09.18.18

420,000 km. Funding secured!

Posted in Broadband, Financials, Operators, Regulatory, Services, SpaceX, Spectrum at 7:32 am by timfarrar

Yes I know it’s only 384,000 km to the Moon, but just like Elon, I decided to round up. After all, it’s apparently “better karma”!

Last night’s SpaceX event raised a lot of questions for many observers, not least because it “caught some SpaceX employees off guard” and was rushed out so fast that some of the promotional imagery was incorrect. However, I suspect that the reason for this surprise announcement was to distract from impending bad news about the Starlink project, namely that the project has for all intents and purposes been put on hold.

We already knew that there was a significant reduction in hiring in early July, but I’m told the cutbacks went much deeper, with a significant fraction of the Starlink team departing. SpaceX was also looking to develop a more concrete business plan for the project in Q2, but I believe it proved impossible to come up with anything remotely close to the ludicrous forecasts from 2016 reported by the Wall St Journal that suggested the project would have over 40M subscribers and $30B in annual revenues by 2025.

Ironically enough, the principal mention of Starlink last night was as a source of funding for the BFR development. It makes no sense whatsoever to think that Starlink will generate profits to fund a $5B+ BFR development between now and 2023, so the only logical conclusion is that money raised for Starlink will now be diverted to the BFR. Another hint that Starlink is going away was the statement that BFR is expected to consume the majority of engineering resources after the commercial crew development has been completed for NASA next year, despite Starlink supposedly costing more to develop than BFR ($10B+ compared to ~$5B) over the next 5 years.

However, without Starlink to support the business plan, SpaceX will face significant challenges in sustaining its reported $27B valuation, as it grapples with an expected reduction from 28 to 18 launches next year, which will very likely cause overall revenues to decline in 2019. It’s also notable that when Viasat decided to contract with ULA (seeking a US launch provider so as to support its upcoming expected request for Ex-Im Bank funding), it reportedly did not even invite SpaceX to bid, presumably because of a lack of confidence in the future of Falcon Heavy (since the upgraded Falcon 9 Block 5 will now suffice for most GEO satellites).

It’s only natural that SpaceX would look for a replacement market that can be projected to generate billions of dollars of profitable revenue, and the company now appears to have settled on space tourism, as previewed by Gwynne Shotwell last week, when she suggested that it “will probably be the majority of our business in the future, flying people” with “7 billion potential payloads“.

However, the critical question is whether investors will remain sanguine about such a dramatic transformation in where over 80% of SpaceX’s future revenues are supposed to come from. Do investors that thought they were investing in the future of connectivity, really want to invest in taking rich people to space? And does the checkered track record of space tourism give them confidence that Elon’s promises will actually be realized, especially as it will take 5+ years and $5B+ of additional investment (even by Elon’s optimistic estimates) before the BFR is ready to transport passengers to the Moon?

05.22.18

Please don’t throw me into the briar patch!

Posted in Intelsat, Operators, Regulatory, SES, Spectrum at 4:50 pm by timfarrar

It took a while, but it seems that in April investors in Intelsat finally noticed my January blog post, and started to believe in the potential for a windfall from C-band monetization, causing the share price to jump from well under $5 to over $14 now. That’s brought out a lot of new skeptics, who are highlighting differences in both the share price performance and results call commentary at Intelsat and SES.

Some even appear to believe that SES is opposed to ever monetizing more than 100MHz of spectrum, when in fact Intelsat and SES have jointly conveyed the opposite message to the FCC, stating in April:

“For these reasons, Intelsat and SES have proposed an amount of spectrum clearing – 100 MHz available for terrestrial mobile use plus additional transition band spectrum needed to ensure that 5G operations are compatible with ongoing Fixed Satellite Service (“FSS”) to customers in the uncleared spectrum – that they believe can reasonably be accomplished within 18-36 months following a final Commission order. The Parties stated that if the terrestrial demand for mid-band spectrum is as robust as claimed, their market-based approach could result in additional spectrum being cleared in the future – but in a manner and timeframe that protects Intelsat’s and SES’s customers and their businesses.”

So it’s hard to understand why people would see Commissioner O’Rielly’s remarks that “To make this worthwhile, an adequate amount of spectrum – at least 200 or 300 megahertz to start – needs to be made available in this band” as a sign of opposition to a private transaction. That’s especially true when he also said that “This method provides an attractive option that should be thoroughly considered, particularly because of the speed in which it could bring the spectrum to market” and it aligns perfectly with Republican ideals, as described in Tom Hazlett’s book “The Political Spectrum”, that the FCC should allow market forces to reallocate spectrum to the highest and best use.

Certainly there are concerns about the pace of reallocation, given the complexity of moving current users around, and ultimately unwinding the substantial cross-subsidies from large to small cable companies that are inherent in the way distribution of content via satellite is paid for today. However, an outcome along the lines of “sell 100MHz now, then another 200MHz+ within 5 years” (with the option to clear the remainder within say 10 years), is certainly plausible.

At that point any complaints from satellite operators about being forced to clear too much spectrum would be reminiscent of Brer Rabbit saying to Brer Fox “please don’t throw me into the briar patch” because even skeptics like FT Alphaville indicate that the C-band spectrum should be worth more than the ~$0.13/MHzPOP paid in the recent UK spectrum auction (£1164M for 200MHz of spectrum from 3400-3600MHz), putting a valuation in excess of $20B on the entire 500MHz spectrum band.

Another concern expressed by skeptics is that any proceeds would take years to be realized, which is hard to comprehend for the first 100MHz of spectrum (worth $4B+ according to the FT’s assumption), since as in all spectrum sales, the buyer pays upfront and only then is the spectrum cleared. Indeed, if Intelsat and SES were to accept a pre-emptive offer for this initial slice of spectrum (as suggested in my January blog post), a deal could be even in hand at the time that a final FCC order is issued, rather than a process being run after the order is approved. Assuming the initial NPRM is issued soon (plausibly at the July FCC open meeting), that could advance the timing of receipts to the middle of 2019 rather than the very end of 2019 or more likely some time in 2020.

One remaining question raised above relates to the divergent performance of Intelsat and SES’s share price in recent months. But I think this is easily explained by investors believing that SES might well re-invest any windfall into more O3b satellites (where the ultimate return on capital is far from certain), while Intelsat will pay off its debts, stop spending money on new satellites, and return capital to shareholders.

Indeed if you believe that the future of large parts of the FSS industry could look a lot like the dial-up internet business in the mid-2000s, the best bet for Intelsat might then be to sell off its Ku-band data satellites to OneWeb and run the company purely to generate cash from running its legacy satellites and from monetizing its spectrum over time.

So despite me being one of the most skeptical people around on the ability of DISH, Ligado or Globalstar to realize a windfall from their spectrum holdings, I simply don’t understand why investors who apparently don’t know much about spectrum issues think now is a good time to be shorting Intelsat. In early 2017, I didn’t believe that Straight Path would find a buyer that was desperate to establish a leadership position in 5G spectrum in the shape of Verizon, let alone draw AT&T into a bidding war (not least because much more mmWave spectrum will be auctioned in the future). Though at least I wasn’t alone, because even Straight Path’s management was left in disbelief about the result.

But with that as the example, and the C-band now representing the most obvious (and perhaps only) opportunity to acquire a very large block of spectrum for high power mobile use, with much better propagation characteristics than mmWave spectrum and at a fraction of the price of DISH, Ligado or Globalstar’s spectrum, I think it would be foolish to assume that a Straight Path-like outcome won’t happen again.

01.29.18

The art of the deal…

Posted in AT&T, DISH, Operators, Regulatory, Spectrum, T-Mobile, Verizon at 5:40 am by timfarrar

Before yesterday’s Axios article suggesting that President Trump’s National Security Council has set its sights on using the 3.7-4.2GHz satellite C-band downlink spectrum for a national 5G network, it was clear that analysts were underestimating the importance of this spectrum band for the US wireless industry. For example, Morgan Stanley’s January 17 downgrade of DISH Network identified Verizon as the “only suitor” for DISH’s spectrum but only suggested the CBRS auction as an alternative option for Verizon to acquire more spectrum.

It seems few people have read the reply comments filed by wireless operators in the FCC’s mid-band spectrum proceeding last November, where Verizon suggested there should be a a near term NPRM with market-based clearance mechanisms, rather than FCC-run auctions for this band. In contrast, AT&T asked for “substantial record development, including additional analysis and modeling” before the FCC moves forward with an NPRM, and T-Mobile said the FCC should reject Intelsat’s proposal and instead take control of the auction process, with a defined post-auction band plan and payments to incumbents from the auction proceeds, part of which would fund the clearance of existing users.

A logical conclusion is that Verizon believes it could be the sole player to acquire spectrum rights in this band (to supplement its 5G mmWave buildout plans) via a deal with Intelsat, while AT&T has relatively little interest due to its focus on the 700MHz FirstNet buildout and securing additional mmWave spectrum allocations, and T-Mobile is trying to ensure that Verizon is unable to monopolize this spectrum band by asking for a more open auction process.

One important consideration is that the power restrictions that will apply to the CBRS band to permit spectrum sharing may not be necessary above 3.7GHz and therefore with MIMO this band could be deployed for urban coverage on approximately the same cell grid used for PCS and AWS spectrum, as Qualcomm and Nokia have indicated, and as is planned in Europe, where the 3.4-3.8GHz band is being auctioned.

Since the reply comments were filed, Intelsat has continued to push hard for a near-term NPRM and given the difficulties that the FCC would encounter in defining how a “market-based” transaction should occur, it is entirely plausible that an exclusive spectrum deal between Intelsat and Verizon could be struck shortly after a draft NPRM was issued. By selling say 100MHz of spectrum to Verizon, Intelsat would establish a benchmark valuation for its C-band spectrum assets, while being able to maintain existing video distribution services within the remaining 400MHz of spectrum. Of course, Verizon would also presumably be happy to see Charlie Ergen left at the altar without his “only suitor”.

The Trump NSC memo only serves to increase the pressure to execute such a transaction, and pre-empt any (still remote) possibility of the spectrum being “nationalized”. Verizon could certainly promise to build a 5G network using this spectrum within 3 years, without government intervention, and gain an even more concrete lead in 5G network superiority. Meanwhile Intelsat (and other satellite operators including SES) could keep providing their existing C-band video distribution services and receive billions in cash plus additional billions in attributed spectrum value for the remaining 400MHz of spectrum, and the FCC could achieve a pioneering market-based transfer of spectrum to higher value uses. What’s not to like about that deal (unless you are AT&T, T-Mobile or DISH)?

12.14.17

Ajit Pai wins the internet!

Posted in General, Regulatory, Spectrum at 2:12 pm by timfarrar

A couple of weeks ago I pointed out that the net neutrality debate has been overwhelmed by ludicrous hyperbole that this is “the end of the internet as we know it“. Of course, that won’t be the case, making Chairman Pai’s mockery of these predictions a winning political strategy.

In fact, ironically enough, the current outcry has made it easier for the new disclosure-based regime to operate effectively: consumer advocates will be watching out for perceived violations of net neutrality principles and if they can drum up sufficient outrage about unfairness or antitrust violations, then the FTC will be forced to take action. However, its hard to see technical violations which (at least in the short term) benefit consumers, such as zero rating or content bundling, prompting much of an outcry. And even supporters of net neutrality agree that the big tech companies are likely to benefit from the new rules.

But what I find interesting here is the long political game. Its amusing to see net neutrality proponents accusing Pai of being a shill for Verizon and the cable companies. While many past FCC commissioners have simply gone through the revolving door to make millions in the industry, Chairman Pai has the talent and ambition to achieve much bigger goals.

Its already been reported that Pai turned down the offer to run for a seat in the House of Representatives, preferring to wait for the opportunity to be governor of Kansas or a senator. Now he’s become such a household name that The Onion can joke his face is on every computer screen in the nation. And this signature win on net neutrality even caused the New York Times to describe him as “one of the most effective FCC chairmen in decades”, before they decided(!) to delete that phrase.

Given how easy it will be to portray net neutrality opponents as “fake news”, Pai has a clear political platform to run on and it wouldn’t be in the least bit surprising to me to see him ultimately figuring as part of the Presidential or Vice Presidential race in 2028 or 2032. In that context its intriguing to consider what other hot button political issues might come within the overall ambit of the FCC. One area is freeing up spectrum, where there are possibilities for a big bipartisan win with the satellite C-band downlink.

However, an even bigger issue (as highlighted in my last post) is that Pai has already shifted to raising questions about whether you can you trust Silicon Valley companies, such as Google, Facebook and Twitter. And as noted above, many people think these companies are likely to get even stronger after the abolition of net neutrality rules. So a winning populist theme in the latter part of this administration could well be to threaten to cut these companies down to size, potentially with the helpful side effect of limiting their influence (which next time around will more likely reflect these companies’ preference for Democrats) in the 2020 election.

As a result, I think Silicon Valley now has to be concerned not just about losing the favors it has been granted on a regular basis for the last 20 years, but a rising hostility within government to the big tech companies and their role both in the economy and in political dialog.

11.29.17

Tilting the playing field…

Posted in AT&T, Operators, Regulatory, Services, Spectrum, Verizon at 11:08 am by timfarrar

Over the last week its been frustrating to see what should be a technical debate about the best way to regulate access networks deteriorate into ludicrous hyperbole about how “repealing net neutrality would end the internet as we know it” when in reality it “isn’t the end of the world“.

At its core this is really a debate about whether you can trust businesses in general and ISPs in particular, with Republicans declaring that a free market is the best solution to promote investment, whereas Democrats are saying that regulation is needed due to the lack of competition in access networks. Thus one side says “Net neutrality rules are unnecessary because ISPs will do the right thing” whereas the other side says its “the very laziest of anti-net neutrality tropes [to say] that the wolf hasn’t eaten the sheep yet so let’s trust the wolf.” And of course, once politics are involved, the current climate means that everything gets blown out of proportion.

In reality the right answer probably lies somewhere in the middle, which is what sensible commentators like Ben Thompson and Dean Bubley are trying to feel their way towards. Ben’s commentary in particular has come under criticism because he “assumes public intervention is costly and corrupt, that telecoms are accurate, and that there’s no role for morality” despite there being plenty of evidence of previous regulatory failures in Tom Hazlett’s recent book “The Political Spectrum”. However, its not unreasonable to think that trying a light touch approach backed up by antitrust enforcement is a good idea and that “framing these trade-offs as moral choices” is unhelpful.

Perhaps it is true that the best answer would have been to push harder on unbundling local loops to facilitate service-based competition on telco networks, just as in Europe, but that ship sailed 15 years ago when the CLECs went bankrupt. Instead, going all the way back to the 1996 Telecom Act, the US has focused on infrastructure-based competition between cable and telcos, which unsurprisingly hasn’t produced the same level of competition, due to the cost of maintaining multiple access networks.

Maybe this is a failed model and we now have to be content with regulating the current oligopoly of cable and telcos to ensure they don’t behave badly (and we can certainly debate exactly how much regulation is needed to achieve that). But perhaps wireless broadband will provide some level of new competition for fixed providers. I dismissed that possibility 6 years ago, but now I’m increasingly convinced that the enormous efficiency gains coming from MIMO will provide wireless operators with more capacity than they know what to do with, enabling them to deliver wireless broadband in the home to at least some (meaningful) number of consumers.

Whether that’s ultimately 10% or 30% of households very much depends on how much capital is available to invest in those networks. And how good the performance will be remains to be seen – after all the 13% of adults who are smartphone only internet users are mostly doing it for cost reasons and “often encounter difficulties like accessing and reading content, as well as trouble submitting files and documents.”

But that’s not my primary focus here. One point made by net neutrality proponents such as Barbara van Schewick is that for the last 20 years, the regulation of telecom networks has been backed by both Republican and Democrat administrations and so the current proposal is a radical change in precedent. You can argue with the truth of that prediction, depending on whether you think the FTC will actively enforce antitrust law to deal with future net neutrality problems, but what is interesting to me is that many of the actions cited by van Schewick were taken to support content providers like Netflix or Google when those companies had a lot less power than they do today.

Some of those actions had significant costs, such as (Republican FCC chairman) Kevin Martin’s decision to attach “lifetime net neutrality conditions to parts of the 4G spectrum that [the FCC] auctioned off in 2008″. That action was taken at the behest of Google, but the result was that Verizon acquired 22MHz of upper C-block spectrum for only $0.76/MHzPOP, a 41% discount to the average price in the auction, and a more than 70% discount to the price paid (mainly by AT&T) for the lower B-block. Thus Google’s “net neutrality” lobbying effort potentially cost the government somewhere between $5B and $10B in lost auction proceeds, without having any substantial impact on the wireless services you receive today (are you more likely to choose Verizon because some of its spectrum comes with “open access” conditions?).

Of course net neutrality has not been the only area where Silicon Valley companies have sought or obtained favorable regulatory treatment compared to telcos and cable companies. The last Commission’s set top box proceeding and proposed privacy regulations were both seen as favoring Google, Amazon and Netflix over Verizon and Comcast. The current Commission is tilting the playing field back towards access providers by abandoning these efforts and dismantling the net neutrality rules, and opponents argue that it is going too far, because of the lack of competition in access provision and because they don’t trust the wolves at Comcast, Verizon and AT&T.

But if its now a debate about whether you can trust businesses in general to behave reasonably, can you trust Silicon Valley companies any more than ISPs? Do Google and Netflix need regulatory advantages over ISPs now they are so powerful? Are ISPs any more of a monopoly than Google or Facebook or Twitter, and which of them are more likely to be disrupted in the future? Those are the questions that are now being raised, most explicitly in Chairman Pai’s speech yesterday, where he noted that:

“despite all the talk about the fear that broadband providers could decide what Internet content consumers can see, recent experience shows that so-called edge providers are in fact deciding what content they see. These providers routinely block or discriminate against content they don’t like

Nonetheless, these companies want to place much tougher regulations on broadband providers than they are willing to have placed upon themselves. So let’s be clear. They might cloak their advocacy in the public interest, but the real interest of these Internet giants is in using the regulatory process to cement their dominance in the Internet economy.
And here’s the thing: I don’t blame them for trying. But the government shouldn’t aid and abet this effort. We have no business picking winners and losers in the marketplace. A level playing field, not regulatory arbitrage, is what best serves consumers and competition.”

In fact a more directly relevant example than speech censorship comes from Netflix itself, which proclaims its support for “strong Net Neutrality” (and is seen as one of the key beneficiaries) but back in September was trying to muscle inflight connectivity providers into zero rating Netflix video content if they wanted access to Netflix’s improved codecs to minimize bandwidth consumption onboard. Ironically enough, inflight connectivity is seen by net neutrality supporters as a good example of what non-neutral networks might look like.

I’ve been warning for a while that Silicon Valley is not well positioned to succeed in building telecom networks (or cars) and so would not be favored under this infrastructure-focused administration. And that’s far from the only cause of a backlash. But now I think there’s good reason for “the entire tech industry [to be] flipping its shit” because tech companies are the most likely losers even if we don’t end up in all-out partisan warfare, but simply remove the regulatory favoritism that Silicon Valley has benefitted from for the last 20 years.

10.16.17

Set up to fail?

Posted in LightSquared, Operators, Regulatory, Spectrum at 10:35 am by timfarrar

Last week, Fierce Wireless reminded everyone that LightSquared was “one of the 10 worst telecom business moves of the last 10 years.” But now it may be time to consider if Ligado is going to appear on a similar list in a few years time.

On October 10, Brad Parkinson of the PNT Advisory Board invited Doug Smith, CEO of Ligado, to present to them at the meeting in Redondo Beach, CA on November 15. The letter advised Smith to “specifically describe your implementation plan, with a corresponding test plan addressing the issues we have openly raised” noting that “without these specific technical details and corresponding evaluations, we can only conjecture as to what you are really proposing.”

Parkinson’s letter also refers obliquely to Smith’s letter of July 6, noting that “from its tone, it is clear we still have several communications difficulties.” That’s quite an understatement, given that the July 6 letter accuses Parkinson of “willful blindness” about the specific details of Ligado’s public proposal and complains vehemently that the Board gave a “platform to Iridium’s unfounded and irrelevant concerns.”

Ligado has little alternative but to accept the invitation (and I’m told it already has), but the sub-text here is that the PNT Advisory Board meeting is full of technical experts who will undoubtedly be able to pick apart Ligado’s assertions (as stated to the FCC in June 2017) that a “consensus of industry and scientific opinion” backs Ligado’s proposal.

Indeed, the PNT Advisory Board has already advised the Executive Committee (chaired by the DoT and DoD) in July that Ligado’s “current proposal is fundamentally the same as the proposal tested in 2011″ and so the government faces a choice between:

1) Protect current and evolving uses of GPS, military and civilian, as a matter of national priority,
or
2) Approve high power terrestrial mobile broadband application in frequency bands adjacent to the GPS that would very likely cause harmful interference to both government and private sector GPS applications.

Its important to recognize that the PNT Advisory Board is attempting to ensure that the EXCOM can’t do anything other than recommend Ligado’s proposal be shelved, boxing in both NTIA and ultimately the FCC, just as in early 2012, when the EXCOM letter to NTIA was reflected in the NTIA letter to the FCC and the FCC’s proposal to suspend LightSquared’s terrestrial authorization.

Ligado has been claiming to investors that it has Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao onside and she will overrule the concerns of the DoT engineers, as well as suggesting that the nominee for NTIA Administrator David Redl is a firm supporter of freeing up this spectrum. Nevertheless, last time around LightSquared’s political backers ran for cover at the first sign of trouble and there are other voices in government, such as Scott Pace at the National Space Council, who have taken a very different position in the past.

It is fair to say that the DoT’s ABC study conclusions, that Ligado should only be permitted to operate at a few mW of downlink power are an overly conservative “worst case of the worst case” assessment. However, the DoT’s aim here is not to find a compromise but to get rid of Ligado, just as in 2011 when the FAA suggested that LightSquared could kill 800 people over 10 years.

Ironically enough, I think there could be viable technical solutions to most of these problems, such as Ligado offering to buy back or repair all affected GPS receivers, which would be cheap compared to the more than $500M of interest that the company is accruing each year on its outstanding debt. However, Ligado once again appears more interested in political lobbying efforts to obtain approval, and opponents are again using the possibility of catastrophic outcomes to block that. So just as in 2011-12, Ligado now appears likely to drown in the political swamp that it has created.

10.03.17

Which company is behind the “deadly falling satellites”?

Posted in Regulatory, SpaceX, Spectrum at 8:15 pm by timfarrar

That’s one question raised by a September 29 letter to the FCC from Senators Cory Booker and Dan Sullivan, expressing concern for the “growing challenge presented by low-Earth orbit (LEO) space debris” and asking Chairman Pai to coordinate with NASA and the FAA to “establish an interagency working group on space debris and to develop a comprehensive domestic policy on space debris mitigation”.

The letter focuses primarily on collisions between satellites and other in-orbit debris, such as the Iridium 33 incident in 2009, but the FCC also has concerns about debris falling to Earth as highlighted in the Dilbert cartoon. SpaceX has now submitted proposals for both a 4425 satellite LEO constellation and a 7518 satellite VLEO (very low Earth orbit) constellation, and when the FCC assessed SpaceX’s proposal, it calculated a worst case “aggregate casualty risk from components that survive atmospheric re-entry as roughly 1 in 4 for the 7,518 satellite deployment described in the application, assuming no replenishment” and a risk of “roughly 1 in 5 for the 4,425 satellite deployment“.

SpaceX’s application indicates that there will be five or six components on each VLEO satellite which would survive re-entry with a kinetic energy of at least 960 Joules (equivalent to a 5lb brick traveling at 65mph) and its response to the FCC’s query, stating that “individual vehicle risks rang[e] from 1:17,400 to 1:31,200″, is not exactly encouraging when there are intended to be 12,000 satellites in the constellation.

Indeed, although Elon apparently has only Non-GAAP “adjusted” hair rather than pointy hair, SpaceX’s proposed mitigation measure was similar to that in the Dilbert cartoon, suggesting that (rather than aiming for cities that have lots of swimming pools) the Commission take into account “the degree to which people would be located within structures that would provide shelter from potential impact”.

With concern now being expressed from Congress as well as within the FCC, it will therefore be interesting to see what happens next, and in particular whether this impacts the approval process, including the two draft orders that were circulated by Chairman Pai last week to “grant U.S. market access to two more NGSO systems in the Ku- and Ka- spectrum bands”. I had assumed these orders would be for SpaceX and Telesat, due to those companies’ intention to launch test satellites later this year, but according to Communications Daily, the orders are in fact to approve Space Norway and Telesat, leaving SpaceX out in the cold.

09.08.17

Me first, no me…

Posted in Broadband, Regulatory, Spectrum at 9:42 am by timfarrar

Yesterday the FCC released the proposed text of its Report and Order on “Updating Rules for Non-Geostationary-Satellite Orbit Fixed-Satellite Service Constellations” which will be voted on at the Open Meeting on September 26. There are some minor wins for SpaceX and other systems that aren’t as advanced as OneWeb, notably in the relaxation of the 6 year construction deadline so that only 50% of the constellation needs to be completed by that date.

However, the key text on the geographic scope of the FCC’s in-line interference avoidance rule (that requires the spectrum to be shared equally between NGSO systems when their satellites are aligned with one another) marks a major defeat for SpaceX, because the FCC will allow the ITU’s “first-come, first-served” coordination procedures to take precedence for non-US systems operating outside the US.

53. Geographic Area. SpaceX and SES/O3b ask that we clarify the geographic scope of our NGSO FSS sharing method as it relates to non-U.S.-licensed satellite systems granted U.S. market access. While SpaceX argues that it should govern such operations worldwide, a grant of market access typically considers radiofrequency operations only within the United States. Sharing between systems of different administrations internationally is subject to coordination under Article 9 of the ITU Radio Regulations. We believe this international regime is the appropriate forum to consider NGSO FSS radiofrequency operations that fall outside the scope of a grant of U.S. market access. Because ITU coordination procedures do not apply between two U.S. systems, our coordination trigger of ΔT/T of 6 percent will govern such operations both within and outside the United States.

OneWeb is licensed by the UK and Telesat by Canada, and these systems have ITU priority in the Ku and Ka-band NGSO spectrum respectively. Thus SpaceX will have to operate on a non-interference basis with respect to these systems in either band outside the US. This (proposed) ruling represents a big problem for SpaceX, which needs to find another line of business outside of launch to justify its latest $21B valuation.

SpaceX is already building two experimental 400kg Ku-band satellites, apparently pictured above, which are scheduled for launch at the end of 2017, as co-passengers with the Hisdesat PAZ SAR imaging satellite (note that the orbital injection parameters of PAZ and SpaceX are identical: a sun-synchronous orbit at 514 km altitude with an inclination of 97.44 degrees). A license from the FCC, both for these test satellites, and likely for the entire constellation as well, is expected very shortly.

The key purpose of SpaceX’s accelerated launch schedule is to beat OneWeb (which plans to launch its 10 test satellites in early 2018) to orbit, as under the FCC’s regulations, the first system to launch gets to choose its “home” spectrum during an inline event. Presumably on the assumption that possession is nine-tenths of the law, SpaceX also recently extended the planned lifetime of these two satellites from 6 months to at least 20 months, stating that “if this lifetime is exceeded, SpaceX plans to continue operation until such time as the primary mission goals can no longer be met.”

However, now the FCC’s proposed order appears to have derailed its strategy, SpaceX will need to find a way to gain ITU priority, if it is to build and operate a global constellation. From this point of view, Telesat, which has been adamantly defending its ITU priority, appears to be sitting pretty. Indeed we are told that after its planned test satellite launch later this year, Telesat will wait until next summer before deciding how to move forward, presumably expecting to have a wide variety of suitors once its ITU priority status is recognized.

A joint venture with SpaceX (to which Telesat contributes its licenses and SpaceX brings the money) is certainly a plausible option, though it would require SpaceX to shift its plans to Ka-band. However, if this became a real possibility, it wouldn’t be surprising for SoftBank to try and head off SpaceX by investing in Telesat, or perhaps even buying Loral Space and Communications.

The ramifications of such a move on SoftBank’s part would be even more significant, given that Intelsat’s investors apparently expect SoftBank to return to the negotiating table next year, after they rejected SoftBank’s previous offer in May, and a switch to Telesat would put them in a tricky position.

So now we have to wait and see how SpaceX responds to this setback. Will SpaceX still move forward aggressively into the satellite business or will some of the executives who have in the past counselled caution gain the upper hand? Will the experimental launch proceed on plan (I assume so)? And most importantly, which partners will emerge for Telesat’s proposed LEO system?

04.27.17

Hello Charlie!

Posted in DISH, Financials, Operators, Regulatory, Spectrum, T-Mobile at 6:58 am by timfarrar

“Goodbye Seattle…next stop Denver, Colorado!” as John Legere wrote yesterday, perhaps in preparation for a meeting when the incentive auction quiet period ends at 4pm MT this afternoon. That could seem like just more speculation about the supposed M&A negotiations frenzy that many expect now the incentive auction is over. However, it is possible that the outlines of a deal might already have been formulated a year ago, which led to DISH’s perplexing decision to bid for 20MHz of spectrum in the auction.

What is certain is that DISH didn’t accidentally end up with 20MHz of spectrum, but instead went into the auction with a bidding strategy which virtually guaranteed DISH would end up with that much spectrum, unless AT&T and Verizon both wanted a large national block. So Ergen must have had a plan for what to do with that spectrum, and that plan couldn’t be that he simply expected Verizon to turn up and buy DISH, because his position is now more stretched financially and he owns a block of spectrum that neither Verizon nor AT&T appear to want. However, this national block of low band spectrum would be ideal for a new entrant buildout.

So I think the only plausible conclusion is that Ergen already has (at least in outline) a deal in his back pocket to provide spectrum for a new competitive national network. There’s a lot of history here that has never been in public view before, and I only know about 60% of what happened, so there may be some errors below, but I believe that the overall big picture storyline of what happened in 2015 and 2016 is broadly correct.

Back in second half of 2015, DISH, T-Mobile and Google discussed a huge three way deal to build out a national LTE Advanced network that would have used DISH’s spectrum, Google’s money (plus technology developed by ATAP) and T-Mobile’s network as host. Each of the three parties would have received wholesale capacity in exchange for their contribution, similar to the LightSquared-Sprint agreement back in 2011, allowing T-Mobile to augment its network capacity and DISH and Google to offer MVNO services, such as streaming Sling TV.

Ergen made a lot of trips to Silicon Valley that fall (I was told his jet was a regular visitor at Moffett Field) but he ultimately declined to do a deal because he considered the valuation being put on his spectrum ($15B was the number mentioned to me) was insufficient. By spring 2016 Ergen had changed his mind, but Google then decided against it, after hiring Rick Osterloh and deciding to focus on the Pixel phone (which required partnerships with existing wireless operators such as Verizon).

Google has now pretty much given up on its Access projects, including Google Fiber, and no longer seems plausible as a provider of funds for the new network. That leaves two possible players with the balance sheet and potential interest to fund the plan, namely Amazon and Apple, and its pretty remarkable that John Legere mentioned Amazon twice (but not Apple) in connection with deals like this during his Q1 results call on Monday:

“…we should be clear that there are strategic possibilities between wireless companies, cable players, adjacent industries, Amazon, Internet players, that should be thought about, because they drive great value for shareholders and also new opportunities for customers.”

“Now I do feel that the old lore of the four wireless player market, it’s dead. It’s gone. So did Comcast enter or not? How long are we going to play that game? Is Google in or not? Will Amazon come in at some point in the day?”

A three way partnership between DISH, Amazon and T-Mobile therefore seems to me to be the single most likely deal to emerge in the next few weeks. T-Mobile has emphasized its desire for a rapid build out of its large block of new spectrum, and it could easily include a buildout of DISH’s incentive auction spectrum at the same time. Amazon could use the capacity not only for in-home services such as Echo, but also to support other activities such as drone deliveries, while DISH could provide wireless service built around Sling TV, as well as fixed wireless broadband if desired.

In contrast, Verizon and AT&T have their sights set on mmWave spectrum and 5G, so neither seems like a potential buyer of DISH’s spectrum, while Comcast appears determined to rely on its MVNO deal with Verizon after only buying 5x5MHz of spectrum in the incentive auction. Most importantly, attempting a merger of T-Mobile and Sprint, would still carry significant regulatory risk and would be far less attractive for T-Mobile than an agreement to host a differentiated new entrant (as Legere points out that can “drive great value for shareholders”). And as far as DISH is concerned, I’m simply amazed that no one appears to be writing about this as one of Ergen’s “options“.

04.13.17

Bluff and double bluff…

Posted in AT&T, DISH, Operators, Regulatory, Spectrum, T-Mobile, Verizon at 7:18 pm by timfarrar

The FCC incentive auction results were published earlier today, and to everyone’s surprise, DISH ended up spending $6.2B to acquire a near national 10x10MHz footprint. T-Mobile spent $8.0B (which was only slightly above the predicted figure), but Verizon didn’t bid, and AT&T ended up with even less spectrum than predicted, spending only $900M. Comcast spent $1.7B, while two hedge fund-backed spectrum speculators, Bluewater and Channel 51, spent $568M and $860M respectively (after each receiving a $150M discount for being “small” businesses).

Some parts of this outcome (notably T-Mobile’s substantial purchases and AT&T’s bluff in bidding for a large amount of spectrum before dropping bids) are similar to my predictions, but I had expected Comcast rather than DISH to be the other large bidder. My assessment that DISH might have been pushed out of the bidding in Stage 1 was based on an assessment that DISH would initially focus on major cities to force up the price for others (as happened in AWS-3), but instead DISH played the role of a more regular bidder (presumably as a double-bluff to hide its intentions), and spread its bids fairly uniformly across a large number of licenses. In fact Comcast started with this drastically more concentrated strategy and then tried to drop bids, while AT&T also began to drop most of its bids before the end of Stage 1, with both Comcast and AT&T responsible for the dramatic falls in overall bidding eligibility from Round 24 onwards.

What did go as I predicted was that AT&T largely dictated the pace of the auction, reaching a maximum commitment of $7.4B in Stage 1 Round 21, before dropping eligibility rapidly in the latter part of Stage 1 and attempting to exit from all of its bids in Stage 2 and beyond. AT&T was only prevented from achieving this goal because Comcast apparently also got cold feet about being stranded after reaching a maximum commitment of $5.9B in Stage 1 Round 22 (based largely on concentrated bids within the largest PEAs in addition to its more modest bids for a single 5x5MHz block elsewhere).

It is unclear exactly what Comcast’s objective was, but Comcast may have been making these concentrated bids to push up the overall price to reach the reserve (which is measured on average across the top PEAs) in areas which it didn’t want, so that the price in areas it did want would be lower. However, Comcast didn’t want to be stranded and so when AT&T started dropping bids, I assume Comcast panicked and decided that it also needed to get out of those concentrated bids.

So in summary, despite its high exposure during Stage 1, I doubt Comcast really wanted to spend $6B+ on spectrum – instead it just wanted to get a limited 5x5MHz block of spectrum within its cable footprint at the lowest possible cost. AT&T apparently wanted to use its financial resources to game the auction and strand others (Verizon or DISH) with spectrum that they might struggle to put to use. T-Mobile was trying to get at least 10x10MHz of spectrum on a national basis, and succeeded, albeit with no other wireless operators now present to help ensure a quick transition of broadcasters out of the band. DISH also seems to have set out from the beginning to buy a national 10x10MHz block, with Ergen going all in on spectrum, presumably because he believed this spectrum would be cheap and could provide leverage for a subsequent deal. And finally, several speculators decided to acquire a more limited set of licenses that they hoped they could sell on to AT&T or Verizon at a later date, which now looks like a rather unwise bet.

Of course the most important, and puzzling, question is why did DISH set out to buy another 20MHz of spectrum when it already has a huge amount of spectrum that it has not yet put to use (and DISH’s current plan for that spectrum is a low cost IOT network to minimize the cost of meeting its March 2020 buildout deadline)? It seems Ergen concluded that this spectrum would either sell for a low price because of the sheer amount of spectrum available or (if AT&T and Verizon both turned up and wanted 20MHz+ of spectrum) then he could push up the price and make life difficult for T-Mobile just as in the AWS-3 auction. It turned out to be the former, but Ergen may not have expected AT&T to drop its bids at the end of Stage 1, which has resulted in both AT&T and Verizon likely having no long term interest in acquiring spectrum in this band (and potentially even an opportunity to push out the time period over which this spectrum is put to widespread use).

That leaves DISH with less leverage rather than more, because now DISH has spent so much on spectrum it can’t credibly play the role of disruptor in upcoming industry consolidation (either by building or buying) and instead Ergen has to wait for operators to come to him to buy or lease his spectrum. DISH may now want to shift into the role of neutral lessor of spectrum to all comers, but it seems unlikely that AT&T and Verizon will be prepared to enable that, while T-Mobile and Sprint now both have plenty of their own spectrum to deploy.

Instead it seems probable that Ergen might end up attempting to find other potential partners outside the wireless industry, but with cable companies are unlikely to deploy a network from scratch, he may have to return to Silicon Valley. However, with Google already having said no to a deal with DISH, the list of possibilities there is also pretty short. So yet again, we may end up with DISH on the sidelines, overshadowing, but ultimately not having much influence on the wireless dealmaking to come, whether that is a merger between a cable company and a wireless operator, or an attempt to get approval for a merger of T-Mobile and Sprint.

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