11.29.11

Not very happy holidays for the MSS sector…

Posted in Aeronautical, Broadband, Globalstar, Handheld, Inmarsat, Iridium, LDR, Maritime, Operators, Orbcomm, Services, TerreStar, VSAT at 12:20 pm by timfarrar

As I remarked in an interview for the Satellite 2012 downlink newsletter yesterday, 2011 has seen a dramatic deceleration in MSS revenue growth, with wholesale service revenues now expected to grow by less than 3% in 2011, compared to the 7%-8% growth seen in each of 2008, 2009 and 2010. Yesterday we also released our latest industry report which gives ten year forecasts for MSS industry growth. In the L-band market (including Inmarsat L-band, LightSquared, Thuraya, Iridium, Globalstar and Orbcomm) we project cumulative revenue growth from 2010 to 2020 of only 4% p.a. and even when Global Xpress is added to Inmarsat’s revenues in the latter part of the decade, the overall cumulative growth rate is only increased to around 6% p.a.

This represents a striking contrast with widely quoted forecasts from Euroconsult and NSR, that the MSS market (excluding GX) will grow at 7% p.a. over the decade (Euroconsult) or 10% p.a. from 2010-15 (NSR). These optimistic forecasts seem to have achieved wide currency with analysts and bankers, who have argued (for example at the Satcon conference in October) that the MSS industry is more attractive than the FSS industry because of its much faster growth profile. One example that stands out is a JP Morgan analyst report on Inmarsat, published last Thursday, which gives an upbeat assessment of Inmarsat’s prospects and projects a target price of 800p per share (roughly double the current level). Not only does JPM expect LightSquared’s spectrum lease payments to be continued indefinitely after they file for bankruptcy (which is ludicrously unrealistic once you understand that LightSquared’s political backing has evaporated and even the FCC has basically given up on them, but may reflect the fact that JPM co-led (with UBS) the sale of LightSquared’s first lien debt earlier this year), but they expect Inmarsat’s core L-band business to resume growth at 2.5% p.a. from 2012 and Global Xpress to achieve Inmarsat’s target of $500M in annual revenues after 5 years.

Where do we differ with Euroconsult and NSR? It appears the primary source of the discrepancy is in our expectations for the maritime and aeronautical L-band markets. According to the JPM report, NSR is projecting 11% p.a. and 13% p.a. growth respectively for the maritime and aeronautical segments between 2010 and 2015. We are told that Euroconsult also takes a relatively optimistic view of the outlook for the maritime and aeronautical L-band markets. However, our expectations are that wholesale maritime and aeronautical L-band service revenues will actually decline between 2010 and 2020, as customers move to Global Xpress and other VSAT solutions. As a result, future L-band growth will have to come from land-based services, particularly low speed data and (to a much lesser extent) handheld satellite phones. That’s relatively good news for Iridium and Globalstar (as well as Orbcomm, if they can continue to gain momentum), but its still unclear whether ~8% p.a. growth in land MSS revenues will be sufficient for all of these companies to thrive in the face of what will inevitably be an ever-increasing focus by Inmarsat on this part of the MSS market.

If you are interested in our latest report, which also includes a detailed analysis of Inmarsat’s maritime market outlook and forecasts for in-flight passenger communications services, as well as discussion of the current prospects for terrestrial use of MSS spectrum, please contact us for more details about our MSS information service.

02.07.11

Who will Aircell’s next airline customer be?

Posted in Aeronautical, Financials, Services at 4:58 pm by timfarrar

The most intriguing aspect of today’s announcement by Aircell that it had raised $35M and was preparing for an IPO, was buried deep in the press release, which indicated that “in 2011, Aircell expects to increase its base of installed aircraft by an average of three per day in the airline market”. At the end of 2010, Aircell was on nearly 1100 planes, and we know about some of the planned installations for 2011, including 223 of Delta’s regional jets and the possibility that United will eventually decide which way to jump.

Nevertheless, I have a hard time getting to 1100 more installations in 2011, given Aircell’s existing dominance of the US market and the fact that Canadian network deployment is not expected until the end of the year. However, with recent personnel changes at Southwest and the fact that Southwest’s purchase of AirTran will mean it has more aircraft equipped with Aircell than with Row44, it is intriguing to speculate about whether Southwest might once again be up for grabs, just as Alaska switched a year ago. Certainly that seems rather more plausible than the idea that Southwest will now decide to buy Row44, and would fit with my prediction back in March 2010 that Southwest will never complete its fleetwide deployment with Row44.

09.23.10

JetBlue Ka-band connectivity: will it be free?

Posted in Aeronautical, Inmarsat, Operators at 11:59 am by timfarrar

Its now been announced that JetBlue has signed an MOU with Viasat to install Ka-band connectivity on its fleet, starting in 2012. One of the primary reasons cited by JetBlue was that the satellite capacity was much cheaper than at Ku-band.

We analyzed the cost of providing service for Aircell and Row44 in one of our recent research reports, and concluded that (as JetBlue also asserted), Ku-band satellite capacity can rapidly become the dominant cost driver for aeronautical broadband even at moderate usage levels and take rates. For example, we estimated that at a 25% take-rate, the cost of Ku-band satellite capacity would be between $30K and $80K per plane per year, depending on the amount of bandwidth allocated to each customer. This compares to an amortized satellite equipment cost of perhaps $40K per plane per year. Viasat’s Ka-band satellite could reduce the capacity cost by a factor of up to about 5 times, bringing the cost of capacity down to say $6K to $16K per plane per year.

Thus the strategic question for JetBlue is whether it will use this capacity cost differential to make the service free to end users (or free for most applications other than say streaming video). As noted in past news articles, charging for in-flight broadband has a huge impact on take rates. However, Row 44 (with expensive Ku-band capacity) and Aircell (with a limited amount of terrestrial bandwidth) can’t afford to offer free usage, unless they constrain the service significantly (e.g. no streaming video and limited bandwidth). JetBlue has already offered free (albeit very limited) service on its Beta Blue plane, whereas Southwest (which will set pricing on its Row44-equipped planes) has indicated that it plans to charge for the service.

If JetBlue did offer free service, then this would certainly shake up the in-flight broadband business. Would airlines step-in to pay Aircell directly for their service instead of relying on passenger revenues? Will there be a return of the sponsorship model used on airlines like Virgin America for a period last year? More to the point, will the mere prospect of such disruption cause airlines thinking about installing Ku-band to consider waiting for Inmarsat’s new Ka-band Global Xpress service in 2014?

UPDATE: Now Southwest has agreed to buy AirTran, which already has fleetwide in-flight connectivity through Aircell, will Southwest have yet another reason to reconsider its Ku-band plans with Row44?

06.02.10

Guaranteeing a competitive future for MSS

Posted in Aeronautical, Broadband, Financials, Globalstar, Handheld, Inmarsat, Iridium, Maritime, Operators, Services, VSAT at 2:57 pm by timfarrar

So Iridium has finally announced the contract to build its NEXT satellites, which was won by Thales Alenia Space (TAS) with the support of a stunning $1.8B loan package which will be 95% guaranteed by COFACE, the French Export Credit Agency (ECA). By the sound of it, Lockheed had been confident of winning the contract, but the US Ex-Im Bank simply couldn’t match the level of support offered by COFACE.

Even Iridium appears surprised by the $1.8B Promise of Guarantee, given the suggestions in their March 2010 results call that the company would need to raise additional unsecured or subordinated debt in the public market. We had expected Iridium might need to raise $300M or more in backstop financing, based on Iridium’s April 2010 investor presentation which stated that the company was “seeking support for a[n ECA] facility of approximately $1.5B”. COFACE’s additional support therefore clearly appears to have tipped the balance in favor of TAS, because it removes the risk that Iridium would have faced in trying to tap the public markets at this point in time.

We now expect Globalstar to point out that Iridium has received an even more favorable financing package than Globalstar did last year (when Thermo was required to provide additional backstop funding as a condition of the $586M COFACE-backed facility) and potentially to seek a $200M+ extension of its current facility. This would provide funding so Globalstar could exercise its option to purchase the last 24 second generation satellites, allowing them to add more satellites to their constellation before NEXT becomes operational (and before radiation problems are expected to start impacting their 8 first generation spares in about 2015). Such a facility could also give Globalstar more firepower to market its new second generation services in 2011 and 2012, without the risk of eating into the contingent equity and debt service reserve accounts previously established by Thermo.

The next stage in this war of the Export Credit Agencies may then come in the shape of Inmarsat’s upcoming Ka-band constellation, which we expect to involve 3 or 4 dedicated Ka-band satellites (costing at least $200M each including launch and insurance), providing oceanic coverage to complement and extend its existing FleetBroadband and SwiftBroadband services. With Inmarsat’s new satellites expected to be deployed between 2013 and 2015, an order could well come as soon as this summer, when Inmarsat announces its investor guidance for the next five years. More details of Inmarsat’s plans and our expectations for their future Ka-band revenues were given in the March 2010 report, available to subscribers to our MSS information service.

The competition to build Inmarsat’s new satellites appears once again to be shaping up as a US vs European battle with TAS, SS/L and Astrium all bidding for the contract. Will ECA financing once again prove to be a key factor in the decision, even though Inmarsat has much less need for a guarantee than Iridium and Globalstar? Certainly Inmarsat has not been reluctant to seek cheap government-backed funding when it is available, as seen in its recent European Investment Bank loan to fund the Alphasat project.

In summary, its clear that ECA financing is now going to play a very substantial role in supporting the MSS industry. As a result, the prospects for a long awaited consolidation of the sector appear to be diminishing. That is certainly good news for end users of MSS, as well as service providers and distributors, who will be able to take advantage of an increasing range of competitive alternatives. This is particularly true in the maritime and aeronautical markets, where Iridium is really the only potential MSS competitor for Inmarsat. Indeed Iridium’s ability to serve these markets gives it a much more sustainable long term position than some other systems, because most maritime and aeronautical opportunities are much less likely to be undermined by the buildout of terrestrial wireless systems.

Nevertheless, it also seems hard to justify the $8B+ of capital investment that has been committed by Iridium, Globalstar and all of the other players (Iridium NEXT, Globalstar 2, Inmarsat 4, Orbcomm, ICO/DBSD, SkyTerra and TerreStar) in an industry sector which only generated $1.1B in wholesale service revenues in 2009, and though growing healthily, doesn’t appear poised to breakout from the 8% annual growth rate seen in recent years. Unless new sources of value appear (spectrum monetization being the obvious option for several players) it appears unlikely that all of the MSS operators will be as successful as they and their investors hope.

Indeed the main story of the next decade is likely to be the competition between Iridium and Globalstar, as they both strive to be the second biggest player in an MSS market that will continue to be dominated by Inmarsat, while other providers may fall by the wayside. If Iridium can grow from its current 19% share of wholesale service revenues to about a 25% market share, or Globalstar can grow from its current 5% share to 15% or more (based on its lower cost satellite system), then that should be sufficient to achieve an attractive return on capital for either company. However, with Inmarsat holding a more than 60% market share today, it appears unlikely that both Iridium and Globalstar could achieve this level of success simultaneously.

03.30.10

Back to Earth with a bump for OnAir…

Posted in Aeronautical, Inmarsat, Operators, Services at 9:23 am by timfarrar

Its turning out to be a good week for our predictions. After the announcement that Harbinger is going to build a new LTE ATC network, comes the news that Ryanair is discontinuing its in-flight connectivity service, after OnAir exercised its right to terminate the contract. Though the termination apparently “puzzled analysts”, we predicted back in 2006 and reiterated in 2008 that there wouldn’t be enough revenue for both Ryanair and OnAir to make money from the service, and so the fleetwide deployment would never be completed.

Thought Ryanair is putting a brave face on it, presumably in the hope of finding another sucker to take on the contract under similar terms and conditions, it was well known that the original contract was extremely unfavorable to OnAir (so much so that a major rival told us they wouldn’t touch it with a bargepole).

We believe that Ryanair got a cut of revenues off the top, with OnAir left to pay for the terminals out of what was left after paying expenses for airtime, termination, etc. Unsurprisingly it was therefore virtually all upside for Ryanair (bar the cost of flying the equipment around), but financially disastrous for OnAir when revenues came in at a small fraction of the EUR528K per plane per year that was originally predicted by the two companies.

OnAir Analyst Briefing Sept 27, 2007

It now seems that an approximation of reality is slowly returning to the in-flight communications market. Hopefully the next shoe to drop will be when Southwest doesn’t follow through on its fleetwide deployment plans with Row44, for exactly the same reason – there simply isn’t enough passenger revenue to pay for expensive VSAT or SwiftBroadband terminals, if both the airline and provider want to make a profit.

12.14.09

Ku-band flights of fancy

Posted in Aeronautical, Broadband, Financials, Inmarsat, Operators, Services at 5:24 pm by timfarrar

Since we last wrote on the topic in September, skepticism about the future of in-flight Internet services has become even more widespread, and recently disclosed usage data from Aircell has not been particularly impressive – roughly 100K sessions per week (of which only a fraction are paid for), equating to about a 5% take rate on equipped aircraft.

The good news is that Aircell is now touting the “operational applications” of in-flight Internet: the obvious corollary being that it is going to try and extract some money from airlines to pay for these benefits, as we suggested it would have to back in September.

The bad news is that the business case for Row44′s Ku-band service looks even more questionable than we had suspected, and it faces a near term deadline (we understand January 2010) from Southwest to secure $100M+ of funding for its planned fleetwide rollout. We have been told that the Southwest-Row44 agreement calls for Southwest to pay Row44 a fee of $0.25 per passenger flown on each equipped aircraft, whether or not they use the service, and Southwest will then mostly likely give the connectivity away for free. With Southwest carrying about 170K passengers per plane per year, that would mean Row44 receiving just over $40K per plane per year (about $22M per year in total once fleetwide installation is complete), which it hopes to supplement with advertising revenue. However, we are doubtful that a dramatic increase could be realized from advertising: for example according to a recent article, in-flight magazines generate an average of about $1M per airline per year in gross advertising revenue, and a large airline such as Southwest would presumably therefore generate in the high single digit millions of dollars from its magazine. Given the lack of technology (and power outlets) required to read the magazine, then even if Southwest gives away the Row44 service for free, usage would be far less than the 80% of passengers that read the in-flight magazine, and we would view it as unlikely that advertising revenue could add more than a few million dollars to Row44′s income.

More to the point, a free service will put an unsustainably costly load on the Row44 network: we believe this was originally designed with an expectation of loading 100 planes onto each transponder (which can provide 18Mbps of capacity), but if 25% of passengers used the network for streaming video, and other high bandwidth applications (remember that these were the primary selling point of Row44′s solution compared to Aircell), then it is quite possible that 1 transponder would be needed for every 20-30 planes. With each transponder costing about $1.25M, Row44 could find itself coming close to spending all of the revenue from Southwest on bandwidth and never making any margin to even begin to pay for the $100M+ of equipment that it would have installed.

In this context, it is far from clear that a sustainable business model is available for large scale Ku-band passenger communications deployments (although a limited Panasonic service on Lufthansa could be viable, assuming Panasonic has some form of revenue sharing agreement with Intelsat and initial installations rely on the old Connexion antennas). Certainly it appears that Viasat, which was the primary equipment supplier to Connexion-by-Boeing (and was rumored to be in pole position to secure a deal with Lufthansa, prior to its recent shift to Panasonic) is emphasizing the lower cost of Ka-band capacity over a Ku-band only model for mobility services. Intriguingly, even Inmarsat may agree that Ka-band is the future: we understand that it has recently issued an RFI for one or more Ka-band satellites, which are likely to be part of its planned roadmap for future government and/or aero services (e.g. UAVs).

09.14.09

In-flight broadband: follow the money

Posted in Aeronautical, Financials, Inmarsat, Operators, Services at 12:26 pm by timfarrar

It seems that people are now coming round to the view, which we’ve expressed since 2006, that there won’t be enough paying users of in-flight broadband for both network providers and airlines to make a profit on the costs of deploying equipment and running a network (as Boeing found out after spending somewhere between $1B and $2B on Connexion). Our view was that only airlines who are interested in offering a differentiated service would be able to justify the costs involved. However, to date the leading service providers (Aircell and Row44) have apparently not only been installing the equipment for free, but have also been offering a cut of revenues to the airline. Its no wonder that this “no lose” proposition has led to fleetwide installation commitments from most of the major US airlines. In comparison, installations of Inmarsat equipment for in-flight cellular services on aircraft in other parts of the world have slowed dramatically over the last 18 months, as most airlines no longer have the money to pay for fleetwide upgrades (with the possible exception of Ryanair, which we suspect may have a similarly attractive deal from OnAir).

Lost in the noise of Southwest’s commitment to install Row44 service across its entire fleet of 540 aircraft was the footnote that there isn’t “a solid timeframe for [installation]” because “certain specific details concerning the cost and financing of equipage are still being worked out”. From what we’ve heard, Row44 needs to raise a lot more money very soon in order to move forward with full-scale deployment (pretty obviously, since fitting equipment on 500 planes at $250K+ each would cost $125M), and presumably Southwest’s announcement was timed to help them secure that funding. However, with Southwest also demanding “control [over] the price point that our customer sees”, it seems a pretty unpalatable deal for potential investors if Row44 must front the installation costs and pay for the network and then let Southwest set the pricing to maximize its own return (probably more dictated by customer loyalty) rather than Row44′s revenues. Similarly unreasonable expectations appear to have been the reason why the oft-mentioned return of Connexion service on Lufthansa (who refused to provide any revenue guarantee to the network provider but wanted to make the provider liable for any future equipment deinstallations) has not happened to date.

What is the solution to achieving a sustainable business model for in-flight broadband? Whether it lies in airlines providing connectivity for free as a differentiator for their customers, or airlines using the link to the aircraft as a means to reduce their own operating costs, what we’re ultimately going to have to see is a change in the direction that the money flows. Instead of airlines getting the equipment for free and receiving a share of the service revenues, the airline is going to have to pay for the equipment and maybe in some cases even offer a revenue guarantee to the network provider (particularly on long-haul international routes where the cost of providing Ku-band coverage is much greater).

How palatable will in-flight connectivity be then to airlines that are currently losing hundreds of millions of dollars a year? At the very least we’d expect them to be a lot more discriminating in deciding whether to provide connectivity or not (who needs it on a one hour shuttle flight?). Perhaps its only if one of the providers goes bust that we’ll see a return to rationality in pricing (of course, it would be very unlikely for the service itself to disappear completely as Connexion did, because the costs of operating either Aircell or Row44′s networks domestically aren’t that high). Until that point is reached, expect airlines to continue to scramble to get something for nothing with their in-flight connectivity installations. In the meantime we’ll be watching carefully to see if the discussions over “cost and financing of equipage” between Southwest and Row44 get resolved and if investors are willing to put more money into in-flight connectivity providers.

06.15.09

The race to provide in-flight WiFi

Posted in Aeronautical, Services, VSAT at 10:56 am by timfarrar

So how many passengers will be willing to pay for in-flight Wi-Fi service on domestic routes? We’ve always agreed that there is “‘there is zero proof’ that a significant number of passengers are willing to pay for in-flight Wi-Fi service on domestic routes”, as noted in a recent NY Times article?

Certainly airlines are “rushing to install Wi-Fi” but its far from clear that they are “banking on a viable market” since it is rumored that Aircell is funding most if not all of the cost of installations. Instead its clear that airlines see very positive passenger reactions to WiFi availability and want to gain a competitive advantage, especially amongst high revenue business travelers. It appears that airlines are receiving a share of revenues, but unless a substantial part of these payments are being held back until the equipment costs have been covered, then the number of planes needed for Aircell to reach break even may be even higher than the 2000 planes previously indicated.

Current usage largely reflects take-up confined to this business traveler segment, with Virgin America reporting that “20 to 25 percent of its passengers use it on the San Francisco-Boston route, heavily used by business travelers” with an across the board “average of 12 to 15 percent”. That’s slightly better than our experience of 15%-20% take rates (20-25 users) on cross country daytime flights between San Francisco and Washington DC with only a handful of users on short West Coast flights, and its not clear if Virgin America is including night flights in its overall estimate. Although WiFiNetNews suggests “that’s not a bad ROI”, even if 25% of the revenue goes to covering the installation costs it will still take at least a couple of years before these have been covered, and Virgin has by far the best selection of routes (about 50% of flying hours cross country) and airplanes (all with at-seat power) and this ignores the fuel cost of flying the equipment around.

For Delta, it remains far more doubtful whether a fleet-wide installation makes economic sense (although it appears the risk is likely to be borne by Aircell rather than Delta) given the prevalence of short flights in most network carriers’ schedules. Indeed, Aircell is now experimenting with lower prices on these short flights ($5.95 on one recent flight we took from San Diego to San Francisco) in an attempt to stimulate demand. As a result, as the NY Times highlights, incremental revenues from Internet-enabled smartphones may be important to closing the Aircell business plan. However, we remain skeptical as to whether it will be possible to attract substantial usage from the average consumer, unless through consumption of video entertainment, which would likely overload the Aircell network, and its far from clear what is the compelling reason to consume sports or movies, which are already available from the entertainment system built into Virgin America’s planes.

Even if it proves difficult to generate a return on its original investment, Aircell is likely to dominate in-flight communications in North America, simply because its capex is a sunk cost and it is going to be installed on 1000+ commercial aircraft in the next 18 months. We hold out far less hope for VSAT-based services such as Row44, which believe will struggle to gain critical mass and justify their rather more expensive terminal installations. The most interesting airline to focus on will be Southwest, which is currently trialling the Row44 solution. Will it decide to proceed with fleetwide installation of in-flight WiFi, and if so will it decide to switch to the much lower cost AirCell solution?

01.15.09

More airlines, but apparently few users for Aircell

Posted in Aeronautical, Financials at 10:03 am by timfarrar

United has now joined the North American airlines signing up to fit the Aircell service for in-flight Internet connectivity. Similar to American, it is initially just installing the service on its P.S. business-oriented cross country flights between JFK and LAX/SFO (though American also includes some 767 flights to MIA). Undoubtedly this is a great boon for business travelers, and our experience of the service was excellent. However, to date it looks like overall usage levels are very low, since few leisure travelers are willing to pay $12.95 even for a five hour flight.

On a American SFO-JFK afternoon flight last October, we decided to walk the plane and count the number of users: the result was 8 out of 34 business and first passengers were using it, but only 2 out of about 110 economy passengers. I’m sure American is pleased with this – since the high revenue customers at the front of the plane are happy, but the amount of money flowing to Aircell is far from enough to pay for the network. We understand that to date Aircell has installed the equipment for free, so the only cost to the airline is the fuel to fly it around.

Based on the usage levels we saw, gross Aircell revenue is probably only ~$60K-$80K per plane per year, less even than the $100K seen by Connexion-by-Boeing back in 2006. Connexion had many of the same characteristics – giving away equipment, a high fixed cost network (in that case global satellite capacity leases rather than a national tower network), a large staff, and was also a great service for passengers and airlines. There are a few differences, most notably that the Connexion equipment was much heavier and more expensive than the Aircell terminals, but also that Aircell can supplement its passenger revenues with installations in the business jet market. However, Boeing ultimately decided it couldn’t afford to continue to run the service, as did Claircom, Airfone and others with their earlier voice services. In the current financial climate, we wonder if Aircell’s network will be able to avoid the same fate? Certainly they seem a long way from the prediction of 2000 equipped aircraft by the end of 2009 made by Aircell’s CEO last summer.

08.14.08

How much will cellphones be used in-flight?

Posted in Aeronautical, Inmarsat at 11:28 am by timfarrar

According to a recent Economist article Air France has found that “On a typical flight about 100 text messages were sent or received and ten megabytes of data transferred by a dozen BlackBerry users”. This level of usage seems very high, given that Blackberries can usually synchronize with 100kbytes or less of data and the usage level given here is 800kbytes per Blackberry. We questioned OnAir’s PR representatives and they confirmed that the data (which comes from the first phase of the Air France trial, before introduction of voice) was quoted correctly.

Inmarsat also stated on its Aug 6 results call that initial Air France trials had seen usage levels of around 300 minutes per day, so combined this would produce total end user revenues of well over $1000 per plane per day, significantly in excess of our expectations (and the Qantas trial which had data only usage of $100-$150 per day). However, we have heard from another source that usage revenues (for voice and data combined) on the Air France aircraft in the second phase of the trial were at a rather lower level of around $400 per day, very close to (or even below) our expectations.

We’re waiting to see if any more data emerges to clarify likely usage. As we’ve noted before, this is critical to determining the rate of installation, particularly on short haul aircraft, since airlines need to see a minimum usage of about $800 per day to make a profit after paying for the equipment and cost of flying it around. Only then will financially strapped airlines be willing to push forward with fleetwide installations in the current economic climate.

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