01.25.10
Posted in Financials, Iridium, Operators, Spectrum, TerreStar at 3:11 pm by timfarrar
Last week I attended the Iridium Partner Conference held in (a rather wet) Phoenix, AZ at the Hyatt Regency Scottsdale. Ironically that was the very same hotel where the first demonstrations of the Iridium phone were made back in May 1998. 2010 is certainly shaping up to be just as significant for the MSS industry as was 1998, with the launch of the new TerreStar Genus phone just a few months away. We will then find out whether the new entrants are going to be able to mount a credible challenge to existing MSS operators, or whether they will experience an underwhelming customer response as Iridium and Globalstar did a decade ago. Our new profile of TerreStar has just been released, and discusses all these issues, including five year subscriber and revenue forecasts, along with an assessment of the value that might be realizable for ATC spectrum in the next few years.
At the conference itself, Iridium clarified that they intend to contract for the new NEXT constellation in mid-2010, and to ensure that they are fully funded at the same time. That would presumably involve a combination of bank loans guaranteed by export credit agencies and additional capital markets funding, totaling something between $1B and $1.2B – we would guess that they might need to raise of order $200M to $300M in high yield debt or convertible bonds in addition to the guaranteed bank loans. Interestingly, Iridium now regards advance funding from hosted payloads as “icing on the cake”, rather than as an essential component of its NEXT funding, allowing it more flexibility to consider projects which would provide an ongoing stream of revenues as opposed to just an upfront data purchase. Clearly the expectation is that by taking a “big bang” approach to its funding, Iridium will not only be able to persuade their distribution partners and customers that they will be around for the foreseeable future, but also that Iridium will close some of the EBITDA multiple discount on which their shares are trading compared to Inmarsat.
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01.05.10
Posted in Financials, Handheld, Operators, Regulatory, Spectrum, TerreStar at 4:39 pm by timfarrar
There’s a lot happening with TerreStar at the moment, as the company tries to complete the exchange offer to extend the maturity of its preferred shares. The deadline has now been pushed back until early February, while in a separate development, Echostar’s representatives have resigned from TerreStar’s board, effective December 31, 2009.
In the meantime, all eyes will be on the FCC, which needs to approve TerreStar’s ATC application (made back in the summer of 2007) before January 20, 2010 to prevent TerreStar defaulting on its loan agreement for the second satellite, which TerreStar’s deputy GC described in an October 2009 submission to the FCC as an event that “would likely be catastrophic to the company”. TerreStar will certainly be hoping that the FCC’s indications that it is taking another look at MSS allocations as one of the options to free up more spectrum for wireless broadband will not cause them to delay approval of TerreStar’s ATC application beyond this deadline.
Jan 13 update: TerreStar has just received its ATC license, and can look forward to launching commercial service in the “first or second quarter” of 2010 (per its recent statement to Satellite News) once the current testing phase is complete and the company has completed its Preferred Stock Exchange Offer and raised additional funding.
We’re planning to publish our new profile of TerreStar later this month, including forecasts of the market opportunity for both MSS and ATC services, and are also looking forward to trying out the TerreStar Genus phone when its demonstrated at the SATELLITE 2010 show in Washington DC in March. Its going to be fascinating to see whether TerreStar can succeed where others have failed in creating mass market demand for two-way MSS.
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12.14.09
Posted in Aeronautical, Broadband, Financials, Inmarsat, Operators, Services at 5:24 pm by timfarrar
Since we last wrote on the topic in September, skepticism about the future of in-flight Internet services has become even more widespread, and recently disclosed usage data from Aircell has not been particularly impressive – roughly 100K sessions per week (of which only a fraction are paid for), equating to about a 5% take rate on equipped aircraft.
The good news is that Aircell is now touting the “operational applications” of in-flight Internet: the obvious corollary being that it is going to try and extract some money from airlines to pay for these benefits, as we suggested it would have to back in September.
The bad news is that the business case for Row44′s Ku-band service looks even more questionable than we had suspected, and it faces a near term deadline (we understand January 2010) from Southwest to secure $100M+ of funding for its planned fleetwide rollout. We have been told that the Southwest-Row44 agreement calls for Southwest to pay Row44 a fee of $0.25 per passenger flown on each equipped aircraft, whether or not they use the service, and Southwest will then mostly likely give the connectivity away for free. With Southwest carrying about 170K passengers per plane per year, that would mean Row44 receiving just over $40K per plane per year (about $22M per year in total once fleetwide installation is complete), which it hopes to supplement with advertising revenue. However, we are doubtful that a dramatic increase could be realized from advertising: for example according to a recent article, in-flight magazines generate an average of about $1M per airline per year in gross advertising revenue, and a large airline such as Southwest would presumably therefore generate in the high single digit millions of dollars from its magazine. Given the lack of technology (and power outlets) required to read the magazine, then even if Southwest gives away the Row44 service for free, usage would be far less than the 80% of passengers that read the in-flight magazine, and we would view it as unlikely that advertising revenue could add more than a few million dollars to Row44′s income.
More to the point, a free service will put an unsustainably costly load on the Row44 network: we believe this was originally designed with an expectation of loading 100 planes onto each transponder (which can provide 18Mbps of capacity), but if 25% of passengers used the network for streaming video, and other high bandwidth applications (remember that these were the primary selling point of Row44′s solution compared to Aircell), then it is quite possible that 1 transponder would be needed for every 20-30 planes. With each transponder costing about $1.25M, Row44 could find itself coming close to spending all of the revenue from Southwest on bandwidth and never making any margin to even begin to pay for the $100M+ of equipment that it would have installed.
In this context, it is far from clear that a sustainable business model is available for large scale Ku-band passenger communications deployments (although a limited Panasonic service on Lufthansa could be viable, assuming Panasonic has some form of revenue sharing agreement with Intelsat and initial installations rely on the old Connexion antennas). Certainly it appears that Viasat, which was the primary equipment supplier to Connexion-by-Boeing (and was rumored to be in pole position to secure a deal with Lufthansa, prior to its recent shift to Panasonic) is emphasizing the lower cost of Ka-band capacity over a Ku-band only model for mobility services. Intriguingly, even Inmarsat may agree that Ka-band is the future: we understand that it has recently issued an RFI for one or more Ka-band satellites, which are likely to be part of its planned roadmap for future government and/or aero services (e.g. UAVs).
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09.30.09
Posted in Financials, Handheld, Operators, Spectrum, TerreStar at 4:38 pm by timfarrar
TerreStar and AT&T have now announced that AT&T will distribute TerreStar’s Genus (Elektrobit) phone to “government, first responders, public safety, energy, utility, transportation and maritime users” and given additional details of the expected pricing for this satellite-cellular roaming service. The phone will cost $800 to $900 (subsidies were not mentioned, which is perhaps not too surprising given that the service is not being targeted at consumers initially), and then in addition to a standard voice plan, subscribers will need to pay $24.99/month for satellite access and an additional usage fee for satellite roaming (in the United States) of $0.65/minute for voice and $5/Mbyte for data.
TerreStar and AT&T are basically targeting the existing handheld MSS market, but expect that the phone will be deployed more widely, because it will become an “everyday” phone for end users, rather than being a shared phone which is kept in a cupboard for emergencies. In our view, the size of the potential addressable market is probably not too far off that for Land Mobile Radio, where we estimate there are around 2.5M to 3M handsets in use in the US today, with about half in public safety and the rest in other government and private sector market segments (parks, utilities, railroads, energy, etc.). Of course only a fraction of those users also carry a employer-provided cellphone, and at this point in time, TerreStar’s solution is more likely to be a replacement for that device rather than for an LMR radio itself. So let’s assume AT&T and TerreStar are targeting a potential market of say 1M people. For comparison, today there are about 170K MSS phones in use in the US and Canada (including many Globalstar phones with limited two-way service at present), of which probably just under 100K are in the lower 48 states (and remember that the TerreStar phone is unlikely to work as reliably as Iridium or Globalstar in Alaska or Northern Canada).
In that context, TerreStar would be doing amazingly well if it could gain 50K subscribers by the end of 2010 and 100K-150K subscribers by the end of 2011 (when SkyTerra also expects to be offering next generation services, and Globalstar will be back in full two-way service). Remember also that in 1999-2000, despite massive advertising (at least in Iridium’s case), Iridium and Globalstar only managed to gain a few tens of thousands of users on a global basis in their first year of commercial service. TerreStar will probably share the end user revenue about 50/50 with AT&T (Iridium and Inmarsat expect to get about 70% of retail revenue but AT&T would likely want a bigger incentive to promote the service) and monthly retail ARPUs (including the satellite access fee but excluding any terrestrial voice plan) might be expected to be between $40 and $50. So let’s assume TerreStar receives $25 per user per month. If there are (in the most optimistic scenario) an average of 20K subs in 2010 (assuming deployment ramps up towards the end of the year) and 100K subs in 2011, then that would generate service revenues for TerreStar of $6M in 2010 and $30M in 2011. There would presumably be additional equipment revenues (although we doubt TerreStar is looking to make a profit on equipment sales) and perhaps revenue from some other services like M2M data (once chipsets are available, which means only a limited amount of revenue could be produced even in 2011).
However, its pretty clear that TerreStar is going to need to raise additional funds to cover its operating costs in the near future, since its cash burn rate even before going into full commercial service is about $25M per quarter, and excluding the money purchase agreement for the second satellite (not part of this $25M cash burn), TerreStar had $110M of cash at the end of June 2009. Thus regardless of what happens to the $430M of preferred shares (which must be redeemed or converted next April), TerreStar will need to raise more money by mid 2010. From mid 2011, TerreStar will also need to begin paying cash interest on its debt, at an annual rate of more than $150M per year in 2012.
Given the relatively limited opportunity in professional markets (at best a few hundred thousand subscribers for TerreStar, once the overall market is shared with SkyTerra and other MSS operators), TerreStar will eventually need to either achieve considerable success in consumer markets (requiring a dramatically different price point for both equipment and airtime) or find a strategic partner interested in buying or leasing the company’s 20MHz of spectrum for a terrestrial ATC deployment (which doesn’t look likely in the near term, not least because TerreStar doesn’t even have an ATC license as yet). In this context, its probably most appropriate to look at TerreStar’s initial service offering as a proof-of-concept (and a means to justify further funding) for one of these two longer term possibilities, rather than as the means to generate an immediate financial return on its own. We’ll see over the next 12 months whether TerreStar is able to provide the proof that both the financial markets and potential strategic partners will be looking for.
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09.14.09
Posted in Aeronautical, Financials, Inmarsat, Operators, Services at 12:26 pm by timfarrar
It seems that people are now coming round to the view, which we’ve expressed since 2006, that there won’t be enough paying users of in-flight broadband for both network providers and airlines to make a profit on the costs of deploying equipment and running a network (as Boeing found out after spending somewhere between $1B and $2B on Connexion). Our view was that only airlines who are interested in offering a differentiated service would be able to justify the costs involved. However, to date the leading service providers (Aircell and Row44) have apparently not only been installing the equipment for free, but have also been offering a cut of revenues to the airline. Its no wonder that this “no lose” proposition has led to fleetwide installation commitments from most of the major US airlines. In comparison, installations of Inmarsat equipment for in-flight cellular services on aircraft in other parts of the world have slowed dramatically over the last 18 months, as most airlines no longer have the money to pay for fleetwide upgrades (with the possible exception of Ryanair, which we suspect may have a similarly attractive deal from OnAir).
Lost in the noise of Southwest’s commitment to install Row44 service across its entire fleet of 540 aircraft was the footnote that there isn’t “a solid timeframe for [installation]” because “certain specific details concerning the cost and financing of equipage are still being worked out”. From what we’ve heard, Row44 needs to raise a lot more money very soon in order to move forward with full-scale deployment (pretty obviously, since fitting equipment on 500 planes at $250K+ each would cost $125M), and presumably Southwest’s announcement was timed to help them secure that funding. However, with Southwest also demanding “control [over] the price point that our customer sees”, it seems a pretty unpalatable deal for potential investors if Row44 must front the installation costs and pay for the network and then let Southwest set the pricing to maximize its own return (probably more dictated by customer loyalty) rather than Row44′s revenues. Similarly unreasonable expectations appear to have been the reason why the oft-mentioned return of Connexion service on Lufthansa (who refused to provide any revenue guarantee to the network provider but wanted to make the provider liable for any future equipment deinstallations) has not happened to date.
What is the solution to achieving a sustainable business model for in-flight broadband? Whether it lies in airlines providing connectivity for free as a differentiator for their customers, or airlines using the link to the aircraft as a means to reduce their own operating costs, what we’re ultimately going to have to see is a change in the direction that the money flows. Instead of airlines getting the equipment for free and receiving a share of the service revenues, the airline is going to have to pay for the equipment and maybe in some cases even offer a revenue guarantee to the network provider (particularly on long-haul international routes where the cost of providing Ku-band coverage is much greater).
How palatable will in-flight connectivity be then to airlines that are currently losing hundreds of millions of dollars a year? At the very least we’d expect them to be a lot more discriminating in deciding whether to provide connectivity or not (who needs it on a one hour shuttle flight?). Perhaps its only if one of the providers goes bust that we’ll see a return to rationality in pricing (of course, it would be very unlikely for the service itself to disappear completely as Connexion did, because the costs of operating either Aircell or Row44′s networks domestically aren’t that high). Until that point is reached, expect airlines to continue to scramble to get something for nothing with their in-flight connectivity installations. In the meantime we’ll be watching carefully to see if the discussions over “cost and financing of equipage” between Southwest and Row44 get resolved and if investors are willing to put more money into in-flight connectivity providers.
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07.20.09
Posted in Financials, ICO/DBSD, Operators, Spectrum, TerreStar at 3:20 pm by timfarrar
On July 9, DISH Network filed a letter in the ICO North America (DBSD) bankruptcy case, indicating that it had purchased all of the $43.7M of first lien secured debt from the pre-petition lenders.
The first lien lenders had been objecting to ICO’s proposed restructuring which their financial advisers (Chanin Capital Partners) characterized as “a ‘plan’ that is doomed to fail, due to lack of financing, overwhelming debt and inability to move the company from the developmental (non-revenue producing) stage into an operating, revenue producing one”, while DISH Network stated in its letter that it “adopts those objections in their entirety and is prepared to prosecute the objections…”
According to Chanin, ICO/DBSD’s plan “seeks to put the Debtors in a holding pattern in the hope that the capital markets will become more accessible in the future. During this time the Debtors have no intention of furthering their business”.
However, with Echostar already holding a significant stake in TerreStar, ICO’s 2GHz rival, which just launched its own satellite earlier this month, could this development provide renewed impetus to the long rumored merger of the two companies and provide an alternative way forward for the development of MSS and ATC services in the 2GHz band?
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07.01.09
Posted in Financials, Globalstar, Handheld, ICO/DBSD, Inmarsat, Iridium, LightSquared, Operators, Services, Spectrum, TerreStar at 10:25 am by timfarrar
With apologies to the Eagles…its a lovely place, for MSS consumers at least. However, for MSS operators it seems to be somewhere you can check out [or go bankrupt] anytime you like, but you can never leave.
Today we’ve seen confirmation that Globalstar is now fully funded to complete the construction and launch of its first 24 second generation satellites by the end of 2010, while TerreStar has launched its new S-band satellite from Kourou, French Guiana and intends to initiate commercial services at the end of this year. Iridium also looks increasingly likely to complete its deal with GHL, since GHL’s shares and warrants are now trading well above the $10 value that would be refunded to investors if they voted down the deal. While there has been much speculation about potential mergers in the last two years, these now look less, rather than more, likely to occur in the near future (with the sole exception of SkyTerra’s Harbinger-backed bid for Inmarsat, which should be decided one way or another later this year).
Thus by early 2011, it looks like we will have at least four and more likely six voice and data MSS systems providing service in North America (Inmarsat, Iridium, Globalstar and TerreStar plus ICO and SkyTerra) and four systems (Inmarsat, Iridium, Globalstar and Thuraya) providing service in most of the rest of the world. With new advanced satellites, consumers will benefit from improved data capabilities and smaller, cheaper handheld satellite phones.
However, the development of at least three new systems (ICO, TerreStar and SkyTerra) and to some extent Globalstar as well (based on financial analysts’ comments at the time of its IPO in November 2006) has been justified largely by the value of MSS spectrum, due to the FCC’s rules enabling deployment of Ancillary Terrestrial Components (ATC), rather than by the intrinsic potential of the market for mobile satellite services itself. Thus, unless and until demand for MSS spectrum and ATC materializes, we run the risk of overcapacity for land-based MSS services, particularly in North America. This will certainly benefit end users, and price reductions (especially in conjunction with cheaper, more attractive terminals) may help to stimulate significant market growth, but it remains to be seen whether this will enable all the MSS operators to deliver a return for their investors or whether we’ll see more of them “checking out” with a bankruptcy filing as ICO North America did in May this year.
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06.29.09
Posted in Financials, ICO/DBSD, Operators, Regulatory, Spectrum, TerreStar at 9:23 am by timfarrar
In a recent Report and Order, released on June 12, 2009, the FCC addressed the issue of when ICO and TerreStar can offer commercial service in North America, which has been delayed by the need to clear their uplink band (2000-2020MHz) of existing Broadcast Auxiliary Service (BAS) users, who are being transitioned to frequencies above 2025MHz. In the Order, the FCC removed the requirement that ICO and TerreStar must wait until all of the top 30 broadcast markets have been transitioned before they can launch service. However, ICO and TerreStar will have to coordinate with BAS users if they are to operate in uncleared markets, and Sprint Nextel now has until February 8, 2010 to complete the transition. As a result, though TerreStar intends to begin offering service in late 2009, it looks likely that national service will not be available until several months later.
More importantly, as part of the order, the FCC initiated a Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making (FNPRM) related to the sharing of costs for the BAS transition (which Sprint Nextel has paid but is seeking to reclaim from other operators who will use the spectrum). The FCC “tentatively conclude[d] that MSS operators and future AWS licensees will have an obligation to share, on a pro rata basis, in the costs associated with the relocation of BAS incumbents if they “enter the band??? prior to the BAS sunset date of December 9, 2013″ and “tentatively conclude[d] that an MSS operator “enters the band??? and thus incurs an obligation to share in the costs associated with relocation of BAS incumbents when its satellite is found operational under its authorization milestone”. In April 2009, Sprint Nextel estimated these costs at $100M each for ICO and TerreStar. ICO and TerreStar have previously argued that they should not be liable for any of these transition costs, so if confirmed, the FCC’s tentative conclusions would be a significant additional cost for both companies. However, it is uncertain if the recent bankruptcy of ICO North America will affect Sprint Nextel’s claim, including whether the ICO Global parent company (which was not part of the bankruptcy filing) will avoid this liability.
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06.15.09
Posted in Financials, Globalstar, Handheld, Inmarsat, Iridium, Operators, Services at 11:53 am by timfarrar
As Inmarsat moves towards commercial launch of its new Global Satellite Phone Service (GSPS) some time in 2010, expectations have been building in the analyst community about the potential of GSPS to gain 10%+ of the $500M satellite phone business. In reality, the $500M market estimate (given by Inmarsat in 2006 when it acquired ACeS) represents retail service revenues and is an overestimate given the significant revenue declines experienced by Globalstar and Thuraya, two of the three principal handheld satellite phone providers, in 2007 and 2008. By our estimate, Globalstar, Thuraya and Iridium generated only about $270M in wholesale service revenues from handheld satellite phones in 2008, including a significant amount from Iridium’s US government contract.
While Inmarsat will start to compete in this market during 2010, what appears to have been completely overlooked by analysts are the significant limitations of the GSPS handset. As with the current SPS phone (see p17 of the user guide), we believe that customers will be advised to use the handsfree earpierce and physically point the phone antenna at the Inmarsat satellite. Some level of user cooperation in using satellite phones is not unprecendented, since Thuraya advises customers to ensure the antenna is pointed at the satellite when operating at low elevation angles, such as in south east Australia. However, Thuraya has never achieved much success in areas where this level of user cooperation is required, and the feedback we’ve heard on the first generation SPS phone that’s in use today has been pretty negative.
Inmarsat will certainly be able to improve the performance of the GSPS service within the EMEA region, to a level comparable with Thuraya, once its more capable Alphasat satellite is launched in 2012. However, Inmarsat will be constrained in the size of the antenna that it can use on future satellites, due to the need to maintain its existing levels of maritime coverage, so Inmarsat is unlikely to be able to extend similar levels of handheld performance globally without very substantial incremental capital expense.
Thus it does not appear that GSPS will be a realistic challenger to Iridium as a global satellite phone, and it may not be easy for Inmarsat to reach its target of a 10% market share within two years of launching the product, especially if Globalstar completes its next generation system and re-enters the market as a low cost handheld provider by early 2011. More importantly, as Iridium seeks to fund its next generation system (a prospect of which Inmarsat has been openly scornful), it will be able to make a very strong argument to the US government that Iridium NEXT is a necessity to maintain support for global handheld satellite services, on which US soldiers are increasingly reliant.
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05.15.09
Posted in Financials, ICO/DBSD, Spectrum at 2:49 pm by timfarrar
Is this deja vu all over again for the MSS industry? ICO North America has filed for bankruptcy, and plans to turn over almost all of its equity to the convertible debt holders who would have been due for repayment of $767.6M in August. ICO North America has an S-band GEO satellite in orbit, which it launched in April 2008, and had planned to develop a mobile video service for cars which it referred to as MIM. However, these plans were put on hold while the company renegotiated its debts.
There is a distinction between ICO North America, now referring to itself as DBSD, and its parent company, ICO Global, which is not filing for bankruptcy. ICO Global is responsible for a MEO satellite system, whose first satellite was launched back in 2001, although the system was never completed. Though ICO maintains it has a legacy claim to spectrum rights in the S-band on a global basis, the European Commission decided yesterday that it would instead award European spectrum licenses to the Inmarsat and Solaris Mobile. ICO Global’s main asset is the judgment of $631M that it was awarded against Boeing in January this year, after a trial in which ICO blamed Boeing for its inability to complete the MEO system. ICO has not yet collected this judgment, which Boeing has appealed, and ICO has estimated it could take two years for the matter to be resolved.
ICO Global was under no obligation to share any of the Boeing judgment with the ICO North America convertible debt holders, but could have presumably cut a different deal if had wanted to keep a bigger share in ICO North America’s assets and give up some of the potential future litigation proceeds. Clearly ICO Global has therefore decided that these potential future litigation proceeds are more valuable than the share of the GEO satellite and spectrum assets that it could have obtained in exchange for them. That may be good news for ICO Global’s shareholders, since there are about 200M shares outstanding, implying the potential future litigation proceeds are equivalent to $3 per share (compared to a current trading price of $0.60) if Boeing’s appeal is unsuccessful. However, it doesn’t help the prospects for ATC if Craig McCaw, one of the savviest spectrum investors around, believes that ICO North America’s satellite and spectrum assets aren’t worth more than the $767M owed to its convertible debt holders. Our view continues to be that the ATC spectrum will eventually be put to use in terrestrial networks, the problem is just that ‘eventually’ might be quite a long time.
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