High Times…

Posted in Broadband, Operators, Regulatory, Services, SpaceX, Spectrum at 9:43 am by timfarrar

Last week, on hearing the news of Amazon’s Project Kuiper LEO constellation plans, my immediate reaction was that it looked like “a good way to make it even harder for SpaceX to raise their next funding round”. Unsurprisingly, that turns out to be exactly the situation, because I’m told that Elon Musk held a lengthy conference call with SpaceX investors last week to seek additional funding for Starlink, ahead of the next launch (which has now been announced to be “no earlier than May”).

SpaceX is seeking to complete a near term equity raise (apparently limited to existing investors) at a valuation of $32B, and has made some outlandish claims about the potential for Starlink, similar to (if not even more exaggerated than) the widely ridiculed business plan published in the Wall St Journal back in January 2017, with many tens or even hundreds of millions of subscribers relying on the constellation. Jumping onboard with others, but exaggerating further, Starlink’s flat panel terminal is claimed to be capable of 100Mbps, but will cost only $500 at launch, falling to $150 over time. Moreover, the cost of the 4000+ satellites is said to be around half a million dollars each, including launch, implying total capex of less than $3B.

Meanwhile, Amazon continues to troll SpaceX, hiring the former leaders of Starlink, who Musk fired for wanting “more iterations of test satellites” rather than “cheaper and simpler satellites, sooner” and posting over 70 jobs in Bellevue, WA in an attempt to lure away additional engineers from Starlink facility in nearby Redmond.

So can Bezos derail SpaceX’s satellite internet plans, which may be the last avenue left to raise money for SpaceX, as the demand for launches continues to decline and its backlog nears exhaustion? Are people starting to doubt Elon Musk’s claims? Or does Musk still have enough believers amongst the existing SpaceX investors, including Google, which may have many reasons of its own to push back against Amazon?

UPDATE (4/19): The WSJ reported on SpaceX’s new funding round on April 15, noting that Gwynne Shotwell had expressed doubts over the prospects for Starlink in a February interview (although the outlandish claims I noted above were of course made by Elon Musk in the first week of April, not by Shotwell). It then emerged in an April 17 SEC filing that initial fundraising attempts had been largely unsuccessful, with only $44M out of $400M raised to date, suggesting that SpaceX’s approach, described to me as “you’ve got 24 hours to wire us the money or we’ll get it from someone else”, appears to have backfired.

So that makes me wonder quite how much financial pressure SpaceX is now under. Certainly SpaceX is putting considerable pressure on others, notably the FCC, where it filed on April 5 for Special Temporary Authority to operate its initial tranche of Starlink satellites. SpaceX claims these satellites will be launched in “early May”, despite it not having received approval for the revised constellation plan that was filed in November 2018 and not even specifying how many satellites will be in this “initial tranche”.

Given the complexities inherent in assessing SpaceX’s “iterative design” which will initially “use only Ku-band spectrum” and subsequently “phase the Ka-band antennas back into subsequent generations”, it is hardly surprising that it has taken the FCC some time to make a decision on whether to grant a license modification (indeed the FCC is only now proposing to grant a license for Theia’s NGSO system that was filed back in November 2016). Moreover, the mess that resulted from Swarm’s unapproved launch in 2018, led the FCC to caution satellite launch providers such as SpaceX that “a satellite integrated into a launch vehicle or deployment device without a current FCC authorization may need to be removed from that vehicle or deployment device if the satellite operator’s application for an FCC authorization is not acted upon favorably, or for various reasons cannot be granted within a time frame consistent with the launch schedule.”

So will the FCC bend under the pressure that SpaceX is exerting? Even then, would the launch of a few more demo satellites persuade investors that it’s now worth putting more money into SpaceX to fund a questionable (some would say non-existent) Starlink business plan? Or is this going to end badly, with SpaceX running out of cash to fund both Starlink and its new Starship development projects? Certainly the idea that “the decision to open a second $500M funding round just months after the first also bodes well for demand” (as opposed to indicating that SpaceX is experiencing a cash crunch) seems about as plausible as Musk’s recent suggestion that Starship should be fitted with “giant stainless steel dragon wings”. High times indeed!


Splitting the C-band baby

Posted in AT&T, Financials, Intelsat, Operators, Regulatory, Spectrum, T-Mobile, Verizon at 2:02 pm by timfarrar

It’s now just over a year since I first wrote about the possibility of a “pioneering market-based transfer of [C-band] spectrum to higher value uses” which could allow satellite operators to sell part of the C-band to boost Verizon’s 5G network capacity. In that time, the process has moved forward significantly, with the FCC issuing an NPRM in July, to which comments and reply comments were received late last year.

Opposition from the cable companies has been growing, as they’ve become scared by the prospect of new wireless broadband competition, with Verizon, T-Mobile and AT&T all admitting that they have no better plan than to use the huge amounts of capacity that their new 5G networks will create, to compete in the fixed broadband market.

But it was truly ironic to see New America and Google team up with the cable industry last week to claim that the plan put forward in the NPRM for a private market transaction represents “The Great Airwaves Robbery” because satellite operators rather than the Treasury will receive the proceeds. Not only are these very odd bedfellows, but Google has traditionally been on the side of freeing up more spectrum and encouraging broadband competition, rather than trying to block such an effort.

However, it now seems that if Google can’t get what it wants in the C-band (meaning essentially free access to the band on a shared basis), it will seek to derail the plan for a market-based approach. While one reason for Google to mount this effort is to prevent C-band from undermining interest in the CBRS band in which has invested a lot of time and resources, a cynic might also say that Google would prefer a “Political Spectrum” where the FCC would be able to insert policy provisions that suit Google, especially since an FCC-run auction wouldn’t take place until after the next Presidential election in November 2020.

That’s certainly been the case in the past, when Google persuaded (Republican) FCC Chair Kevin Martin to include Open Access provisions covering the upper C-block into the rules for the 700MHz auction in 2008. Of course, despite the fact that the Open Access conditions ultimately proved to have no effect on the wireless market, Google didn’t care that these provisions meant that the C-block spectrum sold (to Verizon) for less than half the price of the unrestricted paired A and B blocks, costing the Treasury something like $6B in auction proceeds.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the various sides of the C-band debate appear to want to capture all of the benefits for themselves, without looking for a compromise solution. This includes the satellite operators, where Preston Padden of the C-band Alliance (CBA) has claimed that there is “no alternative” to the CBA Plan, which gives all of the control and sale proceeds to the satellite operators. In fact there is a fairly simple compromise option, which follows the traditional FCC model of splitting the baby, so everyone gets something out of the process. That was followed back in 2003, when the initial approval of Ancillary Terrestrial Component (ATC) flexibility for MSS operators was given in exchange for 30MHz of the 70MHz of 2GHz band MSS spectrum being reallocated to terrestrial services (this ultimately became the G block and H block spectrum).

So a relatively simple solution at this point would be to allow the satellite operators to sell the 180MHz of spectrum at the bottom of the C-band, and keep the proceeds (part of which would be used to pay for new satellites and filters to enable continuation of video delivery in the remaining 300MHz of spectrum), while the FCC conducted an overlay auction of terrestrial mobile licenses in the rest of the band (excluding a modest guardband of perhaps 50-100MHz below 4200MHz to preserve key services and protect aeronautical users in the 4200-4400MHz band). Purchasers of the overlay licenses (which would cost considerably less than the spectrum being sold by the CBA) would then be able to pay C-band earth station owners to move their earth stations away from major cities or migrate them to fiber, in order to clear the spectrum in high demand areas, with no additional compensation due to the satellite operators (since the satellite operators would already be receiving a windfall from the spectrum they sold).

All parties could then be compensated: the satellite operators would receive proceeds from selling 180MHz of spectrum (potentially worth $11B-$18B at $0.20-$0.30/MHzPOP), the Treasury would receive proceeds from the overlay auction (potentially worth $4B-$5B from selling 270MHz at $0.05/MHzPOP) and the earth station operators would receive compensation if they decided to migrate to fiber or relocate their earth stations to clear the overlay spectrum. And both the FCC and the wireless operators would be happy, with T-Mobile’s demand for 300MHz+ to be made available being met if they bought the overlay licenses and paid to clear the spectrum in the areas where they needed spectrum, while Verizon and AT&T could get the spectrum they need in the near term by agreeing a deal with the CBA. Even Google could acquire spectrum in the overlay auction, if they really did want to buy spectrum, rather than just prevent others from getting hold of it.

Of course the cable operators might not be happy with the additional competition for their broadband business, but they would also have the option to acquire spectrum in the overlay auction, and compete in the wireless market themselves, especially since they would have an easier time clearing their own earth stations out of the band. And if they didn’t want to do that, they could hold out for compensation from the holders of the overlay licenses.

Will the CTIA and the wireless operators now be prepared to push for such a compromise? Will the satellite operators accept that they can’t have it all? And will the cable operators and Google accept that blocking the reallocation of C-band spectrum to terrestrial is an unacceptable outcome? That depends on whether the FCC is willing to rule that none of the parties should get all of what they want, but everyone can get something.


The New New Space Thing…

Posted in Broadband, Financials, Operators, Regulatory, Services, SpaceX, Spectrum at 5:32 pm by timfarrar

Michael Lewis’s book “The New New Thing” was published the same week as I moved to Silicon Valley in October 1999 and provided a great tour through the landscape at the high point of the Dotcom Bubble, just as his Liar’s Poker was a signature story of the 1980s Wall Street boom. Unfortunately we don’t have anything quite the same about New Space, although Tim Fernholz’s book comes close.

However, just as it was obvious back in 1999 quite how untethered Silicon Valley had become from real world business models, the New New Space industry seems intent on demonstrating the same about the space sector. In recent months I’ve heard about numerous planned nano-satellite constellations that are struggling to raise funding (beyond their $10M or so in proof of concept venture capital) and may run out of money soon, because they simply don’t have a credible business plan.

Looking elsewhere, it seems that 5G IoT and “Armani WiFi” are not really such convincing buzzwords after all (sorry Charlie and Jay), and Ligado’s lobbyists can’t outwit Brad Parkinson’s “fervent ally” in the White House, so some if not all of those multi-billion dollar investments will soon prove to be a complete debacle as well.

But the poster child for the bursting of the bubble can be seen in SpaceX’s increasing frantic attempts to raise money in the face of a rapid decline in launch demand, and increasing competition from Blue Origin, which doesn’t need to make a profit. Firing your bankers because they are nervous about how much additional debt you will take on in the future is a bad sign, and redesigning your constellation to hide its problems seems even more bizarre.

SpaceX’s launch tempo is already falling, with 10 launches now scheduled for the second half of 2018 compared to 12 in the first half, far short of the 50% increase in 2018 launches and medium term 30-40 launches per year that the company predicted only a year ago. So its an open question what the core business is worth, but with $270M in LTM adjusted EBITDA (which counts deposits and excludes some R&D) and a declining revenue outlook for 2019, the valuation of $28B achieved this spring is clearly ludicrous.

SpaceX’s attempts to find new sources of revenue are also proving deeply problematic because the broadband satellite constellation business now appears to be in even more dire straits than the launch business. Recently rumors have circulated that SoftBank is looking to exit from OneWeb (before the next tranche of its $1B equity commitment is due after the test satellites are launched in early 2019), as the system costs increase and questions abound over the size of the market opportunity for satellite broadband. Certainly Masa Son’s attitude to the project appears to have changed dramatically in the last year, from touting satellite as an alternative to fiber, to not even mentioning satellite in a recent lengthy feature on the Vision Fund.

And finally, given the lack of demand for launch services, the need for the BFR now seems highly questionable, except as a vehicle for space tourism. Since SpaceX is likely to have investment needs of $1B+ per year just for BFR and the debt capacity of the company is unlikely to be more than about $2B, it therefore wouldn’t be in the least surprising if the company’s next step in 2019 is to start taking more deposits from potential tourists who want to emulate Japanese billionaire Yusaku Maezawa. In the meantime, soliciting contracts from anyone who might offer a cash deposit seems like another avenue SpaceX will be exploring.

Looking back once again to 1999, it seems quite relevant to note that the first major meltdown (the Iridium bankruptcy) came in August 1999, well before the bursting of the wider tech bubble. And it now appears that there are several multi-billion dollar satellite projects that could suffer the same fate within the next year. What will that mean for investor perceptions? Will incumbents benefit? And which elements of this new technology will prove to be useful in the long run?


Fake it till you make it?

Posted in Broadband, Financials, Operators, Regulatory, Services, SpaceX, Spectrum at 1:03 pm by timfarrar

As students of history and those who were there at the time (such as FCC International Bureau chief Jose Albuquerque) know only too well, sometimes a dud satellite can be just as good as a real one for promoters of a new broadband LEO system. Back in February 1998, the Teledesic BATSAT apparently never worked properly (some say not at all), but the launch was instrumental in causing Prince Alwaleed to invest $200M in the company in April and more importantly in persuading Motorola to abandon its own Celestri LEO system and join forces with Teledesic in May 1998, investing $750M for a 26% stake.

So the question now is whether SpaceX is in the same position with Starlink? After all, when basking in the glow of apparent back-to-back successes with Falcon Heavy and Starlink during February 2018, followed by receipt of its constellation license from the FCC, SpaceX raised $500M the following month at a reported valuation as high as $27B, supposedly to develop the Starlink constellation.

And subsequently, SpaceX has been positioning itself to play a role in DARPA’s Blackjack satellite constellation program, which will provide total funding of up to $117.5M to be split between several bidders. Notably, SpaceX filed a new experimental application with the FCC in August 2018 “to reflect additional test activities undertaken with the federal government” and add “two new types of earth stations, one of which will transmit uplink signals to the Microsat satellites first from the ground and later from a moving aircraft”. In that application, SpaceX told the FCC that:

“These experimental engineering verification vehicles are currently engaged in the test regimen as authorized, in order to enable the company to assess the satellite bus and related subsystems, as well as the operation of space-based and ground-based phased array technologies.”

As he looks to secure both DARPA funding (which should be announced in the next couple of weeks) and FCC approval of the new experimental license application, Elon Musk is certainly extraordinarily sensitive to any suggestion that there might be a problem with Starlink. Notably, within a few hours after my previous blog post appeared on September 18, it seems he planted a (rather bizarre) question on Twitter so that he could state that “Starlink should be active by then [2023]“. Indeed, he was so keen to get this assertion out there that the same question was posted twice.

And if we look back to Elon’s previous tweet about the status of Starlink, its hard to believe it was purely a coincidence that this information was released the day after DARPA’s Blackjack solicitation.

But the reality is that the Starlink satellites have not performed in accordance with the plan that SpaceX presented to the FCC as recently as February 1, 2018, when Patricia Cooper told the FCC that:

“As set out in the original application, after system checkouts are performed and the system is evaluated as ready to proceed, SpaceX will engage in orbit-raising maneuvers until the spacecraft reach a circular orbit at an altitude of 1,125km.”

And the original application stated that:

“After system checkouts are performed and the system is evaluated as ready to proceed, the orbit-raising phase of the mission will commence. This segment will last approximately half a year depending on system performance.”

But what has actually happened? Both satellites have remained around the launch altitude of 514km, with TinTin A not showing any meaningful evidence of propulsion since at least early March, and TinTin B not experiencing any significant change in altitude after attempting a few orbital maneuvers. So it seems all but certain that there has been a major issue with the propulsion system onboard both of the Starlink satellites.

When confronted with the rumors of a satellite failure by SpaceIntelReport, SpaceX stated that the satellites “were delivered to their intended orbit, communicated with ground stations, continue to communicate with ground stations, and remain in operation today.” That may all be true, but says nothing about whether the propulsion system has failed.

Unsurprisingly such a failure would put SpaceX in a very awkward position, when there were already many questions about whether Starlink would go forward, not least because the satellites may not reach the correct orbit to bring SpaceX’s ITU filing into use, and the FCC’s experimental authorization was based on the assumption that mission operations would be conducted at 1125km. And if SpaceX cannot build satellites with a reliable propulsion system, that would reinforce concerns expressed by FCC Commissioner Rosenworcel in SpaceX’s license grant that “the FCC has to tackle the growing challenge posed by orbital debris.”


420,000 km. Funding secured!

Posted in Broadband, Financials, Operators, Regulatory, Services, SpaceX, Spectrum at 7:32 am by timfarrar

Yes I know it’s only 384,000 km to the Moon, but just like Elon, I decided to round up. After all, it’s apparently “better karma”!

Last night’s SpaceX event raised a lot of questions for many observers, not least because it “caught some SpaceX employees off guard” and was rushed out so fast that some of the promotional imagery was incorrect. However, I suspect that the reason for this surprise announcement was to distract from impending bad news about the Starlink project, namely that the project has for all intents and purposes been put on hold.

We already knew that there was a significant reduction in hiring in early July, but I’m told the cutbacks went much deeper, with a significant fraction of the Starlink team departing. SpaceX was also looking to develop a more concrete business plan for the project in Q2, but I believe it proved impossible to come up with anything remotely close to the ludicrous forecasts from 2016 reported by the Wall St Journal that suggested the project would have over 40M subscribers and $30B in annual revenues by 2025.

Ironically enough, the principal mention of Starlink last night was as a source of funding for the BFR development. It makes no sense whatsoever to think that Starlink will generate profits to fund a $5B+ BFR development between now and 2023, so the only logical conclusion is that money raised for Starlink will now be diverted to the BFR. Another hint that Starlink is going away was the statement that BFR is expected to consume the majority of engineering resources after the commercial crew development has been completed for NASA next year, despite Starlink supposedly costing more to develop than BFR ($10B+ compared to ~$5B) over the next 5 years.

However, without Starlink to support the business plan, SpaceX will face significant challenges in sustaining its reported $27B valuation, as it grapples with an expected reduction from 28 to 18 launches next year, which will very likely cause overall revenues to decline in 2019. It’s also notable that when Viasat decided to contract with ULA (seeking a US launch provider so as to support its upcoming expected request for Ex-Im Bank funding), it reportedly did not even invite SpaceX to bid, presumably because of a lack of confidence in the future of Falcon Heavy (since the upgraded Falcon 9 Block 5 will now suffice for most GEO satellites).

It’s only natural that SpaceX would look for a replacement market that can be projected to generate billions of dollars of profitable revenue, and the company now appears to have settled on space tourism, as previewed by Gwynne Shotwell last week, when she suggested that it “will probably be the majority of our business in the future, flying people” with “7 billion potential payloads“.

However, the critical question is whether investors will remain sanguine about such a dramatic transformation in where over 80% of SpaceX’s future revenues are supposed to come from. Do investors that thought they were investing in the future of connectivity, really want to invest in taking rich people to space? And does the checkered track record of space tourism give them confidence that Elon’s promises will actually be realized, especially as it will take 5+ years and $5B+ of additional investment (even by Elon’s optimistic estimates) before the BFR is ready to transport passengers to the Moon?


Please don’t throw me into the briar patch!

Posted in Intelsat, Operators, Regulatory, SES, Spectrum at 4:50 pm by timfarrar

It took a while, but it seems that in April investors in Intelsat finally noticed my January blog post, and started to believe in the potential for a windfall from C-band monetization, causing the share price to jump from well under $5 to over $14 now. That’s brought out a lot of new skeptics, who are highlighting differences in both the share price performance and results call commentary at Intelsat and SES.

Some even appear to believe that SES is opposed to ever monetizing more than 100MHz of spectrum, when in fact Intelsat and SES have jointly conveyed the opposite message to the FCC, stating in April:

“For these reasons, Intelsat and SES have proposed an amount of spectrum clearing – 100 MHz available for terrestrial mobile use plus additional transition band spectrum needed to ensure that 5G operations are compatible with ongoing Fixed Satellite Service (“FSS”) to customers in the uncleared spectrum – that they believe can reasonably be accomplished within 18-36 months following a final Commission order. The Parties stated that if the terrestrial demand for mid-band spectrum is as robust as claimed, their market-based approach could result in additional spectrum being cleared in the future – but in a manner and timeframe that protects Intelsat’s and SES’s customers and their businesses.”

So it’s hard to understand why people would see Commissioner O’Rielly’s remarks that “To make this worthwhile, an adequate amount of spectrum – at least 200 or 300 megahertz to start – needs to be made available in this band” as a sign of opposition to a private transaction. That’s especially true when he also said that “This method provides an attractive option that should be thoroughly considered, particularly because of the speed in which it could bring the spectrum to market” and it aligns perfectly with Republican ideals, as described in Tom Hazlett’s book “The Political Spectrum”, that the FCC should allow market forces to reallocate spectrum to the highest and best use.

Certainly there are concerns about the pace of reallocation, given the complexity of moving current users around, and ultimately unwinding the substantial cross-subsidies from large to small cable companies that are inherent in the way distribution of content via satellite is paid for today. However, an outcome along the lines of “sell 100MHz now, then another 200MHz+ within 5 years” (with the option to clear the remainder within say 10 years), is certainly plausible.

At that point any complaints from satellite operators about being forced to clear too much spectrum would be reminiscent of Brer Rabbit saying to Brer Fox “please don’t throw me into the briar patch” because even skeptics like FT Alphaville indicate that the C-band spectrum should be worth more than the ~$0.13/MHzPOP paid in the recent UK spectrum auction (£1164M for 200MHz of spectrum from 3400-3600MHz), putting a valuation in excess of $20B on the entire 500MHz spectrum band.

Another concern expressed by skeptics is that any proceeds would take years to be realized, which is hard to comprehend for the first 100MHz of spectrum (worth $4B+ according to the FT’s assumption), since as in all spectrum sales, the buyer pays upfront and only then is the spectrum cleared. Indeed, if Intelsat and SES were to accept a pre-emptive offer for this initial slice of spectrum (as suggested in my January blog post), a deal could be even in hand at the time that a final FCC order is issued, rather than a process being run after the order is approved. Assuming the initial NPRM is issued soon (plausibly at the July FCC open meeting), that could advance the timing of receipts to the middle of 2019 rather than the very end of 2019 or more likely some time in 2020.

One remaining question raised above relates to the divergent performance of Intelsat and SES’s share price in recent months. But I think this is easily explained by investors believing that SES might well re-invest any windfall into more O3b satellites (where the ultimate return on capital is far from certain), while Intelsat will pay off its debts, stop spending money on new satellites, and return capital to shareholders.

Indeed if you believe that the future of large parts of the FSS industry could look a lot like the dial-up internet business in the mid-2000s, the best bet for Intelsat might then be to sell off its Ku-band data satellites to OneWeb and run the company purely to generate cash from running its legacy satellites and from monetizing its spectrum over time.

So despite me being one of the most skeptical people around on the ability of DISH, Ligado or Globalstar to realize a windfall from their spectrum holdings, I simply don’t understand why investors who apparently don’t know much about spectrum issues think now is a good time to be shorting Intelsat. In early 2017, I didn’t believe that Straight Path would find a buyer that was desperate to establish a leadership position in 5G spectrum in the shape of Verizon, let alone draw AT&T into a bidding war (not least because much more mmWave spectrum will be auctioned in the future). Though at least I wasn’t alone, because even Straight Path’s management was left in disbelief about the result.

But with that as the example, and the C-band now representing the most obvious (and perhaps only) opportunity to acquire a very large block of spectrum for high power mobile use, with much better propagation characteristics than mmWave spectrum and at a fraction of the price of DISH, Ligado or Globalstar’s spectrum, I think it would be foolish to assume that a Straight Path-like outcome won’t happen again.


The art of the deal…

Posted in AT&T, DISH, Operators, Regulatory, Spectrum, T-Mobile, Verizon at 5:40 am by timfarrar

Before yesterday’s Axios article suggesting that President Trump’s National Security Council has set its sights on using the 3.7-4.2GHz satellite C-band downlink spectrum for a national 5G network, it was clear that analysts were underestimating the importance of this spectrum band for the US wireless industry. For example, Morgan Stanley’s January 17 downgrade of DISH Network identified Verizon as the “only suitor” for DISH’s spectrum but only suggested the CBRS auction as an alternative option for Verizon to acquire more spectrum.

It seems few people have read the reply comments filed by wireless operators in the FCC’s mid-band spectrum proceeding last November, where Verizon suggested there should be a a near term NPRM with market-based clearance mechanisms, rather than FCC-run auctions for this band. In contrast, AT&T asked for “substantial record development, including additional analysis and modeling” before the FCC moves forward with an NPRM, and T-Mobile said the FCC should reject Intelsat’s proposal and instead take control of the auction process, with a defined post-auction band plan and payments to incumbents from the auction proceeds, part of which would fund the clearance of existing users.

A logical conclusion is that Verizon believes it could be the sole player to acquire spectrum rights in this band (to supplement its 5G mmWave buildout plans) via a deal with Intelsat, while AT&T has relatively little interest due to its focus on the 700MHz FirstNet buildout and securing additional mmWave spectrum allocations, and T-Mobile is trying to ensure that Verizon is unable to monopolize this spectrum band by asking for a more open auction process.

One important consideration is that the power restrictions that will apply to the CBRS band to permit spectrum sharing may not be necessary above 3.7GHz and therefore with MIMO this band could be deployed for urban coverage on approximately the same cell grid used for PCS and AWS spectrum, as Qualcomm and Nokia have indicated, and as is planned in Europe, where the 3.4-3.8GHz band is being auctioned.

Since the reply comments were filed, Intelsat has continued to push hard for a near-term NPRM and given the difficulties that the FCC would encounter in defining how a “market-based” transaction should occur, it is entirely plausible that an exclusive spectrum deal between Intelsat and Verizon could be struck shortly after a draft NPRM was issued. By selling say 100MHz of spectrum to Verizon, Intelsat would establish a benchmark valuation for its C-band spectrum assets, while being able to maintain existing video distribution services within the remaining 400MHz of spectrum. Of course, Verizon would also presumably be happy to see Charlie Ergen left at the altar without his “only suitor”.

The Trump NSC memo only serves to increase the pressure to execute such a transaction, and pre-empt any (still remote) possibility of the spectrum being “nationalized”. Verizon could certainly promise to build a 5G network using this spectrum within 3 years, without government intervention, and gain an even more concrete lead in 5G network superiority. Meanwhile Intelsat (and other satellite operators including SES) could keep providing their existing C-band video distribution services and receive billions in cash plus additional billions in attributed spectrum value for the remaining 400MHz of spectrum, and the FCC could achieve a pioneering market-based transfer of spectrum to higher value uses. What’s not to like about that deal (unless you are AT&T, T-Mobile or DISH)?


Ajit Pai wins the internet!

Posted in General, Regulatory, Spectrum at 2:12 pm by timfarrar

A couple of weeks ago I pointed out that the net neutrality debate has been overwhelmed by ludicrous hyperbole that this is “the end of the internet as we know it“. Of course, that won’t be the case, making Chairman Pai’s mockery of these predictions a winning political strategy.

In fact, ironically enough, the current outcry has made it easier for the new disclosure-based regime to operate effectively: consumer advocates will be watching out for perceived violations of net neutrality principles and if they can drum up sufficient outrage about unfairness or antitrust violations, then the FTC will be forced to take action. However, its hard to see technical violations which (at least in the short term) benefit consumers, such as zero rating or content bundling, prompting much of an outcry. And even supporters of net neutrality agree that the big tech companies are likely to benefit from the new rules.

But what I find interesting here is the long political game. Its amusing to see net neutrality proponents accusing Pai of being a shill for Verizon and the cable companies. While many past FCC commissioners have simply gone through the revolving door to make millions in the industry, Chairman Pai has the talent and ambition to achieve much bigger goals.

Its already been reported that Pai turned down the offer to run for a seat in the House of Representatives, preferring to wait for the opportunity to be governor of Kansas or a senator. Now he’s become such a household name that The Onion can joke his face is on every computer screen in the nation. And this signature win on net neutrality even caused the New York Times to describe him as “one of the most effective FCC chairmen in decades”, before they decided(!) to delete that phrase.

Given how easy it will be to portray net neutrality opponents as “fake news”, Pai has a clear political platform to run on and it wouldn’t be in the least bit surprising to me to see him ultimately figuring as part of the Presidential or Vice Presidential race in 2028 or 2032. In that context its intriguing to consider what other hot button political issues might come within the overall ambit of the FCC. One area is freeing up spectrum, where there are possibilities for a big bipartisan win with the satellite C-band downlink.

However, an even bigger issue (as highlighted in my last post) is that Pai has already shifted to raising questions about whether you can you trust Silicon Valley companies, such as Google, Facebook and Twitter. And as noted above, many people think these companies are likely to get even stronger after the abolition of net neutrality rules. So a winning populist theme in the latter part of this administration could well be to threaten to cut these companies down to size, potentially with the helpful side effect of limiting their influence (which next time around will more likely reflect these companies’ preference for Democrats) in the 2020 election.

As a result, I think Silicon Valley now has to be concerned not just about losing the favors it has been granted on a regular basis for the last 20 years, but a rising hostility within government to the big tech companies and their role both in the economy and in political dialog.


Tilting the playing field…

Posted in AT&T, Operators, Regulatory, Services, Spectrum, Verizon at 11:08 am by timfarrar

Over the last week its been frustrating to see what should be a technical debate about the best way to regulate access networks deteriorate into ludicrous hyperbole about how “repealing net neutrality would end the internet as we know it” when in reality it “isn’t the end of the world“.

At its core this is really a debate about whether you can trust businesses in general and ISPs in particular, with Republicans declaring that a free market is the best solution to promote investment, whereas Democrats are saying that regulation is needed due to the lack of competition in access networks. Thus one side says “Net neutrality rules are unnecessary because ISPs will do the right thing” whereas the other side says its “the very laziest of anti-net neutrality tropes [to say] that the wolf hasn’t eaten the sheep yet so let’s trust the wolf.” And of course, once politics are involved, the current climate means that everything gets blown out of proportion.

In reality the right answer probably lies somewhere in the middle, which is what sensible commentators like Ben Thompson and Dean Bubley are trying to feel their way towards. Ben’s commentary in particular has come under criticism because he “assumes public intervention is costly and corrupt, that telecoms are accurate, and that there’s no role for morality” despite there being plenty of evidence of previous regulatory failures in Tom Hazlett’s recent book “The Political Spectrum”. However, its not unreasonable to think that trying a light touch approach backed up by antitrust enforcement is a good idea and that “framing these trade-offs as moral choices” is unhelpful.

Perhaps it is true that the best answer would have been to push harder on unbundling local loops to facilitate service-based competition on telco networks, just as in Europe, but that ship sailed 15 years ago when the CLECs went bankrupt. Instead, going all the way back to the 1996 Telecom Act, the US has focused on infrastructure-based competition between cable and telcos, which unsurprisingly hasn’t produced the same level of competition, due to the cost of maintaining multiple access networks.

Maybe this is a failed model and we now have to be content with regulating the current oligopoly of cable and telcos to ensure they don’t behave badly (and we can certainly debate exactly how much regulation is needed to achieve that). But perhaps wireless broadband will provide some level of new competition for fixed providers. I dismissed that possibility 6 years ago, but now I’m increasingly convinced that the enormous efficiency gains coming from MIMO will provide wireless operators with more capacity than they know what to do with, enabling them to deliver wireless broadband in the home to at least some (meaningful) number of consumers.

Whether that’s ultimately 10% or 30% of households very much depends on how much capital is available to invest in those networks. And how good the performance will be remains to be seen – after all the 13% of adults who are smartphone only internet users are mostly doing it for cost reasons and “often encounter difficulties like accessing and reading content, as well as trouble submitting files and documents.”

But that’s not my primary focus here. One point made by net neutrality proponents such as Barbara van Schewick is that for the last 20 years, the regulation of telecom networks has been backed by both Republican and Democrat administrations and so the current proposal is a radical change in precedent. You can argue with the truth of that prediction, depending on whether you think the FTC will actively enforce antitrust law to deal with future net neutrality problems, but what is interesting to me is that many of the actions cited by van Schewick were taken to support content providers like Netflix or Google when those companies had a lot less power than they do today.

Some of those actions had significant costs, such as (Republican FCC chairman) Kevin Martin’s decision to attach “lifetime net neutrality conditions to parts of the 4G spectrum that [the FCC] auctioned off in 2008″. That action was taken at the behest of Google, but the result was that Verizon acquired 22MHz of upper C-block spectrum for only $0.76/MHzPOP, a 41% discount to the average price in the auction, and a more than 70% discount to the price paid (mainly by AT&T) for the lower B-block. Thus Google’s “net neutrality” lobbying effort potentially cost the government somewhere between $5B and $10B in lost auction proceeds, without having any substantial impact on the wireless services you receive today (are you more likely to choose Verizon because some of its spectrum comes with “open access” conditions?).

Of course net neutrality has not been the only area where Silicon Valley companies have sought or obtained favorable regulatory treatment compared to telcos and cable companies. The last Commission’s set top box proceeding and proposed privacy regulations were both seen as favoring Google, Amazon and Netflix over Verizon and Comcast. The current Commission is tilting the playing field back towards access providers by abandoning these efforts and dismantling the net neutrality rules, and opponents argue that it is going too far, because of the lack of competition in access provision and because they don’t trust the wolves at Comcast, Verizon and AT&T.

But if its now a debate about whether you can trust businesses in general to behave reasonably, can you trust Silicon Valley companies any more than ISPs? Do Google and Netflix need regulatory advantages over ISPs now they are so powerful? Are ISPs any more of a monopoly than Google or Facebook or Twitter, and which of them are more likely to be disrupted in the future? Those are the questions that are now being raised, most explicitly in Chairman Pai’s speech yesterday, where he noted that:

“despite all the talk about the fear that broadband providers could decide what Internet content consumers can see, recent experience shows that so-called edge providers are in fact deciding what content they see. These providers routinely block or discriminate against content they don’t like

Nonetheless, these companies want to place much tougher regulations on broadband providers than they are willing to have placed upon themselves. So let’s be clear. They might cloak their advocacy in the public interest, but the real interest of these Internet giants is in using the regulatory process to cement their dominance in the Internet economy.
And here’s the thing: I don’t blame them for trying. But the government shouldn’t aid and abet this effort. We have no business picking winners and losers in the marketplace. A level playing field, not regulatory arbitrage, is what best serves consumers and competition.”

In fact a more directly relevant example than speech censorship comes from Netflix itself, which proclaims its support for “strong Net Neutrality” (and is seen as one of the key beneficiaries) but back in September was trying to muscle inflight connectivity providers into zero rating Netflix video content if they wanted access to Netflix’s improved codecs to minimize bandwidth consumption onboard. Ironically enough, inflight connectivity is seen by net neutrality supporters as a good example of what non-neutral networks might look like.

I’ve been warning for a while that Silicon Valley is not well positioned to succeed in building telecom networks (or cars) and so would not be favored under this infrastructure-focused administration. And that’s far from the only cause of a backlash. But now I think there’s good reason for “the entire tech industry [to be] flipping its shit” because tech companies are the most likely losers even if we don’t end up in all-out partisan warfare, but simply remove the regulatory favoritism that Silicon Valley has benefitted from for the last 20 years.


Set up to fail?

Posted in LightSquared, Operators, Regulatory, Spectrum at 10:35 am by timfarrar

Last week, Fierce Wireless reminded everyone that LightSquared was “one of the 10 worst telecom business moves of the last 10 years.” But now it may be time to consider if Ligado is going to appear on a similar list in a few years time.

On October 10, Brad Parkinson of the PNT Advisory Board invited Doug Smith, CEO of Ligado, to present to them at the meeting in Redondo Beach, CA on November 15. The letter advised Smith to “specifically describe your implementation plan, with a corresponding test plan addressing the issues we have openly raised” noting that “without these specific technical details and corresponding evaluations, we can only conjecture as to what you are really proposing.”

Parkinson’s letter also refers obliquely to Smith’s letter of July 6, noting that “from its tone, it is clear we still have several communications difficulties.” That’s quite an understatement, given that the July 6 letter accuses Parkinson of “willful blindness” about the specific details of Ligado’s public proposal and complains vehemently that the Board gave a “platform to Iridium’s unfounded and irrelevant concerns.”

Ligado has little alternative but to accept the invitation (and I’m told it already has), but the sub-text here is that the PNT Advisory Board meeting is full of technical experts who will undoubtedly be able to pick apart Ligado’s assertions (as stated to the FCC in June 2017) that a “consensus of industry and scientific opinion” backs Ligado’s proposal.

Indeed, the PNT Advisory Board has already advised the Executive Committee (chaired by the DoT and DoD) in July that Ligado’s “current proposal is fundamentally the same as the proposal tested in 2011″ and so the government faces a choice between:

1) Protect current and evolving uses of GPS, military and civilian, as a matter of national priority,
2) Approve high power terrestrial mobile broadband application in frequency bands adjacent to the GPS that would very likely cause harmful interference to both government and private sector GPS applications.

Its important to recognize that the PNT Advisory Board is attempting to ensure that the EXCOM can’t do anything other than recommend Ligado’s proposal be shelved, boxing in both NTIA and ultimately the FCC, just as in early 2012, when the EXCOM letter to NTIA was reflected in the NTIA letter to the FCC and the FCC’s proposal to suspend LightSquared’s terrestrial authorization.

Ligado has been claiming to investors that it has Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao onside and she will overrule the concerns of the DoT engineers, as well as suggesting that the nominee for NTIA Administrator David Redl is a firm supporter of freeing up this spectrum. Nevertheless, last time around LightSquared’s political backers ran for cover at the first sign of trouble and there are other voices in government, such as Scott Pace at the National Space Council, who have taken a very different position in the past.

It is fair to say that the DoT’s ABC study conclusions, that Ligado should only be permitted to operate at a few mW of downlink power are an overly conservative “worst case of the worst case” assessment. However, the DoT’s aim here is not to find a compromise but to get rid of Ligado, just as in 2011 when the FAA suggested that LightSquared could kill 800 people over 10 years.

Ironically enough, I think there could be viable technical solutions to most of these problems, such as Ligado offering to buy back or repair all affected GPS receivers, which would be cheap compared to the more than $500M of interest that the company is accruing each year on its outstanding debt. However, Ligado once again appears more interested in political lobbying efforts to obtain approval, and opponents are again using the possibility of catastrophic outcomes to block that. So just as in 2011-12, Ligado now appears likely to drown in the political swamp that it has created.

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