The phone itself has been priced very aggressively, with pricing currently around $599 and in some cases close to $500.
However, the most surprising development is the airtime pricing that Inmarsat has set. Postpaid wholesale pricing has been set very low, leading to retail offers of $150 per year with 60 free minutes of calls. Even more extraordinary is the prepaid pricing, where a user can buy a 25 minute card, valid for 2 years, for only $20.
In my view the fact that Inmarsat has selected a uniform 2 year expiry date on its prepaid cards is a huge mistake, which I can only assume is due to the limitations of Inmarsat’s prepaid billing system (note also that prepaid service is currently not available in the US, due to patent litigation over the prepaid platform that Inmarsat uses). Iridium has previously indicated that about half of handheld MSS users are “glovebox”-type customers, who only use the phone for emergencies (and rarely use any minutes). To date such users have been paying at least $30 per month for satellite phone service (apart from occasional dual mode roamers on Thuraya), but now they will be able to get service for less than $1 per month. Inmarsat has thus completely undermined the economics of a significant part of the handheld MSS market, making it impossible for its service providers to justify targeting these customers (especially as SPs are busy competing away the margins which Inmarsat expected would be available on its handsets). In addition to leaving large amounts of money on the table, this action may also create added costs for Inmarsat, as these users are the least likely to be familiar with the limitations of satellite communications and thus may well end up consuming disproportionate levels of customer support resources.
Inmarsat may well have had a reason to act in such a destructive manner a few months ago, when it thought it might have the opportunity to prevent Iridium gaining funding in the public markets to pay for its NEXT contract. However, now that Iridium can rely on more money than expected from COFACE, such a calculation looks less sensible.
Despite having an attractive proposition for low end users, Inmarsat may still prove less successful than it hopes amongst higher volume users. In particular, these users will gain less of an advantage from the low occasional use tariffs, and may be somewhat reluctant to churn after making a substantial investment in buying an Iridium or Globalstar handset in recent years. Inmarsat has stated that it believes the average lifetime of a satellite handset is around three years, but in reality Iridium and Globalstar handsets are used for up to 8 years (and there is a thriving market for secondhand phones). As a result, churn in the handheld MSS market is much lower than Inmarsat apparently expects (even for Globalstar users, who have had to cope with a lack of two-way service in recent years), which will make it difficult to persuade large numbers of existing users to switch over rapidly to Inmarsat’s new service. On the other hand, competition from Inmarsat will potentially force Globalstar to offer rather more aggressive pricing as it tries to rebuild its subscriber base in 2011 and 2012.
In the end therefore, Inmarsat may end up being able to trumpet a fairly large number of handheld subscribers (potentially up to 150K by 2014), but many of these will be less desirable customers and ARPUs may be rather lower than expected. Thus the overall impact for the handheld MSS market of Inmarsat’s new service (even when combined with Globalstar’s two-way relaunch in 2011) may remain subdued, and at best we expect wholesale revenue growth of no more than 10% p.a. in the next five years. Indeed a more pessimistic view, assuming significant erosion of ARPUs at the low end of the handheld market could put wholesale revenue growth at less than 5% p.a. over this period.
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06.24.10
Posted in Broadband, Financials, Inmarsat, Maritime, Operators, VSAT at 5:12 pm by timfarrar
In recent discussions we’ve heard rumors that Inmarsat may soon make a bid to take over Thrane & Thrane, its biggest equipment supplier. Inmarsat has certainly been in acquisition mode over the last year, taking over Stratos and Segovia and investing in SkyWave. Nevertheless, such a move would still be quite a shock for many in the MSS industry.
However, it would be a logical accompaniment to Inmarsat’s Ka-band strategy: Inmarsat would be able to reduce the price of L-band equipment (particularly FleetBroadband terminals) and thereby help to fend off the threat from Ku-band VSAT for the next few years until its new Ka-band satellites are in orbit. Thrane could also play an important role in development of mobile Ka-band terminals, which are clearly the biggest technical risk in Inmarsat’s entire Ka-band plan.
Though the threat from Ku-band has been hyped up recently, most notably in Comsys’s recent maritime VSAT report, our view continues to be that L-band has a very sustainable market position, outside the highest spending ships. To date, Ku-band VSATs have achieved only limited penetration within Inmarsat’s core maritime commercial transportation market (which incidentally is much smaller than 100,000 ships), and most of these ships spend far too little to ever contemplate a move to VSAT.
By reducing the cost of L-band equipment, in concert with its aggressive moves on airtime pricing over the last year, Inmarsat has a very viable opportunity to hold off Ku-band VSAT incursion. Even the recent concerns about shortfalls in Inmarsat’s maritime revenue growth during the first quarter of 2010 appear to stem much more from the price reductions that Inmarsat and its distributors have used to remain competitive on high spending vessels, rather than any substantial loss of market share to VSAT in the commercial transportation business. Indeed many maritime VSAT service providers had a very disappointing year in 2009, and quite a number of them are now up for sale, in what we would view as an attempt to exploit the perception of rapid future market growth before they actually need to fulfill these expectations.
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06.21.10
Posted in Globalstar, ICO/DBSD, Inmarsat, LightSquared, Operators, Regulatory, Spectrum, TerreStar at 2:36 pm by timfarrar
On Friday, the FCC’s Spectrum Task Force announced a “plan to increase value, utilization, and investment in mobile satellite service (MSS) bands”, beginning with a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) which they hope to approve at the Commission meeting scheduled for July 15.
Although the announcement itself referred to the whole 90MHz of MSS spectrum identified in the National Broadband Plan (NBP) as suitable for terrestrial broadband, the focus of the discussion at Friday’s press conference appeared to be around the 2GHz (S-band) spectrum. Indeed the FCC highlighted that this spectrum, which is held by DBSD and TerreStar, is “right in the neighborhood of both the AWS spectrum and the PCS spectrum”. In particular, the FCC indicated that it would propose changing the table of allocation for the 2GHz spectrum, to allow primary terrestrial use (without ATC), and then enable secondary leasing for all three MSS spectrum bands. These rules would enable secondary leasing to begin “relatively soon”, if the FCC agreed to the proposal of the Spectrum Task Force.
According to Communications Daily, this proposal might include “charges”, presumably as “consideration for the step-up in the value of the affected spectrum” (as proposed in the NBP), but would avoid some of the delays associated with an incentive auction (which was one of the other options suggested in the NBP). Of course spectrum leasing for purely terrestrial use (as would then be possible in the 2GHz band) would be rather more straightforward than leasing under the current set of ATC restrictions, but the level of any FCC “charges” (and perhaps other conditions on terrestrial buildout or provision of satellite services) would dictate how much value could be realized by the existing spectrum holders.
What is particularly interesting is that this NPRM is being issued so quickly, when the Credit Suisse research conference call three weeks ago indicated that it was not expected until September. In addition, the NBP suggested that an S-band (2GHz) Order would not be expected until 2011 (as opposed to 2010 for the L-band and Big LEO bands), at least partly because decisions might be impacted by the outcome of the adjacent AWS-3 band proceeding.
Perhaps the reason for this change in timing is hinted at by the first line in the FCC’s announcement: the need to “increase…investment in MSS bands”. Certainly both Echostar and TerreStar were well prepared with immediate comments on the announcement (with Echostar also noting that the proposed change would “help spur investment”), and TerreStar desperately needs new investment in the very near future. It looks like the outcome of the FCC meeting in July (which according to Friday’s press conference is “still in flux”) might therefore prove critical to TerreStar’s future.
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06.02.10
Posted in Aeronautical, Broadband, Financials, Globalstar, Handheld, Inmarsat, Iridium, Maritime, Operators, Services, VSAT at 2:57 pm by timfarrar
So Iridium has finally announced the contract to build its NEXT satellites, which was won by Thales Alenia Space (TAS) with the support of a stunning $1.8B loan package which will be 95% guaranteed by COFACE, the French Export Credit Agency (ECA). By the sound of it, Lockheed had been confident of winning the contract, but the US Ex-Im Bank simply couldn’t match the level of support offered by COFACE.
Even Iridium appears surprised by the $1.8B Promise of Guarantee, given the suggestions in their March 2010 results call that the company would need to raise additional unsecured or subordinated debt in the public market. We had expected Iridium might need to raise $300M or more in backstop financing, based on Iridium’s April 2010 investor presentation which stated that the company was “seeking support for a[n ECA] facility of approximately $1.5B”. COFACE’s additional support therefore clearly appears to have tipped the balance in favor of TAS, because it removes the risk that Iridium would have faced in trying to tap the public markets at this point in time.
We now expect Globalstar to point out that Iridium has received an even more favorable financing package than Globalstar did last year (when Thermo was required to provide additional backstop funding as a condition of the $586M COFACE-backed facility) and potentially to seek a $200M+ extension of its current facility. This would provide funding so Globalstar could exercise its option to purchase the last 24 second generation satellites, allowing them to add more satellites to their constellation before NEXT becomes operational (and before radiation problems are expected to start impacting their 8 first generation spares in about 2015). Such a facility could also give Globalstar more firepower to market its new second generation services in 2011 and 2012, without the risk of eating into the contingent equity and debt service reserve accounts previously established by Thermo.
The next stage in this war of the Export Credit Agencies may then come in the shape of Inmarsat’s upcoming Ka-band constellation, which we expect to involve 3 or 4 dedicated Ka-band satellites (costing at least $200M each including launch and insurance), providing oceanic coverage to complement and extend its existing FleetBroadband and SwiftBroadband services. With Inmarsat’s new satellites expected to be deployed between 2013 and 2015, an order could well come as soon as this summer, when Inmarsat announces its investor guidance for the next five years. More details of Inmarsat’s plans and our expectations for their future Ka-band revenues were given in the March 2010 report, available to subscribers to our MSS information service.
The competition to build Inmarsat’s new satellites appears once again to be shaping up as a US vs European battle with TAS, SS/L and Astrium all bidding for the contract. Will ECA financing once again prove to be a key factor in the decision, even though Inmarsat has much less need for a guarantee than Iridium and Globalstar? Certainly Inmarsat has not been reluctant to seek cheap government-backed funding when it is available, as seen in its recent European Investment Bank loan to fund the Alphasat project.
In summary, its clear that ECA financing is now going to play a very substantial role in supporting the MSS industry. As a result, the prospects for a long awaited consolidation of the sector appear to be diminishing. That is certainly good news for end users of MSS, as well as service providers and distributors, who will be able to take advantage of an increasing range of competitive alternatives. This is particularly true in the maritime and aeronautical markets, where Iridium is really the only potential MSS competitor for Inmarsat. Indeed Iridium’s ability to serve these markets gives it a much more sustainable long term position than some other systems, because most maritime and aeronautical opportunities are much less likely to be undermined by the buildout of terrestrial wireless systems.
Nevertheless, it also seems hard to justify the $8B+ of capital investment that has been committed by Iridium, Globalstar and all of the other players (Iridium NEXT, Globalstar 2, Inmarsat 4, Orbcomm, ICO/DBSD, SkyTerra and TerreStar) in an industry sector which only generated $1.1B in wholesale service revenues in 2009, and though growing healthily, doesn’t appear poised to breakout from the 8% annual growth rate seen in recent years. Unless new sources of value appear (spectrum monetization being the obvious option for several players) it appears unlikely that all of the MSS operators will be as successful as they and their investors hope.
Indeed the main story of the next decade is likely to be the competition between Iridium and Globalstar, as they both strive to be the second biggest player in an MSS market that will continue to be dominated by Inmarsat, while other providers may fall by the wayside. If Iridium can grow from its current 19% share of wholesale service revenues to about a 25% market share, or Globalstar can grow from its current 5% share to 15% or more (based on its lower cost satellite system), then that should be sufficient to achieve an attractive return on capital for either company. However, with Inmarsat holding a more than 60% market share today, it appears unlikely that both Iridium and Globalstar could achieve this level of success simultaneously.
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03.30.10
Posted in Aeronautical, Inmarsat, Operators, Services at 9:23 am by timfarrar
Its turning out to be a good week for our predictions. After the announcement that Harbinger is going to build a new LTE ATC network, comes the news that Ryanair is discontinuing its in-flight connectivity service, after OnAir exercised its right to terminate the contract. Though the termination apparently “puzzled analysts”, we predicted back in 2006 and reiterated in 2008 that there wouldn’t be enough revenue for both Ryanair and OnAir to make money from the service, and so the fleetwide deployment would never be completed.
Thought Ryanair is putting a brave face on it, presumably in the hope of finding another sucker to take on the contract under similar terms and conditions, it was well known that the original contract was extremely unfavorable to OnAir (so much so that a major rival told us they wouldn’t touch it with a bargepole).
We believe that Ryanair got a cut of revenues off the top, with OnAir left to pay for the terminals out of what was left after paying expenses for airtime, termination, etc. Unsurprisingly it was therefore virtually all upside for Ryanair (bar the cost of flying the equipment around), but financially disastrous for OnAir when revenues came in at a small fraction of the EUR528K per plane per year that was originally predicted by the two companies.
OnAir Analyst Briefing Sept 27, 2007
It now seems that an approximation of reality is slowly returning to the in-flight communications market. Hopefully the next shoe to drop will be when Southwest doesn’t follow through on its fleetwide deployment plans with Row44, for exactly the same reason – there simply isn’t enough passenger revenue to pay for expensive VSAT or SwiftBroadband terminals, if both the airline and provider want to make a profit.
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03.27.10
Posted in Financials, Inmarsat, LightSquared, Operators, Regulatory, Spectrum, TerreStar at 4:01 pm by timfarrar
As we’ve been blogging over the last month, Harbinger is planning to deploy a multi-billion dollar US ATC network which is breathtaking in its ambition. On Friday, Harbinger filed a letter with the FCC summarizing these plans, which it had told the FCC confidentially a month earlier, before the FCC approved Harbinger taking control of SkyTerra and approved its ATC license modifications, both of which were also announced on Friday.
Specifically, Harbinger plans to develop a nationwide terrestrial broadband mobile 4G LTE network, which, without regard to satellite coverage, will provide wireless data on a nationwide basis, through over 36,000 base stations. The network will be operated on an open access basis and will initially use 23MHz of spectrum, including 8 MHz of 1.4 GHz terrestrial spectrum, 5 MHz of 1.6 GHz terrestrial spectrum (1670-75MHz) and 10 MHz of (SkyTerra’s) MSS/ATC L-band spectrum. Through a cooperation agreement with Inmarsat and associated waivers of the Commission’s ATC rules, by 2013 Harbinger will have access to an additional 30 MHz of ATC spectrum (in the L-band).
In addition, Harbinger also is discussing with other Commission licensees (presumably including TerreStar but clearly also including other terrestrial bands such as WCS) the possibility of hosting or pooling their spectrum in order to enable them on the terrestrial wireless network, i.e., the spectrum would be incorporated into the infrastructure of the terrestrial wireless network. The hosted or pooled spectrum then could be integrated with Harbinger’s spectrum to enhance the broadband capacity of the terrestrial network.
Service will begin in two trial markets, Denver and Phoenix, with a commercial launch before the third quarter of 2011 providing service to up to 9 million POPs. All major markets will be installed by the end of the second quarter of 2013. Harbinger has committed to the FCC that it will construct a terrestrial network to provide coverage to at least 100 million people in the United States by December 31, 2012; to at least 145 million people in the United States by December 31, 2013; and to at least 260 million people in the United States by December 31, 2015. By 2015, the company expects to serve more than 40 million connected consumer terrestrial devices on a wholesale basis, which is even more ambitious than Clearwire’s targets.
Just in case it wasn’t clear already, the proposed Harbinger bid for Inmarsat is not going to happen: the emphasis is on the Cooperation Agreement as the means of exploiting the L-band MSS-ATC spectrum. On the other hand, Inmarsat can’t be disappointed with $115M per year of incremental revenue with no cost and no risk.
Oh, and just to throw one more random guess out there, the first thing I thought of when reading T-Mobile’s recent statements that it has enough spectrum for the next couple of years, but that it was looking at various joint ventures to boost its holdings, and correlating it with Harbinger’s commitments not to sell more than 25% of its capacity to the two largest mobile operators, was that I bet I know who is number one on Harbinger’s list of potential target partners to use its new wholesale network.
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02.24.10
Posted in Financials, Globalstar, ICO/DBSD, Inmarsat, LightSquared, Operators, Regulatory, Spectrum, TerreStar at 11:32 am by timfarrar
So the cat is out of the bag. As we noted last December, the FCC has been looking hard at how to make sure MSS spectrum is put to productive uses, and now in a speech by Chairman Genachowski, he has stated that the Plan will propose a Mobile Future Auction “permitting existing spectrum licensees, such as television broadcasters in spectrum-starved markets, to voluntarily relinquish spectrum in exchange for a share of auction proceeds, and allow spectrum sharing and other spectrum efficiency measures”. Specifically:
“The Plan proposes resolving longstanding debates about how to maximize the value of spectrum in bands such as the Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) or Wireless Communications Service (WCS) by giving licensees the option of new flexibility to put the spectrum toward mobile broadband use-or the option of voluntarily transferring the license to someone else, who will.”
It is going to be very interesting to see whether this “new flexibility” involves further liberalizing the regulations governing ATC, over what would undoubtedly be the heated objections of existing wireless carriers (who have always had a problem with potential “windfalls” for MSS spectrum holders). For example, would the FCC contemplate removing the requirement that all terminals must include satellite capability and offer a dual mode service (similar to the European S-band licenses which do not include any such restrictions)? Presumably any such carrot might come with a corresponding “use it or lose it” stick, although if an operator chose to stay with MSS-only services, it is hard to imagine that any third party could use the spectrum for terrestrial services at the same time.
However, MSS operators will certainly now be faced with a choice: do they continue to bet that (what conceivably might be more liberalized) ATC is the best way forward, and hope they can either partner with a leading wireless operator or attract investors to a new entrant wireless business plan, or do they agree to return their spectrum to the FCC in exchange for a share of the proceeds in the proposed Mobile Future Auction? The rest of this year will certainly be filled with many twists and turns in the MSS sector as we see which way operators will jump.
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02.18.10
Posted in Financials, Handheld, Inmarsat, LightSquared, Operators, Regulatory, Services, Spectrum, TerreStar at 8:05 pm by timfarrar
The FT’s Alphaville blog has highlighted various documents filed by SkyTerra with the SEC as part of its going private transaction with Harbinger, and suggested that Harbinger is still focused on the acquisition of Inmarsat that it originally proposed back in July 2008.
However, in our view these documents actually indicate the opposite, that although Harbinger is actively attempting to put together a consortium to fund an ATC network deployment, this is unlikely to include a bid for Inmarsat. The UBS analysis for Harbinger in July 2009, suggests three possible strategic options after the privatization of SkyTerra (Sol), namely:
(a) Acquire Inmarsat (Ignis)
(b) Pursue the Inmarsat (Ignis) Coordination Agreement
(c) Lease TerreStar (Taurus) Spectrum.
Over the last several months, it is clear that Harbinger has in fact pursued options (b) and (c) rather than option (a) (although admittedly it would not be able to launch a bid for Inmarsat prior to the SkyTerra takeover):
- SkyTerra declared the Inmarsat Coordination Agreement effective in December 2009 (prior to the two year deadline for this action); and
- TerreStar announced in January 2010 that it had entered a 90 day exclusive negotiation period to lease its satellite spectrum to Harbinger in exchange for an advance of $30M against its prior terrestrial (1.4GHz) spectrum lease to Harbinger.
While the Inmarsat coordination agreement (including its payment of $250M to Inmarsat to fit filters to existing Inmarsat terminals) is a necessity to make use of SkyTerra’s spectrum in any ATC network, in our view the potential Harbinger-TerreStar satellite spectrum lease is a direct alternative to pursuing a takeover of Inmarsat (albeit one which may not give access to European S-band spectrum, unless TerreStar is successful in its challenge to the European S-band process, or either Inmarsat or Solaris give up their licenses for this spectrum).
Similarly, while we understand that Harbinger is attempting to raise money from a consortium of investors over the next month or two, using this new funding to acquire Inmarsat would mean that it could not be used to fund a near term buildout of an ATC network. In fact, given the rise in Inmarsat’s stock price over the last year, it appears plausible that Harbinger might even decide to sell off some of its Inmarsat shares in order to provide funding for an ATC deployment, especially if Inmarsat decides to go down the route of spending its cashflows on a new I5 constellation with Ka-band capabilities.
There would be two ways in which an ATC network deployment could happen: if the buildout was funded by an existing wireless operator as a way to add capacity to its existing network, or as a (self-funded) standalone 4G new entrant to the US wireless market. We believe that Harbinger is pursuing the second of these alternatives at present, because the (less expensive and risky) first option is simply not open to it for the foreseeable future. As SkyTerra notes in its preliminary proxy statement:
“The Company had been actively pursuing a major strategic partner for a considerable period of time. In addition, during early to mid 2009 the Company had pursued and encouraged such parties to submit indications of interest to make an investment in and/or acquire the Company. No such partnering efforts were successful and no bona fide offers were received. In the judgment of Morgan Stanley, it was unclear that there was a short-or-medium term need for additional spectrum by ATC companies who were potential strategic partners. In addition, potential strategic partners had sources of spectrum other than through a partnership with SkyTerra, including via spectrum auctions by the FCC, and sales from SpectrumCo, Clearwire or from other entities in the satellite sector.”
Thus the pressing question is whether Harbinger will now be able to convince prospective partners/investors that a new entrant wireless business plan (presumably similar to that of Clearwire but based on LTE) would make sense. Though some funding might be available from (for example) an equipment vendor who would like to demonstrate its 4G technology (as has happened with Clearwire), it is less obvious who might be interested in providing distribution. Most importantly, with doubts persisting about whether Clearwire (with significant backing from wireless and cable operators) will be able to develop a sustainable 4G business, Harbinger will need to demonstrate a compelling reason why customers should choose its service over those of more established wireless providers. The only credible differentiator for such a wireless network lies in the satellite roaming capabilities that will be available (and mandated) in an ATC network deployment (and which Mr Falcone suggested to the Wall St Journal back in April 2009 would attract “vast global demand”). Thus potential partners’ attention will need to be focused on the TerreStar Genus phone (which now looks like it will come to market sometime in the second quarter of this year, after the deadline for Harbinger to complete its potential satellite spectrum lease with TerreStar), and whether they believe it can provide a compelling demonstration of competitive differentiation and market demand, based on this satellite roaming capability.
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12.14.09
Posted in Aeronautical, Broadband, Financials, Inmarsat, Operators, Services at 5:24 pm by timfarrar
Since we last wrote on the topic in September, skepticism about the future of in-flight Internet services has become even more widespread, and recently disclosed usage data from Aircell has not been particularly impressive – roughly 100K sessions per week (of which only a fraction are paid for), equating to about a 5% take rate on equipped aircraft.
The good news is that Aircell is now touting the “operational applications” of in-flight Internet: the obvious corollary being that it is going to try and extract some money from airlines to pay for these benefits, as we suggested it would have to back in September.
The bad news is that the business case for Row44′s Ku-band service looks even more questionable than we had suspected, and it faces a near term deadline (we understand January 2010) from Southwest to secure $100M+ of funding for its planned fleetwide rollout. We have been told that the Southwest-Row44 agreement calls for Southwest to pay Row44 a fee of $0.25 per passenger flown on each equipped aircraft, whether or not they use the service, and Southwest will then mostly likely give the connectivity away for free. With Southwest carrying about 170K passengers per plane per year, that would mean Row44 receiving just over $40K per plane per year (about $22M per year in total once fleetwide installation is complete), which it hopes to supplement with advertising revenue. However, we are doubtful that a dramatic increase could be realized from advertising: for example according to a recent article, in-flight magazines generate an average of about $1M per airline per year in gross advertising revenue, and a large airline such as Southwest would presumably therefore generate in the high single digit millions of dollars from its magazine. Given the lack of technology (and power outlets) required to read the magazine, then even if Southwest gives away the Row44 service for free, usage would be far less than the 80% of passengers that read the in-flight magazine, and we would view it as unlikely that advertising revenue could add more than a few million dollars to Row44′s income.
More to the point, a free service will put an unsustainably costly load on the Row44 network: we believe this was originally designed with an expectation of loading 100 planes onto each transponder (which can provide 18Mbps of capacity), but if 25% of passengers used the network for streaming video, and other high bandwidth applications (remember that these were the primary selling point of Row44′s solution compared to Aircell), then it is quite possible that 1 transponder would be needed for every 20-30 planes. With each transponder costing about $1.25M, Row44 could find itself coming close to spending all of the revenue from Southwest on bandwidth and never making any margin to even begin to pay for the $100M+ of equipment that it would have installed.
In this context, it is far from clear that a sustainable business model is available for large scale Ku-band passenger communications deployments (although a limited Panasonic service on Lufthansa could be viable, assuming Panasonic has some form of revenue sharing agreement with Intelsat and initial installations rely on the old Connexion antennas). Certainly it appears that Viasat, which was the primary equipment supplier to Connexion-by-Boeing (and was rumored to be in pole position to secure a deal with Lufthansa, prior to its recent shift to Panasonic) is emphasizing the lower cost of Ka-band capacity over a Ku-band only model for mobility services. Intriguingly, even Inmarsat may agree that Ka-band is the future: we understand that it has recently issued an RFI for one or more Ka-band satellites, which are likely to be part of its planned roadmap for future government and/or aero services (e.g. UAVs).
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