11.29.17

Tilting the playing field…

Posted in AT&T, Operators, Regulatory, Services, Spectrum, Verizon at 11:08 am by timfarrar

Over the last week its been frustrating to see what should be a technical debate about the best way to regulate access networks deteriorate into ludicrous hyperbole about how “repealing net neutrality would end the internet as we know it” when in reality it “isn’t the end of the world“.

At its core this is really a debate about whether you can trust businesses in general and ISPs in particular, with Republicans declaring that a free market is the best solution to promote investment, whereas Democrats are saying that regulation is needed due to the lack of competition in access networks. Thus one side says “Net neutrality rules are unnecessary because ISPs will do the right thing” whereas the other side says its “the very laziest of anti-net neutrality tropes [to say] that the wolf hasn’t eaten the sheep yet so let’s trust the wolf.” And of course, once politics are involved, the current climate means that everything gets blown out of proportion.

In reality the right answer probably lies somewhere in the middle, which is what sensible commentators like Ben Thompson and Dean Bubley are trying to feel their way towards. Ben’s commentary in particular has come under criticism because he “assumes public intervention is costly and corrupt, that telecoms are accurate, and that there’s no role for morality” despite there being plenty of evidence of previous regulatory failures in Tom Hazlett’s recent book “The Political Spectrum”. However, its not unreasonable to think that trying a light touch approach backed up by antitrust enforcement is a good idea and that “framing these trade-offs as moral choices” is unhelpful.

Perhaps it is true that the best answer would have been to push harder on unbundling local loops to facilitate service-based competition on telco networks, just as in Europe, but that ship sailed 15 years ago when the CLECs went bankrupt. Instead, going all the way back to the 1996 Telecom Act, the US has focused on infrastructure-based competition between cable and telcos, which unsurprisingly hasn’t produced the same level of competition, due to the cost of maintaining multiple access networks.

Maybe this is a failed model and we now have to be content with regulating the current oligopoly of cable and telcos to ensure they don’t behave badly (and we can certainly debate exactly how much regulation is needed to achieve that). But perhaps wireless broadband will provide some level of new competition for fixed providers. I dismissed that possibility 6 years ago, but now I’m increasingly convinced that the enormous efficiency gains coming from MIMO will provide wireless operators with more capacity than they know what to do with, enabling them to deliver wireless broadband in the home to at least some (meaningful) number of consumers.

Whether that’s ultimately 10% or 30% of households very much depends on how much capital is available to invest in those networks. And how good the performance will be remains to be seen – after all the 13% of adults who are smartphone only internet users are mostly doing it for cost reasons and “often encounter difficulties like accessing and reading content, as well as trouble submitting files and documents.”

But that’s not my primary focus here. One point made by net neutrality proponents such as Barbara van Schewick is that for the last 20 years, the regulation of telecom networks has been backed by both Republican and Democrat administrations and so the current proposal is a radical change in precedent. You can argue with the truth of that prediction, depending on whether you think the FTC will actively enforce antitrust law to deal with future net neutrality problems, but what is interesting to me is that many of the actions cited by van Schewick were taken to support content providers like Netflix or Google when those companies had a lot less power than they do today.

Some of those actions had significant costs, such as (Republican FCC chairman) Kevin Martin’s decision to attach “lifetime net neutrality conditions to parts of the 4G spectrum that [the FCC] auctioned off in 2008″. That action was taken at the behest of Google, but the result was that Verizon acquired 22MHz of upper C-block spectrum for only $0.76/MHzPOP, a 41% discount to the average price in the auction, and a more than 70% discount to the price paid (mainly by AT&T) for the lower B-block. Thus Google’s “net neutrality” lobbying effort potentially cost the government somewhere between $5B and $10B in lost auction proceeds, without having any substantial impact on the wireless services you receive today (are you more likely to choose Verizon because some of its spectrum comes with “open access” conditions?).

Of course net neutrality has not been the only area where Silicon Valley companies have sought or obtained favorable regulatory treatment compared to telcos and cable companies. The last Commission’s set top box proceeding and proposed privacy regulations were both seen as favoring Google, Amazon and Netflix over Verizon and Comcast. The current Commission is tilting the playing field back towards access providers by abandoning these efforts and dismantling the net neutrality rules, and opponents argue that it is going too far, because of the lack of competition in access provision and because they don’t trust the wolves at Comcast, Verizon and AT&T.

But if its now a debate about whether you can trust businesses in general to behave reasonably, can you trust Silicon Valley companies any more than ISPs? Do Google and Netflix need regulatory advantages over ISPs now they are so powerful? Are ISPs any more of a monopoly than Google or Facebook or Twitter, and which of them are more likely to be disrupted in the future? Those are the questions that are now being raised, most explicitly in Chairman Pai’s speech yesterday, where he noted that:

“despite all the talk about the fear that broadband providers could decide what Internet content consumers can see, recent experience shows that so-called edge providers are in fact deciding what content they see. These providers routinely block or discriminate against content they don’t like

Nonetheless, these companies want to place much tougher regulations on broadband providers than they are willing to have placed upon themselves. So let’s be clear. They might cloak their advocacy in the public interest, but the real interest of these Internet giants is in using the regulatory process to cement their dominance in the Internet economy.
And here’s the thing: I don’t blame them for trying. But the government shouldn’t aid and abet this effort. We have no business picking winners and losers in the marketplace. A level playing field, not regulatory arbitrage, is what best serves consumers and competition.”

In fact a more directly relevant example than speech censorship comes from Netflix itself, which proclaims its support for “strong Net Neutrality” (and is seen as one of the key beneficiaries) but back in September was trying to muscle inflight connectivity providers into zero rating Netflix video content if they wanted access to Netflix’s improved codecs to minimize bandwidth consumption onboard. Ironically enough, inflight connectivity is seen by net neutrality supporters as a good example of what non-neutral networks might look like.

I’ve been warning for a while that Silicon Valley is not well positioned to succeed in building telecom networks (or cars) and so would not be favored under this infrastructure-focused administration. And that’s far from the only cause of a backlash. But now I think there’s good reason for “the entire tech industry [to be] flipping its shit” because tech companies are the most likely losers even if we don’t end up in all-out partisan warfare, but simply remove the regulatory favoritism that Silicon Valley has benefitted from for the last 20 years.

09.15.17

Eye of the hurricane…

Posted in Aeronautical, Broadband, Eutelsat, Inmarsat, Operators, Services, SES, Spectrum, ViaSat at 12:54 am by timfarrar

This week in Paris all seemed calm, after the turbulence of the last few years, with the only major announcement coming from SES with its new O3b mPower MEO constellation. But under the surface a lot is happening, and (perhaps appropriately) I think we are now just in the eye of the hurricane, and the storm will shortly ramp up once again, before we find out who and what will be left standing in a couple of years time.

SES’s announcement came several months after it selected Boeing to build the O3b NEXT constellation (the “development agreement” was announced in July as part of SES’s half year results) and the delay until now appears to have been due to SES waiting for an anchor tenant that never materialized. In fact I believe SES originally expected to announce the contract in May, as was hinted at when SES’s CEO said he was “too busy” to go to Satellite 2017). However, SES is clearly not willing to see OneWeb, ViaSat and Inmarsat take the lead in new data-oriented satellite systems, whether or not it secures a major anchor tenant for this system.

Another subject of much debate is what Panasonic will decide to do now its original plan to invest in dedicated XTS satellites appears to be dead. Panasonic wants to lay off much more of the risk on a satellite operator, rather than underwriting the satellite costs in full, as Thales did with SES-17. Will an FSS operator be prepared to take this risk, bearing in mind that Intelsat is short of money, SES is now building O3b NEXT (which won’t be well suited for high latitude aero operations) and Eutelsat is intending to partner with ViaSat? Or would Panasonic do something more radical and let a rival like Inmarsat take over provision of connectivity services?

Finally, Inmarsat seems to be under a lot of pressure after a 15% decline in its share price in the last two weeks, and some were speculating that recent personnel changes were connected to this uncertain outlook. Profitability of aero contracts (notably that with Lufthansa) remains a major concern, and issues remain to be resolved for the EAN air-to-ground network, especially if Inmarsat is forced to provide a more robust satellite link in the wake of ViaSat’s legal challenge.

All of these issues provide much food for thought, and could lead to significant realignments in the industry over the next year. Decisions affecting the inflight connectivity market are almost certain to occur, because Panasonic can’t wait too long to provide clarity on its future positioning, and so we had better batten down the hatches for the coming winds of change.

09.08.17

Me first, no me…

Posted in Broadband, Regulatory, Spectrum at 9:42 am by timfarrar

Yesterday the FCC released the proposed text of its Report and Order on “Updating Rules for Non-Geostationary-Satellite Orbit Fixed-Satellite Service Constellations” which will be voted on at the Open Meeting on September 26. There are some minor wins for SpaceX and other systems that aren’t as advanced as OneWeb, notably in the relaxation of the 6 year construction deadline so that only 50% of the constellation needs to be completed by that date.

However, the key text on the geographic scope of the FCC’s in-line interference avoidance rule (that requires the spectrum to be shared equally between NGSO systems when their satellites are aligned with one another) marks a major defeat for SpaceX, because the FCC will allow the ITU’s “first-come, first-served” coordination procedures to take precedence for non-US systems operating outside the US.

53. Geographic Area. SpaceX and SES/O3b ask that we clarify the geographic scope of our NGSO FSS sharing method as it relates to non-U.S.-licensed satellite systems granted U.S. market access. While SpaceX argues that it should govern such operations worldwide, a grant of market access typically considers radiofrequency operations only within the United States. Sharing between systems of different administrations internationally is subject to coordination under Article 9 of the ITU Radio Regulations. We believe this international regime is the appropriate forum to consider NGSO FSS radiofrequency operations that fall outside the scope of a grant of U.S. market access. Because ITU coordination procedures do not apply between two U.S. systems, our coordination trigger of ΔT/T of 6 percent will govern such operations both within and outside the United States.

OneWeb is licensed by the UK and Telesat by Canada, and these systems have ITU priority in the Ku and Ka-band NGSO spectrum respectively. Thus SpaceX will have to operate on a non-interference basis with respect to these systems in either band outside the US. This (proposed) ruling represents a big problem for SpaceX, which needs to find another line of business outside of launch to justify its latest $21B valuation.

SpaceX is already building two experimental 400kg Ku-band satellites, apparently pictured above, which are scheduled for launch at the end of 2017, as co-passengers with the Hisdesat PAZ SAR imaging satellite (note that the orbital injection parameters of PAZ and SpaceX are identical: a sun-synchronous orbit at 514 km altitude with an inclination of 97.44 degrees). A license from the FCC, both for these test satellites, and likely for the entire constellation as well, is expected very shortly.

The key purpose of SpaceX’s accelerated launch schedule is to beat OneWeb (which plans to launch its 10 test satellites in early 2018) to orbit, as under the FCC’s regulations, the first system to launch gets to choose its “home” spectrum during an inline event. Presumably on the assumption that possession is nine-tenths of the law, SpaceX also recently extended the planned lifetime of these two satellites from 6 months to at least 20 months, stating that “if this lifetime is exceeded, SpaceX plans to continue operation until such time as the primary mission goals can no longer be met.”

However, now the FCC’s proposed order appears to have derailed its strategy, SpaceX will need to find a way to gain ITU priority, if it is to build and operate a global constellation. From this point of view, Telesat, which has been adamantly defending its ITU priority, appears to be sitting pretty. Indeed we are told that after its planned test satellite launch later this year, Telesat will wait until next summer before deciding how to move forward, presumably expecting to have a wide variety of suitors once its ITU priority status is recognized.

A joint venture with SpaceX (to which Telesat contributes its licenses and SpaceX brings the money) is certainly a plausible option, though it would require SpaceX to shift its plans to Ka-band. However, if this became a real possibility, it wouldn’t be surprising for SoftBank to try and head off SpaceX by investing in Telesat, or perhaps even buying Loral Space and Communications.

The ramifications of such a move on SoftBank’s part would be even more significant, given that Intelsat’s investors apparently expect SoftBank to return to the negotiating table next year, after they rejected SoftBank’s previous offer in May, and a switch to Telesat would put them in a tricky position.

So now we have to wait and see how SpaceX responds to this setback. Will SpaceX still move forward aggressively into the satellite business or will some of the executives who have in the past counselled caution gain the upper hand? Will the experimental launch proceed on plan (I assume so)? And most importantly, which partners will emerge for Telesat’s proposed LEO system?

05.14.17

Will ViaSat’s Air Force One contract get trumped?

Posted in Aeronautical, Inmarsat, Operators, Services, ViaSat, VSAT at 12:51 pm by timfarrar

Back in June 2016 there was considerably excitement around ViaSat’s sole source $73M contract to provide connectivity for Air Force One and other senior leadership aircraft. The plan was to replace Boeing’s Ku-band BBSN (which has continued to operate ever since the commercial Connnexion-by-Boeing project was cancelled in 2006) with a dual Ka/Ku-band solution which could utilize the ViaSat Ka-band satellites within their coverage footprint and then switch back to Ku-band in other parts of the world.

I’m told that one reason this upgrade happened was that President Obama’s daughters complained that the connectivity on Air Force One compared unfavorably to the speeds available on other ViaSat-equipped aircraft they had flown on, and ViaSat ultimately received a sole source contract, with the US government purchasing a couple of dozen of ViaSat’s dual Ku/Ka antennas in addition to the airtime contract.

But I’ve heard rumors that the RF performance of this Ku/Ka antenna failed the WGS compatibility tests required by the Air Force, and so to date the US government has not installed these new terminals, and Air Force One is apparently still operating with the old Boeing system. Its unclear what the end result will be, or if this is an easily solvable problem, but ViaSat’s competitors (especially Inmarsat, which has successfully leased GX capacity to the DoD for manned surveillance missions in the Middle East) are now rubbing their hands with glee.

[UPDATE 5/15] A spokesperson for ViaSat states that this rumor “is inaccurate. ViaSat is on target with our testing and deliverables, per our DISA contract.”

The broader prospects for ViaSat’s Ku/Ka antenna also appear uncertain, with the only commercial customer to date being Virgin America, which is using a handful of terminals on its Hawaii routes. Virgin America’s new owner, Alaska Airlines, has announced its intention to replace its existing Gogo ATG solution with a high speed satellite solution, but some now think that Gogo’s recent lease of the AMC-4 satellite for Pacific coverage means it will win this business with 2Ku.

Its interesting to note that Gilat has also developed a Ku/Ka antenna, which Hughes will offer for roaming outside its own Ka-band coverage footprint. Will this antenna be better than ViaSat’s solution, and more broadly will a combined Ku and Ka antenna (which inevitably has a smaller aperture and more beam skew problems) be a realistic alternative to high performance flat panels like Gogo’s 2Ku? The answer to that question will dictate whether ViaSat and Hughes can provide competition in the long haul passenger aircraft market over the next few years, or whether Panasonic, Gogo and Inmarsat will continue to dominate that segment until all three ViaSat-3 satellites are launched in the early 2020s, by which time most airlines will already have made their choice of provider.

03.10.17

Eccentric orbits…

Posted in Broadband, Financials, Intelsat, Iridium, Operators, Regulatory, Services, SES, Spectrum at 3:40 pm by timfarrar

I’m unashamedly stealing the title of the book which chronicles the Iridium bankruptcy, because not only did John Bloom give a talk at this week’s Satellite 2017 conference, but discussion of new LEO satellite systems dominated the conference itself. The proposed merger of OneWeb and Intelsat is only the most visible sign of this return to the 1990s, when Iridium and Globalstar’s satellite phones and Teledesic’s proposed broadband system fascinated both the satellite industry and the wider investing community.

But below the surface there is an even more radical shift going on, as most leading operators are cutting back on their investments in high throughput GEO satellites for data services, and many of them are focused instead on the potential of LEO and MEO systems. Intelsat has already indicated that it is cutting GEO capex, and the merger with OneWeb will mean most of its future capex will be devoted to LEO, in line with Masa Son’s vision of a huge new opportunity for LEO satellites.

However, SES, whose CEO stayed away from the conference, is also hinting at a reallocation of its priorities towards O3b’s MEO system, probably accompanied by a sizeable reduction in overall capex. Telesat is also focused on developing its Ka-band LEO constellation for next generation data services, leaving only Eutelsat (which has already announced that it will cut capex substantially) amongst the Big 4 focusing solely on GEO.

This is deeply worrying for satellite manufacturers, and even the indication by Boeing that GEO demand will “remain soft” at “between 13 and 17 satellites in 2017″ may prove to be overly optimistic. All satellite manufacturers now need to play in the LEO/MEO world, with Thales constructing O3b and Iridium, and Airbus taking the lead role on OneWeb, with SS/L as a major subcontractor.

That leaves Boeing, which is not part of any announced LEO satellite contract, but has its own proposal for a V-band LEO system, which is under consideration at the FCC, along with several rival filings. While Boeing has suggested in the past that it was open to partnerships to develop this concept, most people in the industry are convinced that it already has funding from a potential customer, given the amount of effort that Boeing is putting into developing V-band service rules at the ITU and FCC. Boeing has also indicated to these people that it does not need export credit funding for the project, which supports the idea that this project is backed by a deep pocketed US entity.

There aren’t many possibilities for such a backer, and of the four large technology companies Boeing mentioned two years ago, Google and Facebook have apparently lost interest in satellites (although Google did invest $900M in SpaceX and Facebook tried with Amos-6), and Amazon is pursuing its own efforts in the launch market through Blue Origin. That only leaves Apple as never having discussed publicly its potential interest in space.

This aligns with the chatter I heard from a number of sources at Satellite 2017 that Boeing’s V-band development work is being funded by Apple, which is clearly trying to find the next big thing and has been exploring cars, TVs and other large market opportunities. Its not hard to discern why Apple might want to consider a satellite constellation, when SpaceX came out with a business plan last year that suggested SpaceX alone could generate $30B in revenue from satellite internet by 2025.

Just as in the car market there’s no guarantee that Apple would take this project forward to full deployment, but with SpaceX, SoftBank and now apparently Apple becoming enthusiastic about non-geostationary satellite systems, in addition to most of the main satellite operators, it seems that a dramatic reshaping of industry priorities is underway.

It remains to be seen whether this enthusiasm will last, or whether, like at the end of the 1990s, the pendulum will eventually swing back towards geostationary orbit. However, over the next few years, until we find out whether the ambitions of these visionaries can be realized, non-GEO satellite systems are likely to be the most important contributor to driving satellite communications technology forward.

02.28.17

Groundhog day…

Posted in DISH, Echostar, Financials, Inmarsat, Intelsat, Operators, Regulatory, Spectrum, Sprint, VSAT at 10:17 am by timfarrar

Today’s announcement that SoftBank is investing $1.7B in Intelsat as part of a merger between Intelsat and OneWeb is eerily reminiscent of SoftBank’s investment in Sprint and subsequent purchase of Clearwire back in 2012-13. Then the motivation was acquisition of large amounts of 2.5GHz spectrum to be used with innovative small cells to revolutionize the cellular market. Today the motivation is acquisition of large amounts of NGSO spectrum to be used with innovative small satellites to revolutionize the satellite market.

There are certainly many synergies between Intelsat and OneWeb: Intelsat needs a next generation plan beyond Epic, to lower the cost of its capacity, and hamstrung by debt, it could not have afforded to build a new system on its own. OneWeb needs distribution and market access, as well as interim capacity so that it does not have to wait until the LEO system is fully deployed. So this deal makes a lot of sense, if you believe, as Masa clearly does, that new constellations will dramatically boost the future prospects for the satellite industry. On the other hand, if it doesn’t work out, would SoftBank get to the point where it is prepared to sell the assets and not even mention them in its vision of the future?

However, another potential parallel is that back in 2013, SoftBank faced a lengthy challenge from DISH, which mounted a bid for Clearwire and later made an offer for all of Sprint, and ultimately forced Masa to pay far more for Clearwire than he had hoped. Now EchoStar, which had made a $50M investment in OneWeb (then WorldVu) back in 2015, but has been far less prominently involved in OneWeb’s development efforts compared to Qualcomm (with DISH even objecting to OneWeb’s use of the MVDDS spectrum), has apparently seen its mooted partnership with SES put on hold.

Clearly Charlie Ergen needs to find a way forward for EchoStar to compete in the satellite broadband market on a global basis, building on the successful launch (and market lead) of Jupiter-2. Some analysts have been reiterating that this could involve a bid for Inmarsat, as I mentioned last summer, but the time for that has probably passed. So does Ergen use this development to revive the mooted SES deal, because SES will now need to compete more aggressively with Intelsat? Or does he want to be more actively engaged with OneWeb and get a larger slice of that development effort (and potentially use its capacity in the longer term)?

Either way it would not be surprising if DISH or EchoStar already holds some of Intelsat’s debt, and Ergen could even seek to maximize his leverage by acquiring a larger position in the company. Does Masa want a cooperative relationship with Ergen going forward (perhaps even with a view to collaboration between DISH and Sprint in the wireless sector), or is he still upset over what happened in 2013? And returning to the theme of Groundhog Day, will this movie end with the two protagonists eventually falling in love, or will we see a repeat of 2013, with yet another battle between Masa and Charlie?

02.17.17

Cold feet?

Posted in Aeronautical, Broadband, Echostar, Eutelsat, Operators, Services, SES, ViaSat at 10:47 am by timfarrar

As we get closer to Satellite 2017, where major new deals and partnerships are often announced, it looks like a number of players may be getting cold feet about their future satellite plans. This may be partly attributable to fears that OneWeb will contribute to a eventual glut of capacity, now it has secured SoftBank as a lead investor and raised another $1.2B. Even though capacity pricing may have stabilized somewhat for now, its certainly the case that a satellite ordered now is likely to enter the market at a point when pricing is set to decline much further.

We’ve already seen a delay in Panasonic’s XTS satellite order, which was supposed to happen before the end of 2016. Ironically enough, Leo Mondale of Inmarsat said at the Capital Markets Day last October that he believed “Panasonic in Yokohama are a little wary of getting into the satellite business” and in the wake of the recent FCPA probe, Panasonic Avionics now has a new Japanese CEO.

Moreover, one way of viewing the recent announcement that Eutelsat will take its ViaSat JV forward (and include aero mobility, which was not part of the original agreement) is that Eutelsat no longer believes it will strike a deal to operate Panasonic’s XTS satellites. That’s a much better explanation than bizarre speculation that ViaSat is going to buy Eutelsat, especially when ViaSat is still struggling to fund its third satellite for Asia and is openly hinting that it will need US government contracts to close the business case. Eutelsat also seems to be cutting back elsewhere, with some speculation that the Ka-band broadband satellite previously ordered for Africa may now be repurposed for other (non-broadband) applications.

But the biggest news appears to be a pull back on SES’s part from the long rumored global Ka-band GEO system that I noted last summer. SES announced only a single satellite (SES-17) for the Americas in partnership with Thales last September, but had plans for two additional satellites, and it seemed increasingly likely that a partnership with EchoStar would be announced soon to fund this development. Now it seems that effort is on hold, leaving EchoStar without an obvious way forward to achieving global coverage (as it seems EchoStar considered but rejected the idea of buying Inmarsat last fall).

There are also other more speculative projects that need to show some progress to remain credible. When it was disclosed by the WSJ last month, SpaceX’s business plan for its satellite internet service was widely dismissed as laughably unrealistic. However, I believe that in fact this is not the business plan that corresponds to the current system design, and instead SpaceX will be seeking a large amount of US government money to fund its constellation. Compared to SpaceX and OneWeb, Telesat’s constellation ambitions have largely been ignored by commentators, despite Telesat’s priority claim to the Ka-band NGSO spectrum band. So Telesat therefore also faces pressure to secure external investors in the near term so that it can keep pace with OneWeb.

Now the question is whether caution amongst major existing players will make it harder for new entrants to move forward. Will it signal to investors that they should be cautious about investing in any satellite businesses? Or will it be perceived that new opportunities will face less competition from existing operators? The NewSpace community certainly seems to still be living in a bubble, despite the deeply negative implications of Google’s decision to abandon its efforts in satellite and hand over Terra Bella to Planet (not least because a sale to Google or other internet companies was seen as the most plausible exit for VC investors). So I look forward to seeing how much reality intrudes on the discussions at Satellite 2017.

12.19.16

Me first…

Posted in Broadband, Regulatory, Spectrum at 10:46 am by timfarrar

Probably the most surprising thing about today’s announcement that Softbank is investing $1B in OneWeb as part of a $1.2B funding round, is the lack of a spoiler announcement from SpaceX. That’s happened in the past on both of the two occasions when OneWeb made a major announcement, in January 2015 (when OneWeb announced its initial agreements with Qualcomm and Virgin) and in June 2015 (when OneWeb announced its initial $500M equity round).

In fact one of the more important fights that is going on behind the scenes is related to regulatory priority in terms of ITU filings, where SpaceX is some way behind. OneWeb is acknowledged to be have the first filing for an NGSO Ku-band system, but also needs access to the Ka-band for its gateway links. That led Telesat to request that the FCC deny OneWeb’s petition for a US licenses, based on “Canadian ITU filings associated with Telesat’s Ka-band NGSO system [that] date back to 2012 and January 6, 2015″ whereas “the earliest ITU filing date priority for OneWeb is January 18, 2015.” LeoSat also claimed that it had priority over OneWeb in November 2016, based on “French ITU filings for LeoSat’s Ka-band MCSAT-2 LEO-2 network [that] date back to November 25, 2014.”

However, OneWeb now appears to have attempted something of an end run around these objections, acquiring rights to the French MCSAT LEO with an ITU advance publication date of April 2, 2013 network from Thales Alenia Space. That’s particularly odd because LeoSat, which states specifically in its FCC application that it “will deploy the LeoSat System in conjunction with Thales Alenia Space,” might now find TAS’s own filings being used against it.

UPDATE (12/20): I’m told that the relevant ITU coordination dates for the different Ka-band NGSO proposals are as follows:
Telesat (Comstellation): December 20, 2012
LeoSat (MCSAT2 LEO2): November 25, 2014
OneWeb’s newly acquired MCSAT LEO filing: December 3, 2014
SpaceX: December 27, 2014
OneWeb’s original Ka-band filing: January 18, 2015.
That would imply that OneWeb has now jumped ahead of SpaceX at the ITU, but remains behind Telesat and LeoSat, although I’m sure there will be many arguments to come.

All this fighting to be first in line at the ITU will also have to take into account the FCC’s attempt to clarify the rules for new NGSO systems in an NPRM released on Thursday, December 15. The FCC’s rules state that NGSO systems should share spectrum through the “avoidance of in-line interference events” and the NPRM proposed new language in an attempt to make this more explicit. However, this language is far from clear about whether the sharing of spectrum is required on a global basis or just in the US, specifically the key paragraph in the newly proposed §25.261 states:

(a) Scope. This section applies to NGSO FSS satellite systems that communicate with earth stations with directional antennas and that operate under a Commission license or grant of U.S. market access under this part in the 10.7-12.7 GHz (space-to-Earth), 12.75-13.25 GHz (Earth-to-space), 13.75-14.5 GHz (Earth-to-space), 17.8-18.6 GHz (space-to-Earth), 18.8-19.4 GHz (space-to-Earth), 19.6-20.2 GHz (space-to-Earth), 27.5-29.1 GHz (Earth-to-space), or 29.3-30 GHz (Earth-to-space) bands.

whereas the existing language states:

(a) Applicable NGSO FSS Bands. The coordination procedures in this section apply to non-Federal-Government NGSO FSS
satellite networks operating in the following assigned frequency bands: The 28.6-29.1 GHz or 18.8-19.3 GHz frequency bands.

The pertinent question here, which is left unresolved by the proposed changes shown in the italicized text above, are whether a “satellite network” consists of both an FCC-licensed satellite system and the earth station it is communicating with, and if so whether both of these or just the satellite system itself must “operate under a Commission license or grant of U.S. market access” according the new text. If it is the former, then the new rules will clearly apply only in the US (where the earth station is licensed by the FCC), whereas if it is the latter, then the rules could be taken to imply that any recipient of a satellite system license from the FCC in the current processing round may have to agree to comply with these sharing rules on a global basis.

It therefore seems that regulatory lawyers will have plenty of work for the next year arguing on behalf of their clients. However, OneWeb will have the money to move forward quickly and extend its lead over other NGSO systems, apart from O3b, which is currently building its next batch of 8 satellites. It remains to be seen if other systems will catch-up, but Telesat (which has already ordered two test satellites) is potentially best positioned to be a third player, especially if it can secure Canadian government backing for universal service in the Arctic region.

Then we need to see how the market evolves. Greg Wyler highlighted his ambitions for OneWeb to serve 100M people by 2025 and after the alliance with Softbank, this will most likely be in the form of cellular backhaul from tens or hundreds of thousands of small cells in remote areas, just as Softbank already does at over 6000 cell sites in Japan using IPStar capacity. In contrast, O3b should continue its plans to serve highly concentrated demand hotspots, like remote islands needing connectivity to the outside world and large cruise ships.

Most of the other NGSO proposals, including Telesat and SpaceX, appear to have a fairly similar plan to O3b, with small beams used to serve a select number of demand hotspots. So the question then becomes, how much concentrated demand exists for satellite connectivity? O3b will generate roughly $100M of revenues in 2016 and has a clear path to growth into the $200M-$300M range. But is it a multi-billion dollar opportunity and is there room for one or more additional systems in this niche? And can new systems overtake O3b, given its multi-year lead in this market? Only time will tell, but if OneWeb can maintain its focus on low cost cellular backhaul and gain anchor tenant commitments from Softbank, Bharti Airtel and perhaps others, these competitive dynamics are going to be much more of an issue for O3b.

12.08.16

Chinese checkers, Indonesian intrigue…

Posted in Broadband, Financials, Handheld, Inmarsat, Operators, Regulatory, Services, Spectrum at 9:18 am by timfarrar

UPDATED Feb 5, 2017

There’s been a lot of recent news about Chinese investments in satellite companies, including the planned takeover of Spacecom, which is now being renegotiated (and probably abandoned) after the loss of Amos-6 in September’s Falcon 9 failure, and the Global Eagle joint venture for inflight connectivity.

There were also rumors that Avanti could be sold to a Chinese group, which again came to nothing, with Avanti’s existing bondholders ending up having to fund the company instead in December 2016. The latest of these vanishing offers was a purported $200M bid from a Chinese company, China Trends, for Thuraya in mid-January 2017, which Thuraya promptly dismissed, saying it had never had discussions of any kind with China Trends.

Back in July Inmarsat was also reported to have approached Avanti, but then Inmarsat declared it had “no intention to make an offer for Avanti.” I had guessed that Inmarsat appeared to have done some sort of deal with Avanti, when the Artemis L/S/Ka-band satellite was relocated to 123E, into a slot previously used by Inmarsat for the ACeS Garuda-1 L-band satellite (as Avanti’s presentation at an event in October 2016 confirmed).

However, I’m now told that the Indonesian government reclaimed the rights to this slot after Garuda-1 was de-orbited, and is attempting to use the Artemis satellite to improve its own claim to this vacant slot before these rights expire. I also understand that with Artemis almost out of fuel, various parties were very concerned that the relocation would not even work and the Artemis satellite could have been left to drift along the geostationary arc, an outcome which thankfully has been avoided.

The action by the Indonesian government seems to hint at a continued desire to control its own MSS satellite, which could come in the shape of the long rumored purchase of SkyTerra-2 L-band satellite for Indonesian government use, similar to the MEXSAT program in Mexico. If that is the case, then presumably the Indonesians would also need to procure a ground segment, similar to the recent $69M contract secured by EchoStar in Asia (although that deal is for S-band not L-band).

Meanwhile Inmarsat still appears to be hoping to secure a deal to lease the entire payload of the 4th GX satellite to the Chinese government, which was originally expected back in October 2015, when the Chinese president visited Inmarsat’s offices. That contract has still not been signed, apparently because the Chinese side tried to negotiate Inmarsat’s price down after the visit. Although Inmarsat now seems to be hinting to investors that the I5F4 satellite will be launched into the Atlantic Ocean Region for incremental aeronautical capacity, last fall Inmarsat was apparently still very confident that a deal could be completed in the first half of 2017 once the I5F4 satellite was launched.

So it remains to be seen whether Inmarsat will be any more successful than other satellite operators in securing a large deal with China or whether, just like many others, Inmarsat’s deal will vanish into thin air. China has already launched its own Tiantong-1 S-band satellite in August 2016, as part of the same One Belt One Road effort that Inmarsat was hoping to participate in with its GX satellite, and Tiantong-1 has a smartphone which “will retail from around 10,000 yuan ($1,480), with communication fees starting from around 1 yuan a minute — a tenth of the price charged by Inmarsat.” Thus Inmarsat potentially faces growing pressure on its L-band revenues in China, and must hope that it can secure some offsetting growth in Ka-band.

11.22.16

What about the dish?

Posted in Broadband, Regulatory, Services, Spectrum at 4:42 pm by timfarrar

Although there have been plenty of news articles describing the proposed 4000 satellite constellation that SpaceX filed with the FCC last week, to date there has been no analysis of how technically plausible this proposal actually is. That is perhaps unsurprising because the Technical and Legal Narratives included with the submission omit or obscure many of the most salient points needed to analyze the system and determine how realistic the claims made in SpaceX’s Legal Narrative actually are.

In particular, SpaceX claims that it has “designed its system to achieve the following objectives”:

High capacity: Each satellite in the SpaceX System provides aggregate downlink capacity to users ranging from 17 to 23 Gbps, depending on the gain of the user terminal involved. Assuming an average of 20 Gbps, the 1600 satellites in the Initial Deployment would have a total aggregate capacity of 32 Tbps. SpaceX will periodically improve the satellites over the course of the multi-year deployment of the system, which may further increase capacity.

High adaptability: The system leverages phased array technology to dynamically steer a large pool of beams to focus capacity where it is needed. Optical inter-satellite links permit flexible routing of traffic on-orbit. Further, the constellation ensures that frequencies can be reused effectively across different satellites to enhance the flexibility and capacity and robustness of the overall system.

Broadband services: The system will be able to provide broadband service at speeds of up to 1 Gbps per end user. The system’s use of low-Earth orbits will allow it to target latencies of approximately 25-35 ms.

Worldwide coverage: With deployment of the first 800 satellites, the system will be able to provide U.S. and international broadband connectivity; when fully deployed, the system will add capacity and availability at the equator and poles for truly global coverage.

Low cost: SpaceX is designing the overall system from the ground up with cost effectiveness and reliability in mind, from the design and manufacturing of the space and ground-based elements, to the launch and deployment of the system using SpaceX launch services, development of the user terminals, and end-user subscription rates.

Ease of use: SpaceX’s phased-array user antenna design will allow for a low-profile user terminal that is easy to mount and operate on walls or roofs.

What is particularly interesting is that the application says nothing whatsoever about the size of the user terminal that will be needed for the system. One hint that the user terminals are likely to be large and expensive is that SpaceX assures the FCC that “[t]he earth stations used to communicate with the SpaceX System will operate with aperture sizes that enable narrow, highly-directional beams with strong sidelobe suppression”. More importantly, by analyzing the information on the satellite beams given at the end of the Schedule S, it is clear that the supposed user downlink capacity of 17-23Gbps per satellite assumes a very large user terminal antenna diameter, because there are only 8 Ku-band user downlink beams of 250MHz each per satellite, and thus a total of only 2GHz of user downlink spectrum per satellite.

In other words this calculation implies a link efficiency of somewhere between 8.5 and 11.5bps/Hz. For comparison, OneWeb has 4GHz of user downlink spectrum per satellite, and is estimated to achieve a forward link efficiency of 0.55bps/Hz with a 30cm antenna and up to 2.73bps/Hz with a 70cm antenna. Put another way, OneWeb is intending to operate with twice as much forward bandwidth as SpaceX but with only half as much forward capacity per satellite.

That’s because OneWeb is intending to serve small, low cost (and therefore less efficient) terminals suitable for cellular backhaul in developing countries, or for internet access from homes and small businesses in rural areas. In contrast SpaceX’s system appears much more focused on large expensive terminals, similar to those used by O3b, which can cost $100K or more, and are used to connect large cruise ships or even an entire Pacific Island to the internet with hundreds of Mbps of capacity. While this has proved to be a good market for O3b, it is far from clear that this market could generate enough revenue to pay for a $10B SpaceX system. Even then, an assumption that SpaceX could achieve an average downlink efficiency of 10bps/Hz seems rather unrealistic.

SpaceX is able to gain some increased efficiency compared to OneWeb by using tightly focused steered gateway and user beams, which the Technical Narrative indicates will provide service in “a hexagonal cell with a diameter of 45 km” (Technical Annex 1-13). But there are only 8 user downlink beams per satellite, and so the total coverage area for each satellite is extremely limited. A 45km diameter hexagon has an area of 1315 sq km (or 1590 sq km for a 45km circle). Taking the more generous measure of 1590 sq km, over 5000 cells would be needed to cover the 8 million sq km area of the continental US. And SpaceX states (Technical Annex 2-7) that even in a fully deployed constellation, 340 satellites would be visible at an elevation angle of at least 40 degrees. So this implies that even when the constellation is fully deployed, only about half the land area of CONUS will be able to be served simultaneously. And in the initial deployment of 1600 satellites, potentially only about 30% of CONUS will have simultaneous service.

SpaceX could use beamhopping technology, similar to that planned by ViaSat for ViaSat-2 and ViaSat-3, to move the beams from one cell to another within a fraction of a second, but this is not mentioned anywhere in the application, and would be made even more challenging, especially within the constraints of a relatively small satellite, by the need for avoidance of interference events with both GEO and other LEO constellations.

In summary, returning to the objectives outlined above, the claim of “high capacity” per satellite seems excessive in the absence of large, expensive terminals, while the “worldwide coverage” objective is subject to some question. Most importantly, it will likely be particularly challenging to realize the “low cost” and “ease of use” objectives for the user terminals, if the phased array antennas are very large. And the system itself won’t be particularly low cost, given that each satellite is expected to have a mass of 386kg: taking the Falcon Heavy launch capacity of 54,400kg to LEO and cost of $90M, it would take at least 32 Falcon Heavy launches (and perhaps far more given the challenge of fitting 140 satellites on each rocket), costing $2.8B or more, just to launch the 4425 satellites.

Instead one of the key objectives of the narrow, steerable beams in the SpaceX design appears to be to support an argument that the FCC should continue with its avoidance of in-line interference events policy, with the spectrum shared “using whatever means can be coordinated between the operators to avoid in-line interference events, or by resorting to band segmentation in the absence of any such coordination agreement.”

This continues SpaceX’s prior efforts to cause problems for OneWeb, because OneWeb provides continuous wide area coverage, rather than highly directional service to specified locations, and therefore (at least in the US, since it is unclear that the FCC’s rules could be enforced elsewhere) OneWeb may be forced to discontinue using part of the spectrum band (and thereby lose half of its capacity) during in-line events.

OneWeb is reported to be continuing to make progress in securing investors for its system, and it would be unsurprising if Elon Musk continues to bear a grudge against a space industry rival. But given the design issues outlined above, and the many other more pressing problems that SpaceX faces in catching up with its current backlog of satellite launches, it is rather more doubtful whether SpaceX really has a system design and business plan that would support a multi-billion dollar investment in a new satellite constellation.

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